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ABSTRACT.
This is a study of the relations of Lord William Bentinck 
with the Indian states during his governor-generalship (1828-1835)• It 
considers his attitude towards the Indian states, the ideas with which 
he was inspired and the methods with which he sought to accomplish them.
Bentinck1s period was one of peace. It was disturbed by no 
internal and external wars of magnitude of the type which had characterised 
earlier periods* In this period the British government faced problems 
emerging from its supremacy which vitally affected the Indian states.
Were those states, many of which were in a disorganized condition, to be 
perpetuated? And if so, how was the British government to conduct itself 
theoretically and practically towards them? Again, what part were the 
treaties to play in this relationship? These were questions to which no 
simple answer could be returned. Bentinck tried to answer them in a 
peaceful way. Drawing inspiration from the utilitarian ideas of his time 
he sought reform at the hands of the Indian princes. In place of coercing 
them he sought to influence them by policies of non-intervention, advice, 
persuasion and warning. Paramountcy was avowed but its use was conceived 
only in the last resort. In this study special attention has been given 
to instances which show the working of Bentinck's mind.
Both the official records of the Company and the private papers 
of Lord William-Bentinck have been used.
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CHAPTER 1* INTRODUCTION,
In 1828 the possibility that any single power or 
combination of Indian Powers would contest British supremacy had 
ceased to exist, and the question of improving the internal condition 
of the Indian states was engaging the attention of the authorities 
both in India and in England more than ever before, (l) Hitherto 
while the British supremacy was not undisputed the conception prevailed 
that the British government was concerned with the internal affairs 
of the Indian states only when the resulting situation constituted 
a danger to contiguous British territory. And this idea was slow to 
lose force. Lord Hastings, even after the wars of 1817-18 which 
established British pre-eminence beyond question, asked the home 
government to repudiate categorically the contention that the internal 
affairs of a state involved the responsibility of the British 
government. (2) His conception was of a confederation in which the 
Indian states as component parts had "perfect internal sovereignty."(3)
To the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the 
Indian states Lord Amherst largely adhered, though being preoccupied 
with Burmese affairs he did not develop clear views on the matter. (4)
(1) H.T.Prinsep, "Note on the Policy of Interference and non-interference 
for the consideration of the governor-general." 18 Dec.1830,
Bentinck papers;
Bengal Despatches, 1 Oct. 1828 (political) Vol.108.
(2^  Hastings, minute, 19 Dec. 1822, Beng.Sec.Cons. 20 Dec.1822. No. 8*
(3) Hastings, Private Journal. I, 54?
Hastings, minute, 3 April 1814, Beng.Sec.Cons. 21 June 1814. No. 4»
(4) Amherst, minute, 3 Sept. 1825, Beng.Sec.cons. 16 Sept. 1825* No.225 
Govt. to Resident at Gwalior, 9 April 1827, Beng.Sec.Cons. 1 June 1827*
(Continued over ....) ^°#
In the time of Bentinck the problem of the internal 
administration of the Indian states could be considered independently 
of the question of any danger from them# The authorities both in 
England and in India seemed to be conscious of the change effected 
by the successful wars of Hastings and Amherst, (l) Bentinck's 
private letters speak repeatedly of the absolute safety of the 
empire and the utter incapacity of the Indian powers to dispute 
the British title to supremacy. (2) Bentinck1s belief was not 
shared by his colleague and friend Sir Charles Metcalfe, who
(Continued from previous page)
(4) Cont'd.
ibid. 17 Sept. 1827, Beng. Sec. Cons. 5 Oct. 1827* No. 3«
*************
(1) Hastings, Summary of operations in India with their results,
5 April 1823, P.P.1831-32,
VIII, General Appendix, 93-112;
Board's Secret Drafts, 10 March 1823, No.144, Vol. 6;
Board's Secret Drafts, 9 June I83O, Vol. 7*
(2) Bentinck to Astell, 17 Oct. 1828, Bentinck Papers;
Bentinck to Grant, 1 May 1832, ibid.
Bentinck to Auber, 7 May 1833, ibid.
brooding over the mortality of empires, would see danger 
everywhere, but Bentinck held fast to his opinion, (l) In one 
of his last minutes recorded on the eve of his departure, Bentinck 
saw no other internal danger to the empire except such as arose 
from the increasing enlightenment of the people. (2)
The paramount position of the British government thus 
established by 1828 raised questions of far-.reaching significance 
in so far as the Indian states were concerned. Were the Indian 
states to become an integral part of the British political system 
in India? And if so what was to be the practical and theoretical 
side of their relations with the British government? Already 
in one of the largest states of India, Hyderabad, the British 
government was exercising real powers in the form of controlling 
the choice of the minister which was not warranted by the treaty 
with Hyderabad. (3) Could the British government in theory as 
well in practice assume responsibility for good government in 
the states? And if so how was it to be accomplished and ensured?
(1) Metcalfe, minute, 11 Oct. 1829, Bentinck Papers;
Bentinck to Auber, 12 May 1834, ibid.
(2) Bentinck, minute, 13 Maxch 1835, P.P. 1867, LII (500), 68-69.
(3) Prinsep, Note, 18 Dec. 1830, Bentinck*s Papers.
4In such a position, again, what was to become of the titular 
sovereignty of the Mughal whose name the seal of the Company 
still bore and whose titles and distinctions were considered, in 
Metcalfe*s words, "more respectable and more legitimate than 
those granted by the British Government"? (i) "The princes of 
Rajpootana," remarked another contemporary observer, "the Nizam 
and generally the Princes of India do not consider their accession 
to their several principalities complete, until they have done 
homage to the throne of Dehlee." (2) Such were the questions 
Amherst left for his successor to resolve after meeting the Mughal 
on terms of equality and after vindicating British paramountcy in 
the disputed succession in Bharatpur* (3)
When Bentinck took office the policy of the home government 
towards the Indian states was that of non-intervention. There might 
be a special cause or circumstance necessitating British inter­
vention in particular states like Hyderabad and Nagpur but otherwise 
the internal concerns of the states involved no responsibility for 
the British government. It considered itself
(1) Metcalfe, Quoted by E. Thompson, The Life of Charles, Lord Metcalfe,
287;
Delhi resident to Govt., 17 Jan. 1828, Beng,Pol.Cons. 29 Feb.1828* No,39*
(2) J, Sutherland, Sketches of the relations subsisting between the
British Government in India and the different Native States, 174*
(3) Gov* Gen!s Sec. to Beng. Govt., 3 March 1827, Beng.Pol.Cons. 23 March
1827, No.11;
(Continued over •••••)
entitled to interfere when the situation in a state would constitute 
a danger to the peace and security of British territory or that 
of its allies, (l) Until 1828 both the Directors and the Board 
of Control were agreed in this position.
In that year, however, Lord Ellenborough became the 
President of the Board of Control, and he sought to modify the policy 
of the Indian government in favour of an extended intervention.
The British government, in his opinion, had become the paramount 
power in India and was to assert itself as such by looking into the 
internal affairs of the misgoverned states. He did not wish to do 
away with them but he held that, inasmuch as the British government 
protected them, it should, if necessary, boldly interfere for the 
regulation of their internal affairs.(2)
This attitude brought him into conflict with the Court of 
Directors and the Secret Committee, as theyadhered to their old policy 
of non-intervention. The conflict became apparent when Bentinck framed 
a new treaty with the Raja of Nagpur embodying the principle of non-
(Continued from previous page)
(3) Conttd. Resolution of Gov.-Gen. in Council, 16 Sept.1825, Beng. Sec.
Cons. 16 Sept. 1825* No. 25* 
************
(1) Board’s Secret Drafts, 23 March 1826, No.166, Vol. 6j 
Metcalfe, minute, 20 Dec.1830, Beng.Sec.Cons.31 Dec.1830. No.l.
(2) Board’s Secret Drafts, 9 June 1830, Vol. 7,
ibid. 4 Sept. 1830, Vol. 7;
intervention. His action gave much dissatisfaction to Ellenborough 
who prepared a special despatch in which Bentinck's policy was roundly 
attacked. But the Secret Committee dissented and supported Bentinck. 
Ellenborough was firm, and the Secret Committee after strong opposition 
had to yield. Astell, who was chairman of the Court at this time,
privately informed Bentinck of the change that the policy of the home
government was undergoing. He wrote that the secret despatch of 
9 June 1830 which criticised Bentinck1s policy had been "framed at 
the Board, by which, contrary to the opinion of the Court, and in 
opposition to the strong remonstrances of the Secret Committee, the 
treaty was censured and the course of policy repeatedly recommended by 
the home authorities condemned." He also told Bentinck that the
ultimate power rested with the Board, and that in spite of his efforts
he could not prevent its exercise, (l)
This despatch, which went to India in spite of all the opposition
the Secret Committee could muster, showed that Ellenborough was willing 
to assume for the British government much larger powers and obligations 
in respect of the states than had hitherto been done. Ellenborough was 
followed by Charles Grant (2) (1830-1834), who, like him but not so
(1) Astell to Bentinck, 13 April 1831, Bentinck Papers;
Board’s Secret Drafts, 9 June 1830, Vol. 7*
(2) Grant was followed again by Ellenborough in Dec.1834 and the latter
continued till April I835.
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energetically, sought to exercise greater influence in the internal 
affairs of the states, (l)
But though both Ellenborough and Grant stood for a new 
approach in British relations with the Indian states, the views of 
neither of them were consistent and they did not envisage interference 
for all states alike. (2) Their views again did not result in any 
clear enunciation of the policy of the home government towards the 
Indian states.
The situation in India at the time of Bentinck*s arrival was 
complex. First the British ascendancy in the country was firmly 
established. The subsidiary forces of the Company in the larger states 
precluded them from being a military danger while the control of their 
foreign policies by the British government ruled out the possibility 
of their coalition. Of the external states, Burma and Nepal after their 
defeat, as Bentinck said, had become more conscious than before of their 
inferior power and resources; Afghanistan was weak and divided; and 
neither the Pan jab nor Sind could think of trying conclusions with the 
British government with any chance of success.(3)
(lj C.H.Philips, East India Company, 278-280
(2) Ellenborough to Bentinck, 2 Jan.1830, Bentinck Papers;
C.H.Philips, East India Company, 271-274; 278-284.
(3) Bentinck, minute, 29 June 1832, Beng.Sec.Cons. 6 Aug. 1832. No. 2.
8Secondly, the internal condition of many Indian states was
unsatisfactory. The rulers were ireesponsible and indifferent to the
welfare of their subjects. The main states at this time were Oudh,
Nagpur, Hyderabad, Indore, Mysore, Travancore, Cochin, Baroda, Cutch,
the states of Rajputana, Malwa and Gujrat and some other small states.
While all of these were protected and had surrendered control over their
external affairs, the first nine were subsidiary states having
Company's forces inside their territories over whom the British
government had exclusive control, (l) The case of Gwalior was slightly
\
different. It was theoretically not under British protection and 
controlled its own policies both internal and external. But it was 
surrounded on all sides by British territory or by states which could 
negotiate only with the British government, and so it could in effect 
correspond only with the British government. (2) Internally its 
government was weak and the British supremacy was acknowledged by its 
ruler and his subjects. (3)
These states enjoyed little peace. There were succession
(lj Report of the Select Committee, P.P. 1831-32, XIV, 3»
(2) ibid. 4;
James Mill, evidence before the Select Committee, ibid. 5*
(3) Baiza Bai (Regent) to Gov.Gen., 1827, Beng.Sec.Cons. 28 Sept.l827»No*44; 
Resident to Govt., 16 June 1827, Beng.Sec.Cons. 6 July 1827. No. 2; 
Resident to Govt., 19 June 1827, Beng.Sec.Cons. 6 July 1827* No. 4»
disputes and the rulers sometimes found it difficult to discharge the 
ordinary task of maintaining order in their territories* In many states 
the rulers were guided by no regular system in the conduct of government, 
acting under the influence of evil advisers who sought to advance their 
own interests. The people here had little protection against the 
arbitrary conduct of the subordinate officers who were either uncontrolled 
or were able to have their way in concert with men at the court. The 
Company's forces in the subsidiary states protected the rulers from a 
fear of popular revolt and thus prevented a healthy check to misgovernment. 
Large sums of money were realised in arbitrary ways and spent equally 
recklessly. Things were drifting into chaos and it appeared to Bentinck 
that like the Carnatic, Tanjore and Benares in the past, many Indian 
states would in course of time be absorbed into British territories, (l) 
Thirdly, the British relationship with the states did not 
always conform to the terms of the treaties. Most of these treaties left 
the rulers free in their internal affairs. (2) Lord Hastings, who is
(1) Bentinck, minute, 25 Aug. 1828, Beng.Pol.Cons.13 Sept.,1828. No. 1;
Minute of conference between Bentinck and the King of Oudh on
20 Jan.1831* Beng. Pol. Cons. 17 Sept., 1832, No. 86.
(2) Metcalfe, minute, 20 Dec., 1830, Beng. Sec. Cons. 31 Dec. 1830, No.l.
stated by Lee-Waraer to have concluded the largest number of treaties 
among the governors-general, founded them upon this concept. Internal 
sovereignty was considered sacrosanct and involving no responsibility 
for the British government, (l) When explaining his conception of 
an alliance of the Indian powers with the British government he 
stated emphatically that it meant no encroachment on the internal 
independence of the states. He met the objection to such a league that 
it might put a premium on misgovemment if the Indian rulers sought to 
abuse their internal freedom - by observing:
,!What is that to us? One must lament to see any portion 
of the human race under oppressive sway. But we are not 
charged with the quixotic obligation of vindicating the 
rights of all mankind." (2)
Thus the treaties with the states of Rajputana concluded by 
Lord Hastings provided for the rulers1 absolute authority inside their 
states. (3) The treaty with Gwalior left Sindia "the undisputed master 
of his own troops and resources." (4) Some of the treaties concluded
(1) Hastings, Private Journal, I, 54-55•
(2) Hastings, minute, 3 April 1814, Beng.Sec.Cons. 21 June 1814. No.4.
(3) Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, III, Treaties with Udaipur
(13 Jan.1818) 30-31; Jaipur (2 April 1818) 104-105; Jodhpur 
(6 Jan.1818) 159-160. etc;
Col. Tod to T. Hyde, 23 March 1832, P.P.1831-52, XIV, Appendix, 124*
(4) Aitchison, Treaties. IV, Treaty of 5 Nov.1817. Article IV. 65.
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by Lord Wellesley also secured to the rulers full internal freedom. In 
the case of Hyderabad the British government thus bound itself to have 
"no manner of concern with any of His Highness's children,relations, 
subjects, or servants" with respect to whom the Nizam was to be 
"absolute." (l)
While internal freedom was generally left to the ruler some 
treaties would nonetheless provide for British advice and even 
intervention in internal affairs in clear terms. The treaties with 
Mysore (2) and Oudh (3) obliged their rulers to act in conformity with 
the advice of the British government. The treaty with Baroda also 
obliged its ruler to listen to British advice and by a private 
engagement he was also deprived of the right of appointing a minister 
of his choice. The Dewan Raoji Appaji was confirmed permanently in 
his position there (4)•
This was the position theoretically but practice did not
(l) Aitchison, Treaties. IX, Treaty of 12 Oct. 1800. Article XV, 72; see
also Wellesley's treaties with Gwalior, Nagpur, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Alwar
etc.
(2^  Aitchison, Treaties. IX, Treaty of 8 July 1799* Article XIV, 224.
(3) Aitchison, Treaties. I, Treaty of 10 Nov. 1801, Article VI, 125-126.
(4) Aitchison, Treaties. VTII, Treaty of 6 June 1802, Article V, 35;
Appendix No.13 to the Treaty, 46•
always follow the treaty stipulations. In Hyderabad the British 
government was exercising great authority and even controlling the 
nomination of the minister from an early date, (l) In Mysore on the 
other hand where the exercise of intervention in internal affairs was 
a treaty right such power was for long not exercised, (2) However, 
even when there was no actual exercise of intervention such a power 
was deemed to vest in the British government by virtue of its pre­
eminence and to surround its representative at the court with immense 
influence and authority. Stating his dissent from Bentinckfs policy 
of non-intervention, Prinsep wrote in 1820
"Consistently with our position in India it is out of the 
question that affairs should be carried on anywhere 
without our influence being felt, whatever may be the 
rule established in regard to interference. In the 
matter, for instance, of a succession, all eyes are 
waiting, until our recognition is declared --- " (2)
Interference Metcalfe also considered unavoidable when the relation­
ship in question was between the two powers, one "superlatively strong", 
the other miserably weak, (4)
Lord Hastings wishing to reserve for the rulers "perfect 
internal sovereignty" saw how difficult it was to restrain really
(1) N,B.Edmonstone to T.H.Villiers, 27 0ct*1829> P.P.1821-22, XTV,
Appendix, 105-106;
Metcalfe, minute, 12 May 1829, Beng,Pol,Cons, 14 Aug,1829, No,6lB,
(2) Report of the Enquiry Committee, 12 Dec,1822» Beng,Pol,Cons,
5 June 1824» No,24*
(3) Prinsep, Note, 18 Dec*1820, Bentinck Papers,
(4) Metcalfe, Minute, 20 Dec,1820,Beng,Pol,Cons, 51 Pec,1820^-No, 1«
energetic residents from exercising influence in internal affairs, (l) 
Bentinck, not willing to see the solution of the Indian states1 
problem in annexation and deciding to hold the rulers exclusively 
responsible f or good government inside their territories, was inclined 
to think in similar terms. (2) Viewing with disfavour the immense 
influence possessed by the residents at Nagpur and Hyderabad he 
privately told the resident at Lucknow that "in the exact proportion in 
which his interference shall not be exercised so will confidence in him, 
on the part of the local government, be established and the more 
harmoniously and satisfactorily will the affairs of the dependent power 
be conducted," (3)
It may be asked why Bentinck thought so. Did he consciously 
pursue non-intervention to enable the rulers to develop self-reliance and 
learn from their mistakes and shortcomings or did he passively allow 
events to take their course? Y/as there a purpose in his policy or was 
it a reaction to events and acts for which he was not responsible? And 
what again were his difficulties, aims and methods in dealing with the 
Indian states?
(1) Hastings, Private Journal, I, 47-48, 54?
Hastings to Directors, 6 May 1822, P.P.1831-32, VIII, General
Appendix, III,
(2) Bentinck, minute, 25 Aug. 1828, Beng.Pol,Cons, 12 Sept,1828, No,l.
(3) Bentinck to Maddock, 36ct. 1830, Bentinck Papers.
These problems are the subject of this investigation. 
Particular attention has been paid to instances showing the working 
of Bentinck* s mind and revealing his inspiration. Use has been 
made of his private papers as well as of the official records of 
the Company.
CHAPTER 2.
BENTINCK »S OUTLOOK AND VIEWS ON THE INDIAN STATES.
When Bentinck set out for India in February 1828 he was 
eminently qualified for the duties of the governor-generalship. For 
it was as no stranger that he was going there, and his zeal for reform had 
come to be established beyond question by that time. As the governor of 
Madras from 1803 to 1807 he had had.the opportunity of making himself 
familiar with Indian politics and of learning the requirements of the 
Indian people. During his governorship the British were successful in 
the wars against the Marathas, and although he could not actively 
participate in the conflict, as the area of operations was so distant 
from Madras, he afforded such assistance as he could. He welcomed the 
outcome of these wars as affording a hope of benefitting "the great mass 
of thepeople whose rulers have been conquered" and of founding "British 
Greatness upon Indian Happiness." (l) These words written when he was 
thirty, show the man. His solicitude for the welfare of the people under 
his charge was to become a prominent feature of his character, the 
mainspring of his activity and enthusiasm in subsequent years.
Full of vigour and energy, he found the problems of the Madras 
presidency exacting and demanding firm handling. In combating faction,
(l) Bentinck to Lord Wellesley, 1804> Boulger, Bentinck, 20.
16.
"opposition and counteraction", which he found rampant in the 
government of Madras, he showed great resolution and fixity of purpose. 
While willing to work in hearty co-operation with Lord Wellesley he 
wanted no interference in the concerns of the Madras government, which 
he regarded as his own sphere. He avowed "a steady and determined 
resolution to do what is right, uninfluenced by party or prejudice."
Lord Wellesley saw in him a "truly British spirit, sound judgement, 
and hereditary integrity and honour." (l) The Directors were also 
impressed to see in him " a determination to act for yourself" and for 
a time even considered elevating him1 to the governor-generalship. His 
unjust recall in 1807 for the mutiny at Vellore was unfortunate as he 
was at the time applying himself to the problems of the land revenue, 
uponwhich he felt "the happiness of millions" really depended. He 
showed himself in favour of a permanent settlement of the ryotwari type. 
The limitation of the government demand leavirg the surplus to the 
cultivator he considered applicable "to this, and to every part of the 
world." (2)
(1) Wellesley to Bentinck, 19 Nov.1803, Wellesley's Desnatches (Martin),
III, 462
(2) Bentinck, minutes of 22 Jan.1806, 29 April 1806 and 28 Nov. 1806,
P.P. 1812, VII, Appendix, pp. 912-91?; 919-921.
Bentinck1s experience in different countries and among 
different peoples also played its part in his mental development# (l) 
While raising him above pedantic adherence to any one dogma or creed, it 
imparted a catholicity to his vision which accounted for his easy popu­
larity with the people whom he governed# He early showed himself to be 
in sympathy with nationalism# In Sicily, as the commander-in-chief of 
the British forces in the Mediterranean from 1811 to 1814, he showed 
himself to be in favour of Italian unity and independence. In Genoa, 
which he captured from the French in 1814, he sympathised with the 
ardent desire of the people to return to "their former independence and 
ancient form of government" and restored their ancient republican 
constitution, (2) In pledging British faith to this constitution his 
ardour for the cause of the Genoese led him to exceed his instructions,
1
and his conduct caused much annoyance to his government. Lord 
Castlereagh felt chagrined and wrote to Lord Liverpool describing him 
as "the best of the Buonaparte school." (3)
Bentinck*s Catholicity of outlook lent an egalitarian flavour
(1) Bentinck1s official career took him to Netherlands, Italy, Switzerland
and Egypt, besides India.
(2) Bentinck, Proclamation of 26 April I8I4, Pari.Debs., XXX, Enclosure 4>
391-392.
(3) Castlereagh to Liverpool, 27 April I8I4, A.Alison, Lives of Lord
Castlereagh and Sir Charles Stewart, II, 345♦
18.
to his ideas which made him view with disfavour the privileges of his 
own class. Thus in Sicily, where he had a free hand to work out his 
ideas, unde^his inspiration a new constitution was set up in 1812, the 
royal authority was curtailed and ’’the "barons of Sicily,” as he said 
with enthusiasm later, ’’presented one of the most glorious spectacles 
that the world ever beheld; they came forward with the voluntary 
surrender of their own feudal rights.” (l) In 1821, as a member of the 
House of Commons, he raised his voice in behalf of the people of Sicily 
whose constitution, he said, had not been respected by the despotic 
government of Naples and whose "rights and privileges” had been violated 
by their forcible union with Naples. And he urged in an impassioned 
speech intercession on their behalf with the Neapolitan government. (2)
In England also Bentinck favoured the reform movement. In 
the twenties the house of Mrs. Grote was the meeting place of some of 
the leading radicals, and Bentinck is mentioned by her as among the 
persons belonging to "the choice society” which used to assemble
(1) Bentinck, address' on 21 June 1821, Pari. Debs. V, (New Series), 1237*
(2) ibid. pp. 1234-1240.
19.
there, (l) The Hefonn Bill of 1832 appeared to him to he a very good 
measure although he doubted its getting through Parliament. (2) The 
principles for which he had stood for the past few years, he said in 
I836, while standing for election to the House of Commons, were "a 
perfect equality ofdvil and religious rights,” extension of suffrage, 
shorter duration of Parliament, reform of the House of Lords, Irish 
Church Reform and freedom of trade. (3) By men of his own time he was 
considered to be "the first man of high rank and station” who had
(1) Mrs. Grote, The Personal Life of George Grote, 42.
"Several eminent persons sought the choice society which from time 
to time met in that obscure corner of the City, and the influence 
exercised by their circle came to be felt outside with gradually 
augmenting power. Mr. David Ricardo, Mr. John Smith, M.P. Mr. John 
Blank (of the ’Morning Chronicle1), Mr. Cameron, Mr. Norman,
Mr. Thomas Campbell (the poet), Mr. John Austin and his brother 
Mr. Charles Austin, Mr. John Romilly, Mr. Charles Buller, Lord
William Bentinck , all these, contributed to form the
society, I speak of, in Threadneedle Street from 1822 down to 1830.”
(2) Bentinck to Metcalfe, 17 July 1831, Bentinck Papers.
(3) Bentinck, address to the electors of Glasgow, The Times. 13 Feb.1836.p.5
He was elected to Commons in I836. He favoured a quinquennial term 
for Parliament. The extension of suffrage was not contemplated 
by him beyond what was effected by the Reform Act of 1832. His 
idea of reforming the House of Lords consisted in bringing in a 
liberal majority in the House by the exercise of the royal 
prerogative.
20.
"publicly professed the ultra-Radical opinions." (l)
With a passionate zeal for political and social reform was 
combined moral courage and earnestness of the highest order which 
enabled him to pursue his path unflinchingly in spite of unpopularity. 
Bentinck1s economic reforms in India, during his governor-generalship, 
struck at powerful interests and evoked fierce opposition on the part 
of the civil and military services. He was boycotted by Calcutta 
European society. At some places in the Upper Provinces he was insulted* 
On one occasion his invitation to dinner was declined by the officers.(2) 
At Cawnpore, while the commander-in-chief's Lady was selected for 
special attention, Lady William was ignored. The press, mostly an 
organ of the European community at this time fully ventilated their 
grievances against Bentinck. The newspaper offices were "deluged" with 
denunciatory letters from "all ranks and branches of the service" pouring 
invective upon the govenor-general, but Bentinck, with what would seem 
to be a real dignity of character, allowed the press to exhaust its venom 
without seeking to cripple it. "He was wont to say, snapping his fingers 
as he spoke, that he did not care a straw for the vituperations of the 
Press." (3)
(1) Philip Morrell, Leaves from the Greville Diary* 301.
(2) Bentinck to Metcalfe, 1 Dec.1831, Bentinck Papers.
(3) Kaye, Life and Correspondence of Lord Metcalfe, II, 251.
But perhaps the most notable part of Bentinck!s character was 
the unaffected simplicity of his bearing. He frowned upon pageantry and 
the trappings of office and mixed freely with persons. In this he appealed 
to the hearts and imagination of many. Thus the French traveller 
Jacquemont found it easy to be on cordial terms with him. Nor could 
Jacquemont help expressing his admiration in warm terms. "But perhaps the 
man,"he says, "who does the greatest honour to Europe in Asia is the one 
who governs it. Lord Bentinck, on the throne of the Great Moghul, thinks 
and acts like a Quaker of Pennsylvania. You may imagine whether there is 
any lack of people to exclaim over the dissolution of the empire and the 
end of the world when they see the temporazy master of India riding about 
in an ordinary coat with no escort, or setting off for the country with his 
umbrella under his arm." (l) Years made him the more indifferent to honours. 
When, on his retirement from India, he was offered a peerage by Lord 
Melbourne, he declined the offer as he considered It of "no advantage" to 
him. (2)
Bentinck had the defects of his qualities. His independence of 
character ensured his firmness in dealing with difficult issues but it was
(1) Jacquemont to Victor de Tracy, 1 Sept.1829, Letters from India, 1829-32,12
(2) Bentinck to Metcalfe, 7 March I836, Bentinck Papers.
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also seen at times to make co-operation with others difficult. Thus in 
Madras he found it difficult to work amicably with his colleagues or with 
the chief justice (Sir Henry Gwillim). In Italy he could not co-ordinate 
his schemes with those of the Duke of Wellington in the Peninsular War, 
and thereby hampered the war effort of the allies in their crusade against 
Napoleonic Prance. While governor-general in India, seeing the desirability 
of a change in the seat of government, he was on the point of effecting 
his purpose without the prior consent of the home government, but he was 
restrained by them, (l) The Duke of Wellington considered him "a wrong­
headed man” who if he went wrong would continue in the wrong line. "Other 
men," thought the Duke, "might go wrong and find it out, and go back; 
but if he went wrong he would either not find it out, or if he did, he 
would not go back." (2)
Bentinck!s radical views on foreign and domestic affairs 
deprived him of the favour of his government, and for a long time after 
his Italian career, he remained without an appointment. In .the ministry 
of Liverpool (1812-27) Castlereagh was always conscious of his "imprac­
ticability and Whiggism, which seem to follow him everywhere." (3)
(1) Dalhousie, memorandum on the removal of government, 15 March 1830,
Bentinck Papers.
Dalhousie was commander-in-chief in India from 1830-32.
(2) Ellenborough, Political Diary, 23 June 1829, II, 56-57*
(3) Castlereagh to Liverpool, 27 April I8I4, Alison, Lives, II, 345*
The Duke of Wellington had a strong prejudice against him, and Liverpool*s 
dislike for him was no secret. Thus in 1822 when Bentinck put forward his 
claims to the governor-generalship of Bengal in succession to Lord 
Hastings, though supported by "a very powerful party in the Court of 
Directors1' he could not get the appointment because of his not being in 
favour with Liverpool, and both King George and Liverpool concurred in 
rejecting him. (l) In 1814 there was a clamour of conservative statesmen 
against his appointment to the Ionian islands. "They are," writes 
Mrs. Arbuthnot in her journal, "in a great fuss now for fear Ld Wm Bentinck 
sh^ be appointed to succeed Sir T. Maitland as Ld High Commissioner of 
the Ionian Islands. Mettemich said all the Italian Sovereigns, and first 
among them the Emperor himself, protest loudly against it. They have 
a greater horror of Ld Wm than of any other radical in Europe and last 
year, when Ly Win was in Italy they never allowed her to get a single letter 
from Ld Wm. However, they need not be in a fuss this time as Sir Freds 
Adam is to succeed Sir Thos. " (2)
In 1825 the early British reverses in the Burmese war and the
(1) Liverpool to King, 7 Oct. 1822; King to Liverpool, 8 Oct. 1822,
C.D.Yonge, Life and administration of Earl of Liverpool,
III, 204-205.'
(2) The Journal of Mrs. Arbuthnot (1820-1850) edited by Francis Bamford
and the Duke of Wellington, I, 288-289.
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mutiny at Barrackpur set the home government thinking about Amherst's 
recall and Bentinck again came into the picture as a possible candidate 
of the Directors but the Duke of Y/ellington showed himself to be strongly 
against his appointment and told Liverpool that "if Lord William Bentinck 
should be chosen by the Court of Directors he must be rejected by the 
government at all events," (l) Liverpool concurred with him entirely in 
"the expediency of recommending Sir Thomas Munro in the event of Lord 
Amherst's recall," (2) Amherst, however, was not recalled* Seeing odds 
heavy against him Bentinck seems to have retired into the political 
background, and in December 1825 his relative Lord Canning was finding it 
difficult to ascertain his whereabouts. (3)
Liverpool's illness and death in 1827 opened the way for 
Bentinck*s appointment by Canning. In 1825 in response to Canning's 
request, Bentinck had promised him his full support in the election of an 
Irish representative to the House of Lords and so Canning expected a 
request in return from Bentinck, to be appointed as Amherst's successor.(4)
(l) Duke to Liverpool, 10.Oct*1825• Wellington's Despatches (A.R.Y/ellesley)
II, 51£-518.
(2j Liverpool to Charles Wynn, 13 Oct.1825, ibid. 541-542*
(3) Canning to Liverpool, 6 Dec.1825, E.J.Stapleton, Some Official
Correspondence of George Canning, I, 357*
(4) Canning to Liverpool, 8 Dec.1825> ibid. 341. Bentinck acknowledged
his appointment to Canning in his speech at the East India dinner. 
Bentinck*s dinner address, 1827> Bentinck Papers. Canning, however, 
was not anxious for his appointment and first made the offer 
successively to Melville, Wynn, Tierney, Wellesley, and Wellesley's 
brother. Bentinck was thus his sixth choice.
C.H.Philips, East India Company, 261, footnote.
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And so when Canning became the Prime Minister there was little obstade 
left to Bentinck*s appointment. He was appointed in July 1827* But 
Canning died in August, and was succeeded by Viscount Goderich, whose 
ministry was short lived, and in January 1828 the Duke of Wellington 
became the Prime Minister* Because of these ministerial changes Bentinck, 
though appointed in July.1827* could not set sail for India until February 
1828 when he had become more sure of the support of the new government*
Before his departure for India Bentinck came into contact with 
James Mill at two dinners, one given by Douglas Kinnaird and the other 
by Mrs. Grote. On both occasions Mill availed himself of the opportunity 
of "trumpeting" the Panopticon and though he could not find in him an 
intellectual peer he saw him actuated by good intentions* (l) Bentinck was 
even more impressed by Mill than was Mill by Bentinck, (2) and went to the 
extent of declaring himself a disciple of Bentham. "I am going to British
lj Bentham to Young, 28 Dec*1827> Benthamfs Works (Bowring), X, 576-577* 
2; Mill was an Assistant Examiner at the India House at this time* In 
1822 Mill had considered Bentinck to be the best candidate for the 
governor-generalship of Bengal* Both as a man and by the work he 
subsequently performed in India, Bentinck ranked high in Mill*s 
estimation. (Bain, James Mill, 205-204* 590)* Bentinck, on the 
other hand, though not much interested in reading, read Mill's 
evidence before Parliamentary committees with "great pleasure" and 
"profitable instruction." He also made use of Millfs History of India 
in his official work and considered it an "able" book*
Bain, James Mill, 367*
Bentinck, minute, 30 July 1831, Beng.Pol.Cons.30 Sept.1831. No*2*
In this minute on Oudh Bentinck refers to Mill's comment on the 
treaty of 1801 with Oudh.
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India," he said, "hut I shall not he Governor-General. It is you that
will be Governor-General." (l) Bentham, devoted to the acceptance of his
ideas in England and other countries, could not but rejoice to find in
Bentinck an easy disciple, and sanguinely hoped for utilitarian reforms in
India. (2) In 1829* on reading Bentinck1s notice in the‘Oriental Herald,"
inviting suggestions from the public for the diffusion of useful knowledge 
-^ oT a-lva/v>CLrv<J ttae.
andAprosperity of the Indian people, Bentham felt that the country had 
been entrusted to the right person and that "the golden age of British 
India" had dawned.(3)
Bentinck went to India but India did not attract him. (4) He 
saw much poverty, ignorance and backwardness there and was not impressed. (5) 
Outside Europe, as he once told Metcalfe, he would rather have seen America
(l^  Bentham to Young, 28 Deo. 1827* op.cit.
(2; Bentham to Ram Mohan Roy, Benthamfs Vforks (Bowring), X,589-592.
(3) Bentham to Bentinck, 19 Nov.1829, Bentham Mss. Box 10.Folder 22.f.179
"Reading this invitation it seems to me that I behold the golden
age of British India were (sic) lying before me."
(4) In one of his private letters he states pecuniary considerations to
be the main reason for his having gone to India.
Bentinck to Earl of Gosford, 2 Aug.1832, Bentinck Papers.
(5) Bentinck, minute, 30 May 1829, P*P. 1831-32, General Appendix, VIII,275*
and its happiness and improvement than the rest of the world.(l) He 
found little to admire even in works of art, and that great piece'^of 
Mughal architecture, the Taj Mahal, did not attract him. He has even been 
credited with the intention of seeing it pulled down and making money from 
its marble. (2) His utilitarian outlook, shunning grandeur, was an object 
of comment among his contemporaries, and Calcutta during his time was no 
longer the gay centre of European entertainment that it had been before 
him.(3)
Soon after his arrival in India in July 1828, Bentinck saw the 
need for drastic reform in every branch of administration. The task was 
immense and seemed to demand Herculean efforts for real amelioration.
"How what,is the actual state of the country?" he asked himself ten 
months after his arrival, only to report a melancholy picture. "Is it 
not true that the great body of the people is wretchedly poor and ignorant? 
Do not we every day perceive how little our officers possess the knovrledge
necessary to their good government ? Are not the files of our civil
courts loaded with arrears of business? --  Are not the native officers in
all departments alleged to be guilty of much extortion and corruption?--
(1) Bentinck to Metcalfe, not dated, Bentinck Papers.
(2) Beresford, Journal, I, European mss. 99, 110.
The truth of this statement has been denied by Dr. Spear.
T.G.P.Spear "Lord William Bentinck," Journal of Indian History, Vol.XIX,
April, 1940, 101.
(3) E.Roberts, Scenes and Characteristics of Hindustan, III, 69-103*
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Do not several revolting and "brutalizing practices still prevail among 
the people?  Do our institutions contain the seeds of self-improvement?"
(i)
And wherever Bentinck went he felt more the need for urgent reform, (2)
' The period of wars in India Bentinck considered to he over,
the British supremacy to be established beyond cavil and no Indian power 
to be able to measure swords with the British government with any chance 
of success. This fact, Bentinck thought, gave a different complexion to 
British rule in India, The resources of the country had been used hitherto 
for establishing peace and tranquillity, the vital conditions for reform 
and progress. That consummation reached, the moral and material well-being 
of the people was to follow,(3)
In the scheme of reform Indians were to figure prominently.
His was no gloomy conviction of their utter degeneracy or their inherent
(1) Bentinck, minute, 30 May 1829, P.P.1831-32, General Appendix, VIII, 275*
(2) Bentinck to Directors from Simla, 15 Sept.1831, P,P,1831-32, XI,
Appendix, 298-300;
Bentinck to Charles Grant, 21 Dec,1832, Bentinck Papers,
(3) Bentinck, minute on roads, 1831* Bentinck Papers,
"Upon India have the resources of India been expended, they have 
hitherto been employed for the purposes of war, they will hence­
forth be devoted to the works of peace, to secure and improve the 
condition of all classes, to bring into life the vast dormant 
resources, which undoubtedly exist and to found a British empire 
in India, not less solid or less worthy of admiration by all 
Asiatic nations than Britain has been to the European world,"
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incapacity for noble aspirations, but an optimistic hope for their 
advancement by education and their rightful place ultimately in the 
administration of their oountry. "A believer in the utilitarian principle 
of self-improvement,".observes Dr,Spear, "he considered that the people of 
India should not only be improved by others but could improve themselves 
by their own efforts. His panacea was English education." (l) The 
employment of Indians in larger numbers and higher positions was intended 
to be a step in the same direction. And he felt satisfied that "Native 
probity and talent" could be found in sufficient numbers if a judicious 
selection were made, (2)
The finance committees set up by Bentinck in 1828 to suggest 
measures of economy and to enquire into the judicial and revenue branches 
of the administration were to keep in mind that "His Lordship in Council 
is particularly desirous of receiving the fullest possible information 
as to the success of employing native agency in the three Presidencies," (3) 
While superintendence and direction was to be vested in Europeans, in the
(1) T.O.P. Spear "Lord William Bentinck," Journal of Indian History, Vol.XIX,
April, 1940, 109*
(2) Bentinck to Directors, 15 Sept. 1831, P.P.1831-32, XI, Appendix, 299? 
Bentinck to Grant, 21 Dec.1832, Bentinck Papers,
(3) Resolution of Gov-Gen. in Council, 25 Nov. 1828, Bentinck Papers.
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management of details Indians were to replace them, "The difficulties, 
drawbacks and imperfections unavoidably belonging to an administration, 
conducted by Europeans and foreigners" having a limited acquaintance with 
the customs, habits and language of the people, were to be remedied by 
an extensive recourse to native agency. And in the advocacy of this 
cause Bentinck1s tirade was against his own countrymen, "It appears," he 
says in the same minute, "to be an error in all our administrative 
arrangements, that we have calculated upon a degree of imaginary.perfection 
in the agency by which this country is exclusively governed, which it would 
be utterly inconsistent with the laws of human nature that it can possess,"
(i)
Bentinck took steps to give a more extensive employment to 
Indians in the judicial and revenue branches of the administration, but 
felt by no means satisfied with his efforts in that direction. He 
welcomed the Charter Act of 1833 as removing statutory disqualifications 
for the employment of Indians by making merit the criterion of eligibility 
but felt that it had to be interpreted liberally in favour of Indians, (2) 
From the legislative council established by the Charter Act of 1833 h>e 
considered the exclusion of Indians to be very unfortunate, "To them the
(1) Bentinck, minute, 10 Nov,1831, Enclosure No.9 to Bengal Public Letter of
27 Dec.1831* Beng.Pub.Letters Reed. Vol. 21,
(2) Bentinck*s reply to the address of Indians, India Gazette, 13 March 1835*
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distinction would have "been most acceptable and not open to any objection 
that I can imagine, while to us strangers in the land, their aid in the 
work of legislation would have been most useful." (l) He saw the signs of 
a change in India and urged the wisdom of recognising the forces that 
were slowly setting a new India on foot# "The mind of this country," he says 
in a private letter to Auber "is receiving a new impulse and we must keep 
pace with it* Three thousand boys are learning English at this time and 
the sam9 desire for knowledge is universally spreading." (2)
This view of Bentinckfs that Indians should be able to hold office 
in increasing numbers and to improve their institutions by themselves was 
also to influence him in his relations with the Indian states. His 
endeavour in that sphere was to secure reform by the rulers themselves, and 
for the realisation of that object he was prepared to hazard the greatest 
possible measure of internal freedom in the states that could arouse a
lj Bentinck, minute, 20 June 1834> Bentinck Papers*
2; Bentinck to Auber, 12 May 1834 > Bentinck Papers.
On the subject of the employment of Indians Bentinck used to feel 
strongly even after his retirement from India. In his evidence 
before the Select Committee in 1837 Bentinck called the British 
policy in India "cold, selfish and unfeeling" in excluding Indians
from office. He spoke bitterly of the patronage of the Directors,
exercised not in the interest of the Indian people but of their 
"clients" who engrossed all "the honours and emoluments of the state
  to the exclusion of the natives*"
Bentinck, evidence on 14 July 1837 before the Select Committee,
P.P.1837. VI (0.91), 189.
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sense of responsibility in the rulers and stimulate them to work for 
popular advancement.
In the Indian states he encountered a difficult problem.
The internal condition of these states was deplorable. The rulers in 
many cases were irresponsible, with little care for the concerns of 
government or for the interests of their subjects. The nature of their 
connection with the British government, by which they came to depend upon 
her for protection, was seen to have cramped their energy for good 
government and to have lulled them into easy and puerile pursuits much to 
the misery of their subjects, (l) Bentinck saw the disordered condition of 
the states and soon after his arrival was confronted with the task of 
formulating his policy towards them.
He came to India with no desire to interfere in their affairs.
His objects in India as set out in a letter to Peter Auber were "to promote 
the order, improvement and happiness of the territories subject to the 
East India Company and to maintain peace and good will among tributary 
chiefs and neighbouring powers."(2) He found after his arrival that the 
task of determining British relations with the Indian states was not an 
easy one. "Not a consultation," he observed in his minute of 25 August 1828,
(1) N.B.Edmonstone to T.H.Villiers, 27 Oct.1829, P.P.1831-32, XIV,104-105.
(2) Bentinck to Auber, 3 Aug.1827, Bentinck Papers.
"has passed since I have taken my seat in the Council, in which the 
question of interposition in the internal affairs of independent 
tributaries has not been the occasion of much deliberation and embarrassing 
discussion." (l) In framing his policy he had to take into account that 
the Company1s treaties with many of the states sanctioned internal freedom. 
"The instances are limited," said Metcalfe, in his minute of 20 December 
1830, "in which the Treaties deprive the Native States of the inherent 
rights of sovereignty in their own dominions. In Treaties with the greater 
states they are preserved to them without mention as rights unquestionable. 
In those with many minor states they are expressly reserved to them, in 
order that the acknowledged supremacy of the British government in general 
politics may not be construed as extending to interference in internal 
affairs." (2)
The attitude of the home government was another factor to be 
considered. It had plainly avowed non-intervention. "The system of 
avoiding interference in the internal affairs of the states," Metcalfe 
remarked in 1828, "is not only apparently right in principle but is almost 
enjoined to an unlimited extent by the Home Authorities appointed to rule
(1) Bentinck, minute, 25 Aug.1828, Beng.Pol.Cons. 1828. No. 1.
(2) Metcalfe, minute, 20 Dec.1830, Beng.Sec.Cons. .31 Dec.1830. No. 1.
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India*'1 (l) Not only was such a policy strictly enjoined on the government of
India but as late as 1826, when Metcalfe as resident at Delhi claimed British
intervention in the disputed succession in Bharatpur in consequence of British
supremacy, the Secret Committee peremptorily repudiated any sugh right of the
British government and informed the government of India that:
"We cannot admit that the extension of our power by the 
events of the years 1817 and. 1818 has in any degree extended 
our right of interference in the internal concerns of other 
states, except in so far as that right has been established 
by treaty."
The Secret Committee further drew attention to their instructions
of 10 March 1823, when they had said "--  on every principle of right and
policy, you should abstain from interference unless the peace of the British 
territories should be disturbed or the interests of anyone of your allies or 
Dependents seriously affected*" (2)
Taking into consideration both the treaties with the Indian 
states and the policy of the home government till this time (1828) Bentinck 
decided on non-intervention and on giving the rulers full opportunity of 
improving their affairs by their own efforts* His problem, as he said, was 
of "framing a line of conduct which shall at one and the same time respect the 
perfect independence of the Sovereign, and yet shall maintain the right of his
(1) Metcalfe, minute, 8 Sept.1828, Beng.Pol.Cons. 13 Sept.1828* No.3*
(2) Board's Secret Drafts, 23 March 1826, No.166, Vol.6;
Metcalfe, memorandum, 29 Aug.1825, Beng.Sec.Cons. 16 Sept.1825* No. 21.
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subjects against arbitrary acts, acts which he only ventures to commit from a 
sense of his security from retaliation under the protection of our guarantee."
(i)
But at this time he appeared to think more of Mthe inherent rights" of the 
Indian states arising from their treaties with the British government. The 
problem of the Indian states having definite engagements with the British 
government also did not seem to him to be entirely free from international 
implications and hence all the more complex. !
"They (Supreme Government) do not conceive that any 
prima facie case of the unsuccessful exercise of our 
supremacy can be established by the civil dissensions 
which occasionally break out in the Rajput states 
because it is either optional to desist from interference 
under the influence of respect for internal independence, 
or to interpose our power for the sake of universal
tranquillity ---  or in another view, we are precluded
from such interference by the obligations of treaties, 
and inherent rights of those states, which is a question 
of international law also subject to the consideration 
of the Supreme Government." (2)
Hence it seemed evident to Bentinck that the treaties should
play an important part in determining British relations with the states.
Bentinck indeed avowed his governments decision to adhere "to the very letter";
of the treaties.(3) In regard to the states of Rajputana which were often
troubled by internal disturbances, Bentinck thus stated his mind to Sir John
Malcolm: "I am not disposed to feel much respect for these Rajput
chieftains. They are like your old highland clans, brave 
plunderers, with all the weakness, conceit and vanity of
Asiatic communities. Nothing but time and the steady
operation of the policy laid down by the treaties can
(1) Bentinck, minute, 25 Aug.1828, Beng.Pol.Cons. 13 Sept.1828. No. 1.
(2) Govt*s resolution of 13 Sept.1828, Beng*Pol.Cons. 13 Sept.1828. No. 4* 
(3; Bentinck, minute, 25 Aug. 1828. Beng.Pol.Cons. 13 Sept. 1828. No. 1.
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restore perfect order to that country." (l)
Among the early councillors of Bentinck when he framed his 
views on the Indian states were Lord Combermere (the commander-in-chief), 
William Butterworth Bayley and Metcalfe. Of these, Combermere had little to 
say on the problem of the states and Bayley recognised the superior experience 
of Metcalfe, And so it fell to Metcalfe to expound his views in several 
minutes on the line of policy to be followed in relation to the Indian states. 
His long experience enabled him to speak at length and with great confidence 
on the subject and he seemed to enjoy the task. He had served as resident at 
Gwalior, Delhi and Hyderabad and had taken an active part in the political 
and military transactions of his time. (2)
In the course of his long experience he had had occasion to
carry into effect "both interfering and non-interfering policy" and he
concluded in favour of a policy of non-intervention. He held the "evil" 
created by interference to be generally "irremediable." "It virtually, if 
not ostensibly, destroys the state to which it is applied, and leaves it
(1) Bentinck to Malcolm, 26 Aug. 1828, Bentinck Papers.
(2) He was acting resident at Gwalior in 1810 and resident at Delhi in 1811.
In 1819 he was Secretary in the Secret and Political Department of
Bengal Government. Prom 1820 to 1825 he was resident at Hyderabad 
when he went to Delhi as resident and agent to governor-general in 
Rajputana. He joined the Supreme Council on 24 August 1827 and after 
Bentinck^ retirement acted provisionally as the governor-general.
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only a nominal, if any, existence*" (l) When asked by Bentinck soon after 
his arrival, to give his views on the question of the dissensions and civil 
wars in Rajputana which made it appear prima facie that the exercise of 
British supremacy in that region had not been successful, Metcalfe replied:
"If therefore such internal disturbances are held 
to be proofs of mismanagement on our part, the 
Supreme Government has the remedy in its power*
We may put them dov/n by direct interference in the 
internal affairs of such states*
From such interference in my opinion worse evils would 
arise, difficult but more objectionable disturbances, 
and I expect, if non-interference have a fair trial, that 
is, be steadily and consistently pursued for a suffi­
cient time, that internal dissensions and disturbances 
in protected states would cease." (2)
Though he saw in Bentinck a disposition to act for himself and 
not to fall under anyonefs influence, Metcalfe both by his minutes and by 
private letters exerted his influence in favour of a policy of non-interven­
tion. Finding in Bentinck "a straight forward, honest, upright, benevolent, 
sensible man," who had "the interests of the state at heart," his role 
came to be that of the elder statesman. Bentinck, while maintaining his 
independence of judgement, would never hesitate to avail himself of his 
advice and experience* When questioned by Ellenborough in 1829 on the
(1) Metcalfe, minute, 14 Aug.1835* Kaye, Selections from Metcalfe’s Papers,
241*This minute was recorded when he was acting as the 
governor-general after Bentinck*s retirement.
(2) Metcalfe, minute, 8 Sept. 1828, Beng.Pol.Cons. 13 Sept.1828. No.3.
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subject of the Indian government and its future, Bentinck unhesitatingly 
passed on the queries to Metcalfe with the observation:
"Anxious as I must be to answer to this call, but 
sensible at the same time of my own incompetence to the 
task, I can only obtain the information Lord Ellenborough 
wants by a recourse to greater experience and knowledge.
I confidently apply to you for that assistance which 
no man in India is better able to afford." (i)
Not only did Metcalfe lend full support to Bentinck in his 
policy of non-intervention, the vindication of that policy also became his 
self-assigned task. In I83O Bentinck1s withdrawal of British control from 
Nagpur was severely censured by Ellenborough.(2) The reply to this despatch 
of the Secret Committee which censured Bentinckfs policy was given not by 
Bentinck but by Metcalfe in the form of a long minute in which he 
resolutely defended the policy of Bentinck and the measures taken in 
Nagpur. (3) The force of his arguments was recognised by the home govern­
ment although they adhered to their instructions contained in the despatch 
of 9 June 1830. (4)
For a time after Bentinck's decision in 1828 not to interfere 
in the internal affairs of the states his views began to unfold themselves
(1) Ellenborough to Bentinck, 19 May 1829, Bentinck Papers;
Bentinck to Metcalfe, 16 Sept.1829, ibid.
(2) Board1s Secret Drafts, 9 June I83O, Vol.7*
(3) Metcalfe, minute, 20 Dec.1830, Beng.Sec.Cons. 31 Dec.1830. No. 1.
(4) Board's Secret Drafts, 6 Dec.1831, Vol.8.
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more and more in favour of their internal independence. His policy came to 
be twofold, non-interference in the internal concerns of the states and 
withdrawal of the control exercised by the British government where he 
considered it to be vexatious and inconsistent with the pursuit of a 
liberal policy towards the states. Acting on this he withdrew British 
intervention from Hyderabad and Nagpur in 1029. He instructed the 
resident at Lucknow not to interfere in the internal affairs of Oudh and 
told him in 1830 that while it was necessary that conditions in Oudh should 
be reformed it was Mmost desirable that this should be done by the royal 
authority exclusively. Direct interference which is in fact nothing more 
or less than the transfer of the government from the King to the resident 
is, as far as my observation goes, the very worst course to be permitted.•*
(1)
In thus withdrawing British intervention from the states Bentinck
wanted to give the rulers a free hand to improve their affeirs by their own
efforts. The time, he thought, was suitable for trying the experiment. For
while the British supremacy was not firmly established there might be
justification in exercising influence in the Indian states in an indirect
form, but now that the British government had become paramount, Bentinck
(l) Bentinck to Maddock, 4 Aug.1830, Bentinck Papers; 
ibid. 28 May 1830, Bentinck Papers;
S’
/
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saw none. And he disliked any form of indirect interposition of British 
authority, especially in the form of an appointment of the mirister, which 
without making the British government directly responsible for good 
government was not conducive to the authority of the ruler, (l)
Any indirect interposition creating a duality of control,
Bentinck felt sure, could not operate satisfactorily and was a concealment 
of British authority which he considered unwarranted. (2) And he showed 
himself anxious to avoid this "evil'1 by withdrawing British interference 
from the states and by making the rulers directly responsible for good 
government. ”It has been a principle of British policy,” he said to 
the governor of Madras, ’’approved and uniformly acted upon by His Lordship, 
to avoid this evil, as far as possible, by withdrawing from interference 
with the native governments so connected with us, leaving them to conduct 
their own affairs uncontrolled by the British officers at their Courts, and 
subject only to the general responsibility incident to their position. But 
it is essential to the success of the system that if after warning duly 
given, the government so left to pursue its measures, fail to acquit itself 
of the obligation it is under to its subjects, to provide for them a decent
(1) Beng.Sec.Letters Reed. 6 Sept.1831.
(2; Bentinck to Lushington (governor of Madras), 6 Sept.1831* Madras.Sec.
Cons. 4 Oct. 1831. No. 4»
Beng. Sec. Letters Reed. 6 Sept. 1831*
administration, if instead of order, tranquillity and security to life and 
prosperity, disorganisation prevail in all departments with insurrection, 
disturbance, violence, plundering and bloodshed, the remedy must be to 
provide an administration exempt from the evils of inefficiency, incident 
to the reprobated system of double government, by assuming the direct 
control of all affairs and conducting them through our officers.” (l)
At the same time Bentinck was coming to feel from the adverse 
reports of residents at several courts that a course of non-intervention 
was becoming increasingly difficult to- follow. He did not abandon non­
intervention at once but saw the inevitability of intervention in extreme 
cases. If misgovernment in a state persisted he thought now that the 
British government could interfere as a matter of course and irrespective 
of treaty stipulations. Such a course in his opinion was justified by 
the paramount position of the British government in India which entitled 
it to interfere as a last resort in defence of the people of a misgoverned 
state in violation of the terms of the treaty. Thus on the subject of 
misgovernment in Oudh his words indicating a change in the position he had 
earlier held were:
(i) Supreme Govt, to Madras Govt., 8 June 1831, Madras Sec. Cons. 4 Oct.1831
Ho.3.
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"My opinion upon this subject entirely accords with one 
upon a similar question contained in a letter from my 
worthy colleague (l) when resident at Hyderabad, under 
date the 51st August 1822: 'I suppose our interference in His 
Highness*s affairs to be not merely a right but a duty, 
arising out of our supremacy, which imposes upon us the 
obligation of maintaining the tranquillity of all countries 
connected with us, and consequently of protecting the 
people from oppression, as no less necessary than the 
guaranteeing of their rulers against revolution-— 1 
Our duty and right of interference would have been the same 
whether Lord Wellesleyfs treaty had been made or not, while 
the stipulation, by which the Vizier bound himself not to 
oppress his people, takes away from him all excuse for his 
own mismanagement, and all pretext for complaining of our 
interposition#"
And Bentinck felt further that "advice, remonstrances and measures merely 
negative will avail nothing" and that only "the arm of power forcibly 
interposed" could bring about the desired reform. (2)
This was in marked contrast to his stand in 1828 when he had 
announced his governments decision to be regulated in its conduct towards 
the states by "the strictest adherence" to "the very letter" of the 
treaties. (5)
Inspired by this new conception of British obligations, Bentinck 
interfered vigorously in Mysore in September 1851 to deprive the prince of 
all the powers of government. (4) Bentinck*s annexations of the three 
states of Cachar, Coorg and Jaintia in 1852, 1854 and 1855 were also made
(l^  Metcalfe
(2; Bentinck, minute, 50 July 1831> Beng.Pol.Cons. 50 Sept.1851* No.2. 
(5) Bentinck, minute, 25 Aug.1828, Beng.Pol.Cons. 15 Sept.1828. No.l.
(4) Beng.Sec.Letters Reed. 6 Sept. 1851.
after this change in his ideas.
But though Bentinck interfered drastically in Mysore and annexed 
the states of Cachar, Coorg and Jaintia it would not be correct to say 
that Bentinck's policy in practice underwent a revolutionary change in 
favour of intervention and annexation. While affirming the right of 
intervention in Oudh in the strongest possible words he did not actually 
interfere. In Mysore in 1854 he felt regret for the intervention he had 
exercised in 1851* (l) In Hyderabad though recognising that the withdrawal 
of British control had not been successful in establishing good conditions 
there he left the matter in the hands of the home government for determina­
tion. (2) In a minute in 1854 in which he took stock of his administration 
he showed himself to be against the coercion of the Indian princes. (5) 
Non-intervention did in fact on the whole represent his earnest effort and 
hope to tackle the problem of the Indian states in a peaceful manner and he 
would not ordinarily depart from it.
In conclusion, it may be said that Bentinck's problem was to 
identify the interests of the people in the states with those of the rulers. 
In a peaceful way he sought to do so by influencing the princes to become
(1) Beng. and I dia Sec. Letters Reed. 14 April 1854*
(2^  India Pol. nLetters Reed. 25 July 1854* No.6. Vol I.
(5) Bentinck, minute, 20 June 1854> Bentinck Papers.
good rulers. Non-intervention, personal contact and communication with 
the princes themselves together with the influence of the resident were 
his chief weapons. Such a course was consistent with the particular 
circumstance of the states having definite engagements with the British 
government, with the policy of the home government, and with his own 
utilitarian ideas which made it his study and purpose to educate Indians 
in the task of self-improvement and reform.
44.
CHAPTER 3*
THE MYSORE ASSUMPTION AND ITS AFTERMATH
The case of Mysore is a good example of the working of Bentinck*s 
mind* Here he intervened drastically after Becoming convinced of the 
necessity of entirely superseding the authority of the Raja. By this 
intervention he intended to secure to the people of Mysore a better govern­
ment and at the same time to produce a healthy effect upon the minds of 
the Indian princes as a whole. In resorting to this extremity Bentinck 
sincerely sought the welfare of the people of Mysore and not an aggrandize­
ment of British power or territory. It was a clear assertion of the 
paramount power for a benevolent purpose.
After the assumption a number of circumstances combined to fill 
Bentinck*s mind with misgiving about his action. He doubted the 
propriety of the assumption and felt that the Raja was not as degenerate 
as he had believed. He read his character favourably and felt strongly 
that, if again vested with authority, the Raja would not fail to benefit from 
his past mistakes and acquit himself well. The interests of the ruler and 
the ruled would be harmonized and a happy situation created. Hopeful of 
the Raja's future conduct he was even ready to restore him the government 
of about half of his country. He made a proposal to that effect to the 
home authorities and hoped that they would agree to it.
Behind his change of attitude lay Bentinck*s abounding faith 
in human nature and the desire to see the Raja a different person in the 
future. From the viewpoint of consistency Bentinck1 s stand was weak. He 
seems to have beeniacillating between legal and moral considerations and
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this-raised the question of the limits of British authority. Was it to go 
no further than the treaties permitted? But the change in his ideas 
showed him in all his earnestness and sincerity. He did not hesitate 
to put his doubts openly Before the home government and to speak for the 
Raja. His .aim was to encourage the Indian princes in the work of reform, 
and if he felt satisfied that after the healthy shock he had given to
(i
the Raja, he could govern well in the future, Bentinck was ready to give 
him power and responsibility.
In dealing with the government of Mysore Bentinck had to face 
the problem of maladministration in an acute form. The relations of the 
British government with this state were regulated by a treaty formed in 
17999 when, after the defeat and death of Tipu Sultan, the old Hindu 
dynasty ousted by Haidar Ali was restored under Krishna Raj Udaiyar, a 
child of about three years of age. The treaty stipulated for a subsidiary 
force for the defence and security of Mysore, for which the Raja was to pay 
an annual subsidy to the British government, (l) It forbade any direct 
intercourse with any other state and provided, in case of financial confusion 
and misgovernment, for a temporary assumption of the administration by the 
British government. (2) It further required the Raja "to pay at all times"
(1) Aitchison, Treaties, IX, Treaty of 8 July 1799» Article II, 221.
(2) ibid. Articles IV and V, 221-222,
his "utmost attention" to the advice of the British government in all
important matters of internal administration, (l)
During the minority of the Raja the administration was conducted
by the minister Purnaiya in close collaboration with the British
government. In 1811 the Raja assumed the powers of government himself and
British interference was formally withdrawn in 1814* From this time there
in
set in a decline in the administration which continued until/Bentinck's
\
time it had produced a rising. (2)
The Raja, because of his negligence and misrule became involved 
in serious financial difficulty. In 1825 the governor of Madras, Sir 
Thomas Munro, paid a visit to Mysore, and advised the Raja in person to 
curtail the expenses of his government and warned him of the consequences 
of his continued neglect and mismanagement. (5) The warning had a salutary 
effect for a time. It produced an attempt at amendment and the combined 
efforts of the resident and the minister were successful in reducing the 
debt considerably but this improvement could not be maintained and in 
1851 the aggregate debt of Mysore state stood over 17 lakhs of canteroy 
pagodas. (4)
The Raja had also spent the vast treasure left by Purnaiya
(1) ibid. Article XIV, 224* Trade, industry, agriculture, revenue and
justice, all these matters came within the scope of British advice.
(2) Report of the Enquiry Committee, 12 Dec.l855> Beng.Pol.Cons. 5 June 1854*
The Committee was appointed by Bentinck in 1852 to report No.24*
on the causes of the rising and its ultimate suppression.
This report was also published in 1858 by the Mysore government.
(5) A.J.Arbuthnot, Sir Thomas Munro, II, 76-86.
(4) Resident to Covt., 20 July 1851, Madras Sec.Cons. 27 Sept.1851* No.2.
J.A. Casamaijor was resident from 1825* He continued till 1854 when 
Col.J.S.Fraser succeeded him.
A centeroy pagoda was equivalent to about 5 rupees.
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during the ten years of his administration, (l) He had also caused a
m
serious alienation of revenue by extensive grants of land and costly 
gifts to Brahmans and temples. Since the time of Purnaiya the expense 
of these grants in land and money had increased to about 2 lakhs of 
canteroy pagodas. The embarrassed state of the finances had prompted the 
resident and the minister to advise the Raja to resume many of them, but 
he had resisted such advice. He considered it derogatory to his character 
and authority to withdraw what he had given by a royal decree. (2)
The revenues of the state in later years of the Raja!s government 
were also affected by a fall in the price of agricultural produce. In 
Llysore a large proportion of the revenues was received in kind and a fall 
in prices brought a corresponding diminution of revenue. Hot only Mysore 
but the Company!s districts of Bellary and Cuddapah bordering on 
Mysore had also been affected by this tendency. While affecting the 
finances this fall in prices had also told on the material condition of the 
cultivators and had become a prominent cause of discontent among them. It 
had also led to a demand for a reduction of assessment in Mysore. (3)
Besides the financial distress 01 the government the administra­
tion of Mysore was corrupt and afforded little protection to the people 
against the conduct of public officers. Bribery was rampant and public 
offices were given to persons offering the largest bribes. "All the better 
class of offices," wrote General Briggs in 1833> "were sold to the highest
(1) Resident to Enquiry Committee, 19 Sept.l833> Home Misc.Series.Vol.709.
(2) Resident to Govt.,8 June 1828, Beng.Pol.Cons. 26 Dec. 1828.No.7* P * ^
(3) Report of the Enquiry Committee, op.cit.
4Q*
bidder, or a certain share of the emoluments of each place was paid to the 
ministers and favourites at Court, the chief of whom was a fiddler.” Thus 
the office of Faujdar came to be purchased for 5*000 rupees and that of 
Mamlatdar for 1,000. (l) The public functionaries who obtained their 
appointments in this manner were led to commit every species of extortion 
to gain wealth during their uncertain office. (2)
While the public offices were thus dispensed the system of 
realising the revenues led to the victimisation and impoverishment of the 
people, producing in turn discontent against the government of the day.
Under this s^ sbem an agreement was made with the Amildars whereby they 
engaged themselves to realise for the state a certain amount of revenue. If 
their collections fell short of the stipulated amount they had to make 
good the deficiency, and if there was any surplus it went to the state. 
Though the system was not unknown in the time of Purnaiya it came to be 
followed generally during the personal rule of the Raja. It encouraged 
the Amildars to make arbitrary assessments and overrate the produce of 
the land. These evil results were aggravated when the Amildars began to 
be removed as soon as other persons came forward to realise for the state 
a larger amount. Thus it happened that in the same year in which an 
agreement was made with an Amildar, if some other person came forward with 
a higher offer the incumbent was removed and the latter installed in his 
place. In the precarious tenure of his office it became the chief object 
of an Amildar to collect all the money he could by every means at his
(1) Evens Bell, Memoir of General Briggs, 144-14&.
(2) Col. Woulfe, to Enquiry Committee, 50 April 1855* Home Misc.Series,
Vol. 709. p.1016.
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disposal. In practice the system degenerated into the farming out of the 
revenues to the highest bidder and tended to make the government highly 
unpopular, (l) The main cause of the rising in Mysore in 1830 m s  
ascribed by the resident to this unchecked "system of bribery on the 
nomination to amildaries" which led to the appointment of most unfit persons • 
to those offices, (2)
While no impetus was afforded to agriculture under such 
circumstances, trade was hampered by the vexatious system of duties known 
as Sayer, They were classified under three heads, (a) transit duty on 
goods passing along the roads, (b) duty on goods produced or manufactured 
in towns or other places to be paid previous to their exportation from the 
place of production or manufacture (c) duty on goods at the time of 
their sale. For the collection of these duties 761 custom houses were 
maintained and at no two such houses was the same system in force. Each 
custom house had come to have a set of its own rates which were hardly 
realised without a wrangle. Merchants wishing to avoid embarrassing 
inconvenience and delay found it necessary to bribe almost every Sayer 
servant along the whole line of the road by which their merchandise passed. 
Exemptions granted by the government to favoured individuals added to the 
confusion. Trade had become virtually "monopolised by the Sayer Contractors 
or their servants, and a few practised traders, who were in close alliance 
with them or knew how to command powerful interests at the Durbar," (3)
(l) Report of the Enquiry Committee, op,cit,
\2) Resident to Madras Govt,, 8 Jan.1831, Beng,Pol.Cons. 11 Feb.1831* No,6,
(3) Memorandum on the Sayer System in Mysore compiled by the Mysore 
Commissioners Office, 3*
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The difficulties of the merchants and of the people in general were further 
increased by the absence of any developed means of communication. There 
was hardly any good road in Mysore; such as there were "had become 
impassable, and in some cases altogether obliterated from jungle having 
overgrown them,” Three roads that could be so called were in a neglected 
state, with portions running through swamps, (i)
In the revenue system further, there was a large number of items 
of taxation which, though not heavy in amount, had become odious to the people 
because of the powers they gave to the Ijaradar^&nd their agents of prying 
into the private affairs of the people* Prom these items of taxation some 
ten lakhs and twenty three thousand rupees were realised annually. In the 
"Memorandum on the Sayer System in Mysore" their number is estimated at 7^9* 
Their vexatious nature can be known from the fact that people had to pay 
them "on a female attaining puberty; on a child being bom; on its being 
given a name; and on its head being shaved; on a death of a member of a
family --- Umbrellas were taxed; and any one passing a particular spot in
ITuggur without keeping his arms close to his side had to pay a tax for 
swinging his hands. There was one village whose inhabitants had to pay 
tax because their ancestors had failed to find the stray horse of an
ancient Poligar ---"*(2)
The administration of justice also was in a sad condition.
Towards the close of the Raja's administration there had remained little
(1) Charles Green, Memorandum on Public Y/orks in Mysore, in Selections from
the Records of Mysore Commissioners Office. Collection VII, p.l.
(2) Memorandum on the Sayer System in Mysore, compiled by the Mysore
Commissioner's Office, 5»
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that could be fittingly termed an administration of justice* This 
department like other tranches of administration had come to be affected 
by corruption and the capriciousness of the Raja* It had become a common 
thing for the Raja to issue orders dispensing with the decrees of the Sadr 
Court at the capital. It was also said that sometimes the Raja would 
pass as many as four or five contradictory decrees successively in the same 
suit in addition to the original decree of the Court under the influence 
of different parties at the royal court. The minions of the Darbar also 
interfered with the working of the courts and tried to influence their 
decisions by unfair means. At times the Raja would go so far as to abuse a 
judge of the Sadr Court in the open Darbar, call him names and dismiss him 
from his presence, (l) Little independence or integrity could be 
expected from the judges under these circumstances.
The administration of criminal justice was in as unsatisfactory 
a state as that of the civil branch. It provided little security to the 
persons or property of the people* The public officers were often in league 
with the criminals. They connived at their activities and shared their 
plunder* Thus notorious criminals and brigands committed outrages with 
impunity while the innocent became the scapegoats* At the time of British 
intervention in I83I the prisons contained many who had been confined for 
no good reason. ”For the last ten or twelve years,” stated Briggs, ”there 
has been scarcely a shadow of justice.” (2) Such as did exist served to 
demoralise public servants. The Amildars when charged with corruption or
(D M. Cubbon, Report on the Civil and Criminal Judicature in Mysore, p*7«
(2) Briggs, quoted in the Madras governor*s minute of Jj6ct. 18^2. Board1s
Collections* Vol. 139%
neglect of duty were subjected to great humiliation and were occasionally 
flogged for the recovery of the balances due from them* But they were not 
considered disgraced and were often reappointed to their offices* "The 
natural consequence of this was the extinction of all self-respect and 
honourable feeling among the public servants," (l)
The government of the Raja, in short, as Bentinck stated in 
a despatch to the Directors in 1834> did not deserve that name, "under 
which there was devised no check to extortion, and no redress of 
grievances, which provided neither limit to the oppressor nor refuge for 
the oppressed."(2)
The mis government of the Raja had produced discontent throughout 
the country. But its effects had come to be felt more strongly in the 
north-western district of Hagar than in any other part of Mysore. This 
district had been among the territorial conquests of Haidar Ali and had 
not belonged to the ancient Hindu royal family which was restored in Mysore 
in 1799* Although it formed a part of the territory restored to the 
Raja in 1799the people here had no deep-rooted attachment to the royal 
family to prevent them from taking arms against the Raja's neglect and
(1) Cubbon, Report on Civil and Criminal Judicature in Mysore, 14*
(2) India Pol. Letters Reed. 14 April 1834* No 1. para. 26. Vol. 1.
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misgovernment, (l) In this district also all important public offices had 
been monopolised by the Brahmans and their supremacy was supported at the 
court by Bakshi Ram Rao (2) and his group there. The ascendancy of this 
caste at the court and in the district was disliked by the majority of 
the people of this division who belonged to the sect of the Lingayats. (3) 
While the influence of Bakshi Ram Rao and his group remained 
supreme at the court much misrule and oppression prevailed there. There 
was little security of life and property and crimes were numerous. The 
collusion of brigands with the public functionaries made their apprehension 
and punishment difficult. The nature of the country, covered as it was with 
dense forests and mountains, afforded encouragement and facilities to daring 
robberies which came to be increasingly committed.(4)
Towards the close of the Raja*s administration the people here 
came to be particularly vexed by the arbitrary demands of public officers 
and were left without means of redress. These officers were generally
persons who had obtained appointments by spending large sums of money in
gaining favour and during their uncertain period of power they tried to
(1) Report of the Enquiry Committee, op.cit;
Madras governor, minute, 12 April 1831, Madras Sec.Cons.19 April 1831#
No.2.
S.R.Lushington was governor of Madras from 1827 to 1832.
(2) A/ Maratha Brahman who had served in different positions and had
acquired great influence at the court.
(3) Report of the Enquiry Committee, op.cit.
(4) ibid.
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hoard money unscrupulously, (l) "-— there seemed to be a confederated
system of oppression among all classes of the native authorities from the 
Patel to the District Amildar, on the one hand, and of total disregard of 
all complaints on the other*1' (2) The nature of the grievances of the 
people, as described by Colonel YTbulfe, Captain Hutchinson, Major Clemons 
and others who took part in putting down the insurrection, was that 
nearly double the amount of the regulated Kist was demanded, the failure 
of which was visited with arbitrary fines or with cruel punishments such 
as being made to sit naked upon heated stones, that supplies of forage, 
wood, and other articles were required to be furnished by villages under the 
plea of being for the use of the troops, and that their representations
were not attended to. (3) Though the demands of the government were not
particularly heavy or oppressive, this did not prevent the public servants 
from exacting large amounts from the people and from enriching themselves 
at their expense. "The tyranny under Purnayya," it has been observed 
by a modem writer, "was Purnayya* s own, while the tyranny under the 
maharaja was that of his servants. In any case, the net result to the 
people was the same." (4) By 1830 the division of Hagar had been reduced
(1) Col.Woulfe to Enquiry Committee, 30 April 1833> Home Misc.Series.
Vol.709. p.1016.
He was employed against the insurgents.
(2) Major J. Clemons, evidence on 13 May 1833, Home Misc.Series.Vol.709*p.l050. 
He also took part in putting down the insurrection.
(3) Home Misc.Series. Vol.709. pp.1012-1023; 1045-1055, 1672-1682.
(4) K.H.V. Sastri, The Administration of Mysore under Sir Mark Cubbon,
(1834-61), 236.
to a melancholy state.
For many years past arrears of revenue and defalcations on the 
part of public servants had been accumulating in Nagar. They had neither 
been collected nor remitted. In 1827 Bakshi Ram Rao was deputed to 
investigate the outstanding balances of revenue amounting to upwards of 
13 lakhs of rupees. The Bakshi made recommendations for remissions of 
nearly seven and a half lakhs of rupees. He prepared a list separating 
the balances that were recoverable from those that should be obliterated 
by the government. The Raja at first concurred in the propriety of these 
remissions, but subsequently, under the influence of other advisers, 
changed his opinion. He suspended their confirmation, and in December 1828 
removed the Faujdar Kishan Rao from his office on a charge of inactivity in 
the collection of recoverable balances and sent one Vira Raj Arus for the 
task. Vira Raj started making enquiries into the balances and found that 
much fraud had been practised in the remissions. His enqiiries were 
calculated to arouse the fears of such Amildars and other officers as were 
guilty of embezzling money and whose self-interest was thus involved in the 
removal of the Faujdar. The suspension of the remissions and the attempt 
to recover the balances also excited resentment among the people, who 
would ultimately be most affected. It was stated to be"a prominent cause 
of discontent" by the resident, (l) For once the interest of the people ' 
and the subordinate officers were united. Together they worked to create 
a disturbed situation revealing the incompetence of the Faujdar.
(l) Resident to Enquiry Committee, 19 Sept.1833, Home Misc.Series. Vol.709*
P.1699?
Report of the Enquiry Committee, op.cit.
In July 1830 a plot was formed among the Amildars for effecting
the removal of Vira Raj* (l) They encouraged the inhabitants to assemble
in meetings to make complaints. A pretender was also set up as the
"Huggur Khavind" (Lord or Sovereign of Nagar) and in several parts of the
district the people assembled and first defied the authority of the
government in August and September 1830. In November, Vira Raj was
dismissed in consequence of the disturbed state in which he was said to
have thrown the district. (2)
The pretender was a notorious character originally known as
Sadar Halla. He had been twice imprisoned for robbery. He had acquired a
signet of the last Raja of Nagar from an old religious mendicant who had
been that Raja's spiritual guide. On the basis of that signet he duped
the ignorant and the credulous into believing that he was a descendant of
the old royal family. He had also managed to secure a pass from a district
court of the Company in which he was described by the name he had assumed
"Budi Basavappa, Nagar Khavind." In I83O his marriage was solemnised, and
in an official document issued by an Amildar Lakshman Rao the impostor
was styled the Raja of Nagar. The principal men of the village were asked
to make preparations for his marriage ceremony. Shortly afterwards another
ceremony was held attended by several Patels in which the pretensions of
I
Budi Basavappa were formally recognised and his appellation accepted. He 
was called the Raja of Nagar. "While all this was going on," observed a 
witness, "the government Amildars were aware of it; but remained quiet,
(1) Resident to Enquiry Committee, 8 Jan.1833, Home Misc.Series. Vol.709
(2) Report of the Enquiry Committee, op.cit* p*p*8 18
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therefore the people not being kept in awe by the public functionaries 
commenced the rebellion.” (l) In the ensuing months the agents of Budi 
Basavappa busied themselves instigating the people against the government 
and asking them to support him. (2)
This conspiracy, though formed with the immediate object of 
securing the removal of the Faujdar, was undermining the authority of the 
government and should have been early broken by prompt action. But 
because of the "Rajahfs apathy and procrastination it was allowed to 
progress and the other Talooks adjoining united without being enabled to 
assign any other motive for showing resistance than the example and demand 
of the neighbouring ryots for their assistance, and disaffection became too 
general,1 (5) There were encounters between the Rajafs forces and the 
insurgents. At one place the number of persons gathered to defy the authority 
of the government ranged between 6,000 and 20,000. The insurgents soon 
began to espouse the cause of Budi Basavappa openly. (4)
About the middle of December I83O another leader of the insur­
gents Rangapah Naik joined the main body of the Nagar insurgents with his 
son and nephew. In a short time he took possession of two hill forts in 
Eastern Nagar. (5)
In the meantime the unrest spread to other districts of Mysore
(lj Ramiah, evidence on 14 March 1833> Home Misc.Seris.Vol.709• p* 499*
(2; Report of the Enquiry Committee, op. cit.
(3) Resident to Govt., 8 Jan.1831* Beng.Pol.Cons. 11 Feb.1831, No.6.
(4) Report of the Enquiry Committee, op.cit.
(5) ibid*
also (Chitaldroog and Bangalore.) (l)
The Raja was slow in perceiving the danger even after the 
disturbances had become serious. He was persuaded by the resident to make 
a tour of the disturbed areas to pacify the minds of the people. (2) He 
set out on this journey from his capital on 13 December. On his way he 
received various complaints from the people of the oppression of public 
officers which he enquired into and redressed. On 18 December he reached 
Chenroypatam where he found the shops closed and the supplies for his 
retinue refused. The next day people showed their lack of respect for him 
by beating drums and blowing horns. These acts of disrespect were severely 
punished. (3) The visit of the Raja, much as the resident wished it, was 
not extended to other areas, and he returned to Mysore on 10 January 1831* 
The resident ascribed the Raja’s return to weakness of character - his 
"dissolute and timid" nature - an indisposition to further exertion or 
"to be longer absent from the allurements of his Palace,"(4) but it could 
well have been a recognition that the situation had got out of hand.
At this period the insurrection had taken an organised form and 
the incapacity of the Raja’s troops to cope with it had become apparent.
The new Faujdar of Nagar sent with forces to control the situation, found 
himself opposed on all sides and after having fought the insurgents bravely
(1) ibid.
Iz) Resident to Govt., 11 Sept. 1832, Beng.Pol.Cons. 15 Oct.1832, No.21.
(3) Report of the Enquiry Committee, op.cit,
(4) Resident to Govt., 11 Sept. 1832, Beng.Pol.Cons. 15 Oct. 1832. No. 21.
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was obliged to fall back. An effort by Raja's troops to capture the fort 
of Kamandurg held by the insurgents also failed, (l)
These reverses led to the employment by the resident of a 
portion of the Companyrs subsidiary force maintained in Mysore. After the 
employment of these bodies a number of engagements were fought and the 
insurgents beaten. But the insurrection held its own in certain areas, and 
hence led to the employment of the subsidiary, force in larger numbers. 
Against these, the insurgents fought a losing battle and the insurrection 
began to peter out. After the capture of the town of Nagar on 6 June 18J1 
it was not considered necessary to detain the British force, and with the 
exception of a small detachment, it was sent back to its quarters. The 
Raja's troops were broken up into four divisions for establishing confidence 
among the people and to suppress a small body of insurgents who under the 
direction of Rangapah Naik and Surjapah Naik continued to have encounters 
with the Raja's forces. Matters were in this state when the interference 
of British government placed the country under British management.
British relations with Mysore were under the immediate control 
of the government of Madras. But the outbreak of the insurrection, which 
necessitated the employment of the Company's forces, led Bentinck to interfere 
personally and to take over the whole administration even when such a course
(l) Report of the Enquiry Committee, op.cit.
6o.
was not recommended by the government of Madras. During the insurrection 
the governor of Madras, who considered it to be a serious matter, visited 
Mysore in person in order to ascertain the real state of affairs. The 
rising, he said in his minute of 12 April 1831> required the special 
attention and intervention of the British government. It had, he pointed 
out, affected the-adjoining province of Canara in the possession of the 
Company, and proved the incompetence of the Raja to govern his country* The 
policy of the British government, he said, had been for a long time to 
leave the affairs of Mysore to be governed by the Raja alone, but now such 
a course had become impossible. The insurrection was subversive of all 
"the principles of policy, justice and moderation" by which the Raja was 
placed on the throne in 1799 by the British government. The treaty had 
been meant to secure for the British government and its allies permanent peace 
and tranquillity in and outside Mysore, and now it stood violated and 
showed the need for British intervention. (1)
V/hat was, however, actually contemplated by Lushington was the 
assumption of the district of Nagar, where there had been a strong resistance 
to the Raja's forces. Here petitions from various inhabitants and the 
reports of the resident had shown that "the spirit of hatred and revenge 
had been so much excited as not to admit of any real reconciliation between 
the people of Nuggur and His Highness's government." (2)
In another minute of 4 July I83I Lushington further urged the 
need for intervention. The situation in Mysore, he said, had created a real
(1) Lushington, minute, 12 April I83I, Madras Sec,Cons, 19 April 1831* No.2*
(2) ibid.
apprehension- for the subsidy paid by the state to the British government 
and thereby established a strong case for intervention which was clearly 
warranted by the treaty of 1799* wus further stated that the payment 
of the subsidy had been delayed beyond the appointed period and that the 
troops and civil servants were in a discontented state# (l)
In this minute of 4 July another form of intervention suggested
by the resident in Mysore was recommended for the favourable consideration 
of the Supreme Government# It was the appointment of a Dewan supported 
by the British government and working in collaboration with the resident. 
The resident at the time who had made this suggestion was J.A.Casamaijor# 
He had acted as resident since 1825 a-ud thus had had a good opportunity
of knowing the Raja well# The Raja, according to him, was not wilfully
cruel or oppressive, "no faults of any malignity" could be ascribed to him# 
"In his personal character as Sovereign he is proverbially generous and 
humane to his people," His chief shortcomings were "his habitual extrava­
gance, indolence and a total incapacity to that continued exertion so 
essential to the conduct of duties of government — " And so Casamaijor 
considered the Raja fitted to act only as the nominal head while all the 
powers of government would be in fact exercised by a Dewan appointed by 
the British government and working conjointly with the resident# And he 
felt confident that the affairs of Mysore could be restored by such an
(i) Lushington, minute, 4 July 1831, Beng.Sec.Cons# 7 Oct# 1831# No.6#
arrangement. (1)
Bentinck could not accept either of Lushington?s suggestions#
The facts of the situation, in his opinion, called for strong action# These 
were that the Raja had spent all the treasure left by Purnaiya and was 
wasting public resources in useless grants of lands# He was indifferent 
to the welfare of the people and had allowed them to suffer grievously. The 
people, finding no redress for their grievances, had risen in desperation* 
When the Raja’s forces failed to cope with the rising that spread to about 
half of his dominions, the Company's forces were sent to control the 
situation# The British government which suppressed the people must see 
justice done to them. His policy was to leave the states full freedom of 
action. But if a state so left to itself failed "to acquit itself of the 
obligation it is under to its subjects, to provide for them a decent 
administration; if instead of order, tranquillity and security to life 
and prosperity, disorganisation prevail in all departments with 
insurrection, disturbance, violence, plundering and bloodshed," the proper 
course was to substitute British authority entirely in all the departments 
of government. (2)
This principle was to be applied to Mysore. The reports of the 
resident showed the condition of Mysore to be such as to merit the full 
application of this principle. Hence Bentinck could not accept the measure 
proposed by Lushington - "the assumption and temporary management of the
(1) ibid;
Resident to Govt#, 28 Junel831, Enclos#to Beng.Sec.Letters Reed# Vol#40;
Resident to Govt., 20 July I83I, Madras Sec.Cons# 27 Sept#1831. No#2#
(2) Gov.-Gen's Sec# to Madras Govt., 8 June 1831, Madras Sec.Cons#
4 Oct. 1831. No. 3.
disturbed districts." If there was ground for the assumption of a part 
Bentinck was of opinion that the same ground warranted the assumption of 
the whole, (l)
The appointment of a Dewan by the British government was equally 
objectionable to Bentinck. It was a partial measure and not likely to be 
effective for the disordered condition of Mysore. An able and experienced 
Dewan suited to the task might not be found easily. Further such an 
arrangement, in which the Dewan exercised his authority conjointly with the 
resident, would create dual control and responsibility. If they did not 
agree with each other the way might be opehed for confusion and 
embarrassment. (2)
Such an arrangement to Bentinck had also an appearance of a 
concealment of British authority which might create a misunderstanding of 
British intentions. Once the need for British intervention was clearly 
established it was necessary that such interference was "open and avowed," 
and that its 'hiethod and form" had no "appearance of an insidious character." 
Bentinck was anxious that British intervention "should not seem as if 
adopted as a step to something else." (3) Hence he resolved to order the 
assumption of the whole country and to deprive the Raja of all the powers 
of government by vesting the entire administration in a commission of two 
British officers.
The letter of notice required for such a course by the treaty
(1) ibid.
(2) Bentinck to Lushington, 5 Sept.1831, Madras Sec.Cons. 4 Oct.1831. No.4* 
(3; Beng.Sec. Letters reed. 6 Sept* 1831. para.
of 1799 was sent to the Madras government for submission to the Raja. In 
this letter Bentinck told the Raja that the assumption had been ordered for 
the vindication of British justice, which required that the British 
government should provide redress to the people whom it had reduced to 
submission. The assumption, the Raja was told, had also been ordered with
reference to the terms of the treaty and on account of the protective
character of the British government towards Mysore. (1)
On account of misgovernment in several states Bentinck was at
this time entertaining an extended conception of British obligations. He 
thought that the British government as the paramount power in India could 
in the last resort interfere vigorously in a state ^respective of treaty 
stipulations. (2) The insurrection in Mysore, producing an extreme
<x|rouCfc
situation, left Bentinck in no doubt^the justice of the assumption from 
any point of view. Hence he acted promptly and vigorously.
The Raja received Bentinck1s letter while celebrating a Hindu 
festival. He was struck with remorse on knowing Bentinck1s decision but 
decided on surrendering his authority without any protest or resistance.(3)
So the transfer of power was easy. A commission of two officers
(4)
was appointed, and it assumed charge on 20 October I83I. Of the two 
commissioners, the senior, Colonel John Briggs, was appointed by Bentinck,
(lj Bentinck to Raja, 7 Sept.1831, Beng.Sec.Cons. 7 Oct.1831. No.10.
?2; Bentinck, minute, 30 July 1831, Beng.Pol.Cons. 30 Sept.1831. No.2. 
lyj Resident to Govt., 11 Oct. 1831, Beng.Sec.Cons. 4 Nov.1831. No.14*
(4) Lushington (commissioner) to Govt., 20 Oct. 1831, Beng.Sec.Cons.
18 Nov. 1831. No. 8.
and the junior, C.M.Lushington (l) of the Madras Civil Service, by the 
governor of Madras, S.R. Lushington. The Raja was provided with a sum
of one lakh of star pagodas per annum plus one fifth of the net revenue of
Mysore, as stipulated by the treaty of 1799* (2)
The scheme of two commissioners appointed by two governments
could not work. A complex situation developed. There were differences of 
opinion and friction between the two commissioners» Bentinck1s instructions 
were interpreted differently by the government of Madras. The governor 
of Madras was at loggerheads with the senior commissioner, who complained 
of a combination of the government of Madras, the junior commissioner 
and the resident against him. Both in official and private correspondence 
charges and countercharges were made and Bentinck felt ill at eaaa (3)
He resolved in 1832 to place Mysore under the immediate superintendence of 
the Supreme Government, but that did not bring to an end the differences 
between the commissioners, or the ill feeling between the commission and 
the residency. (4) Bentinck was much embarrassed by these controversies. 
"Mysore," he wrote to Ravenshaw, "has dreadfully plagued me, but having got 
rid both of Briggs and Lushington, I trust things will go on better for the
(l) Brother of the governor of Madras.
(2  ^ Bentinck to Raja, 7 Sept.1831, Beng.Sec.Cons. 7 Oct.1831. No. 10.
(3) Briggs to Bentinck, 16 Jan.1832, Bentinck Papers;
Lushington (governor) to Bentinck, 19 April 1832. ibid;
Briggs, minute, 6 Jan.1832, Briggs’s Papers, ff. 17-23, (Ms.Eng.his.c.334) 
Lushington, minute, 9 Jan.1832, ibid. ff. 23-26;
Briggs, rejoinder, 12 Jan.1832, ibid. ff. 27-36*
(4) E. Bell, Memoir of General John Briggs, 158-206.
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future*” (l) He felt that the party spirit and jealousy which he had seen 
thirty years ago in Madras was still rampant there* (2) In 1834> in 
accordance with the orders of the Directors, a single commissioner was 
appointed by Bentinck* He was Colonel W.Morison of the Madras Military 
Service. (3)
In 1832 Bentinck instituted a committee consisting of Major 
General Thomas Hawker, J.M. Macleod, Lieutenant Colonel W.Morison and 
Lieutenant Colonel Mark Cubbon to framea report on ”the origin, progress and 
suppression of the recent disturbances in Mysore including a detail of the 
consequences by which they may have been attended as affecting the lives and 
property of the people of the country.” His motive in forming the committee 
was, in his words, "to obtain the fullest and most accurate report which 
shall be subject to no imputation of partiality.”(4) The report of the 
committee was sent to the Supreme Government in December 1833 and was based 
on an examination of all documents that could afford light on the subject 
and on a large body of evidence collected by it.(5)
The report had a considerable influence in changing the mind 
of Bentinck in favour of the Raja. It furnished facts which, Bentinck said
t
(1) Bentinck to Ravenshaw, 11 Dec.1832, Bentinck Papers.
Lushington left the commission in the beginning of 1832. Briggsfs 
resignation was accepted in November 1832.
Bentinck to Stewart, 29 April 1834> Bentinck Papers.
(3j Bengal Despatches, 6 March 1833> No.7* Vol.122;
India Pol. Letters Reed. 14 April 1834» No.l. Vol. I.
(4) Beng. and India Sec. Letters Reed. 22 June I832.
(5) Report of the Enquiry Committee, op.cit.
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in his despatch to the Directors of 14 April 1834> were calculated to 
surprise the Directors no less than him. (l)
First and foremost was the statement that the circumstances of 
the ryots had greatly deteriorated during the administration of Dewan 
Purnaiya. "Accustomed as I had always been to hear the administration of 
that able man mentioned in terms of unqualified praise, I confess that I 
was forcibly struck with this assertion though I cannot doubt its accuracy."
(2)
It was further stated by the committee that the amassing of a large sum 
of money exceeding two crores of rupees by Purnaiya could not be regarded 
as having contributed to the prosperity of the people. It could not 
but have operated as if Mysore during his administration had "exported
anually seven lacs of canteroy pagodas (upwards of twenty lacs of rupees)
no t s
to a foreign countiy whence to part of it returned," (3)
The second fact in the report which appeared "remarkable" to
Bentinck was that as early as 1813 the resident had reported to the
government the "intolerable vices and corruptions" of the Raja*s rule and
that similar complaints had beeh repeated- from that time to the period of
assumption. But the British government had not only not intervened, it
had in I8I4 asked the resident "to abstain from the public reception of
complaints from the subjects of Mysore and from the avowed support of the
cause of those whose grievances might become known to him." (4)
The Raja at the time of his accession, the report stated was a
(1) India Pol. Letters Reed. 14 April 1834* No. 1. Vol. I.
(2) ibid.
(3) Report of the Enquiry Committee, op.cit.
(4) India Pol. Letters Reed. 14 April 1834* No. 1. Vol. I.
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boy of 16 years* His early education had been neglected, his company 
was of low and profligate persons and he had in consequence acquired bad 
habits. These circumstances entitled him to special care and protection*
I.t was necessary that the personal exercise of the powers of government 
he had assumed in 1811 should be watched and his extravagance checked.
It seemed particularly advisable because it was warranted by the treaty of 
1799 which brought him to the throne* In the words of the committee, this 
treaty not only committed "the defence and security of the country to the 
Honourable Company," but also placed the "civil administration of its 
affairs completely under the control and direction of the Company*s 
government." It was, the committee pointed out, not only in case of 
extreme misgovernment that the British government was authorised to 
interfere. Intervention was also meant to be exercised for introducing 
improvements into every branch of the administration. And it was 
therefore hoped by Lord Wellesley, who framed this treaty of 1799 > that 
the necessity for depriving the Raja of all the powers of government 
would never arise, (l)
It was also stated by the committee that the decline of revenue 
in the time of the Raja's period of power was not ascribable exclusively
(1) Report of the Enquiry Committee, op.cit.
The memorandum explanatory of the treaty expressing Wellesley's 
intentions stated that articles 4 and 5 of the treaty secured to "the 
Company the power not only of assuming the management of the Rajdis 
revenues either in time of peace or war, whenever such a measure may 
appear necessary, but also of introducing any improvements into any 
or each of the Rajahs administration (sic), which the Governor-General 
in Council may deem advisable. It may, therefore, be hoped that it 
will not be necessaiy to resort to the extreme measure of assuming the 
Rajah's country. The powers both of regulation and assumption are 
secured in the most unqualified manner for the purpose of avoiding the 
embarrassments which have occasioned so much inconvenience in Oude, 
Tanjore and the Carnatic." ^ Home Miso.Series, Vol.635. „
"Memorial explanatory of the Subsidiary Treaty of Mysore." p»200,
to misgovernment. It had also been effected by a fall in the price of 
agricultural produce which meant a corresponding diminution of revenue, 
by a reduction of the number of British forces stationed in Mysore, and 
by the end of the predatory character of the Mysore state after its 
conquest by the British in 1799* (l)
The report of the committee showed that the policy of non­
intervention followed with regard to Mysore for a long period was a 
departure from the letter, of the treaty of 1799 and the intentions of its 
author* To Bentinck it could not have failed to show the inadequacy of 
his views as set down in the despatch to the government of Madras dated 
8 June 1831, in which his policy was described as one of non-interference 
until disorganisation and disturbance compelled the British government to 
supersede the authority of the ruler entirely (p. 62 ). This view could 
hardly be said to apply to the Company's connexion with Mysore* Between 
the two extremes contemplated by Bentinck, the treaty of 1799, the report 
served to show conclusively, had been especially designed to ensure good 
government without entailing the entire suppression of the ruler's authority* 
Soon after receiving the report of the committee Bentinck paid 
a visit to Mysore* He had intended to do so soon after placing Mysore under 
the direct control of the Supreme Government in 1832 but various difficulties 
from time to time prevented him, and it was only in February 1834 that his 
visit could materialize. He found matters in Mysore in a settled state and 
the routine of business carried on with regularity. After staying at
(l) Report of the Enquiry Committee, op.cit.
Bangalore for a number of days he proceeded to Mysore, (l) Here he met 
the Raja and was favourably impressed by him. He considered him "intelligent 
and sensible" and his disposition the reverse of "tyrannical and cruel."
(2) At the meeting the Raja protested in person that he had always been 
devoted to the British cause. Prinsep considered the "circumstances of 
his elevation" a sufficient guarantee for his attachment. (3) Bentinck 
was also impressed by his faithfulness and wrote subsequently to the 
Directors that whatever his past errors might have been he had "never 
forgotten his obligation and duties to the Company!s government." (4) The 
Raja had been careful in the discharge of his financial obligations to 
the Company, as stipulated in the treaty of 1799* The Mysore commissioners 
testified that "the fixed sum of twenty four lacs and fifty thousand rupees 
has been paid annually for the last thirty years from the Mysore- resources 
on account of the Madras Government and that the payment has been made by 
monthly instalments of Rs. 204>l66. That this should be done is stipulated 
by the treaty of Seringapatam." (5)
From Mysore, Bentinck went to Ootacumund in the Hilgiri hills 
for reasons of health, and there found leisure to think over Mysore affairs.
By this time he had begun to feel that he had not been just to the Raja in 
having ordered the assumption of the whole country. He had also begun to 
feel that he had not given the Raja a definite warning that his country
(1) India Pol.Letters Reed. 14 April 1834* No. 1. Vol. I.
(2) Beng. and India Sec. Letters Reed. 14 April 1834*
(3) Prinsep, H.T., Histor:/ of the Political and Military Transactions in India
(4) Beng. and India Sec.Letters Reed. 14 April 1834* ( T, 16.
(5) Commission to Madras Govt., 19 July 1832, Boardfs Collections.Yol.1393*
would be assumed if his neglect continued* Perhaps the Raja had believed 
sincerely that in the last resort his misgovernment could be punished by 
the nomination of a Dewan supported by British authority* The Rajafs 
mind, according to the resident, had "for years past been prepared to 
expect that the British government v/ould eventually resort to the 
experiment of constituting a Dewan vested with adequate authority to collect 
and divert the management of the revenues in Mysore and the payment of 
establishments• " (l)
From Ootacamund Bentinck wrote two despatches bearing the same 
date viz, 14 April 1834 > °ne addressed to the Court of Directors and the 
other to the Secret Committee. In the former he expressed his views on the 
circumstances which had led to his assuming the powers of government and the 
plan of administration.to be adopted in Mysore* (2) In the latter he 
suggested an alternative which he thought preferable to assumption and 
advantageous both to the British government and to the Raja. The alternative 
proposed was that the divisions of Nagar, Chitaldroog and Bangalore, or 
more, if necessary to yield an annual revenue of 13 lakhs of pagodas should 
be ceded to the British government and the remainder, namely the divisions 
of Ashtagram, Manjarabad and Kasha Mysore should be restored to the Raja 
under securities for good government. (3) Urging the acceptance of his 
proposal Bentinck wrotes
(1) Resident to Govt*, 16 Sept.1831, Beng.Sec.Cons* 14 Oct* 1831* No. 27•
(2j India Pol. Letters Reed* 14 April 1834* No. 1. Vol. I*
(3) Beng* and India Sec* Letters Reed. 14 April 1834J
Despatches to India and Bengal, 25 Sept. 1835* No. 45> Vol. 6.
The pecuniary claims of the British government on Mysore amounted 
to 13 laSdis of pagodas.
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"By the adoption of the arrangement which I advocate 
certain doubts will be removed which I cannot help 
entertaining both as to the legality and the justice, 
according to a strict interpretation, of the course that 
has been pursued. The Treaty warrants our assumption of 
the country with a view to secure the payment of our 
subsidy. The assumption was actually made on account 
of the Rajah's misgovemment. The subsidy does not 
appear to have been in any immediate jeopardy. Again 
the Treaty authorises us to assume such part or parts 
of the country as may be necessary to render the funds 
which we claim sufficient and available. The whole has 
been assumed although a part would unquestionably have 
sufficed for the purpose specified in the Treaty. And 
with regard to the justice of the case I cannot but 
think that it would have been more fair towards the Rajah 
had a more distinct and positive warning been given him 
that the decided measure since adopted would be put in 
force if misgovernment should be found to prevail."(l)
These words show a marked change in the ideas of Bentinck in
regard to his interference in Mysore. In his despatch to the Secret
Committee dated 6 September 1331 he had held the assumption to be fully
warranted by the peculiar relations of the British government with Mysore 9
by the specific stipulations of the treaty of 1799 an^ in consequence of
the misgovernment which had prevailed in Mysore. (2) In the letter to the
be
Raja of 7 September 1831 he had stated assumption to/indispensable on 
these grounds. (3)
In Bentinck1s letter to the Raja of 7 September 1831 the government 
of Madras had changed a few vrords to suit the terms of the treaty of 1799*
In place of Bentinck*s words "the subsidy due to the British government is 
several months in arrears," the government of Madras on enquiry substituted
(1) Beng. and India Sec. Letters Reed. 14 April 1934* para 8.
(2) Beng. Sec. Letters Reed. 6 Sept. 1831.
(3) Bentinck to Raja, 7 Sept. 1831, Beng.Sec.Cons. 7 Oct. 1831. No.10.
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these words, "the subsidy due to the British government has not been paid 
monthly according to the treaty of 6 July 1799*,f But this "correction" 
appeared to Bentinck to be of no consequence. As late as June 1832 he 
maintained "The error, however, had little or no influence on the merits 
of the ^ question as affecting my decision." (l) This further strengthens 
the view that the consideration of the subsidy did not weigh with him 
materially at the time of his deciding on the assumption of the country 
in September 1831* The assumption was at that time (1831) considered 
fully legal, just and necessary on the ground of misgovernment. It was, 
in addition, intended by Bentinck to be an example to the princes of India 
of the open and avowed nature of British intervention when necessary. (2) 
After having such definite views at the time of the assumption Bentinck*s 
subsequent doubts of the legality and justice of his action seem to betray 
weakness and inconsistency.
The confusion will be more apparent if the words quoted (on 
page. 72 ) are studied closely. They suggest that the legality and
justice of the assumption could not go hand-in-hand. If the basis of the 
assumption of a part or the whole of Mysore was only the security of the 
subsidy than it is clear that the assumption could not be decreed legally 
on other grounds. In that case a positive warning, as justice appeared to 
Bentinck to demand, that the assumption of the entire country would be 
carried out for misgovernment was misleading.
a) Beng. and India See, Letters ^ecd. 22 June 1832.
In this.letter the treaty was wrongly dated 6 July 1799 instead of
8 July 1799.
Treaties and Agreements with Country Powers in India, 1795-1802.
Home Misc. Series. Vol. 635* PP* 181-198*
(2) Beng. Sec. Letters Reed. 6 Sept. 1831.
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Surely the cause of Bentinck1s misgiving was his realisation 
in the light of the enquiry committeeTs report that his views on the 
question of interference, as given in the despatch to the government of Madras 
of 8 June 1831 (p»62) were not applicable to Mysore. He further realised
that before entirely excluding the Rajafs authority he had not made use
of the extensive powers of interposition vested by Lord Wellesley in the 
British government and especially designed to prevent assumption. The 
report of the committee in a definite manner pointed out the existence of 
those powers and their being exercised for ensuring good government. In 
his despatch to the Directors Bentinck himself refers (quoting the words 
of the enquiry committee) to "those powers of control and regulation, the 
exercise of which was expected by the Marquis Wellesley to prove the means
of preventing any necessity for a resort to the measure of resumption u(l)
The state of Mysore at the time of its very establishment in 1799 had been 
so much dependent on the British government that James Llill considered the 
Raja and his ministers to be vicegerents of the British government. Mill 
even thought that the installation of the Hindu Raja on the throne was a 
screen to hide from European and Indian eyes the extent of British 
territorial aggrandizement. "It enabled the Governor-G-eneral to dismiss 
Nizam Ali with a much smaller share of the prey, than would have satisfied 
him, had the English taken without disguise the whole of what in this manner 
they actually appropriated." (2)
(1) India Pol.Letters Reed. 14 April 1834* No.l. Vol.I.
(2) James Mill, The History of British India, VI, 164-165*
Lord Wellesley himself wrote to Dundas on the settlement after the 
conquest of Mysore "The present settlement is more gracious, and 
as effectual in point of real power, as that which seems to have 
formed the extreme point of your wishes."
Wellesley to Dundas, 29 Jan.1800, Wellesley1s Despatches (Martin),11,203*
Under these circumstances it is clear that the policy of non­
intervention pursued towards Mysore since 1814 was ill assorted with the 
Company1s connexion with that state. To such an extent was this policy 
pursued that Casamaijor wrote in 1833 that "the Rajah1s administration over 
his country has been totally uncontrolled by any local or presiding 
influence, direct or indirect" and further that" the Rajah*s supremacy to 
exercise independent rule has never been invaded." (l) And this had been 
done in spite of the Raja’s having never abided by his promises to amend 
his administration "since his first admission to exercise independent 
power." (2)
Thus a number of factors made Bentinck feel favourably disposed 
to the Raja. His ommission to make use of the extensive powers of 
interference vested in the British government before entirely excluding 
the Raja from power was one consideration. Another was the Raja’s 
attachment to the British, together with his discharge of his financial 
obligations. His meeting with the Raja further impressed him. He read 
the Raja’s character in a favourable light and saw in him the ability to 
make a good ruler. Thus influenced, in April 1834 be recommended to his 
superiors the restoration of about half of Mysore to the Raja. He felt 
confident that the interests of the people of the restored territory 
would not suffer under this arrangement, and that the Raja would not fail 
to bring his good qualities into active use. "The personal character of
(1) Resident to Enquiry Committee, 19 Sept. 1833> Home Misc.Series. Vol.709*
p.1693.
(2) ibid. p. 1691.
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the Rajah," he told his superiors, "has I confess materially weighed with 
me in recommending the measure above adverted to." (l)
The Directors, however, could not share his optimism about the 
future conduct of the Raja and held more consistently that "the same reasons 
which serve to recommend the restoration to the Raja of a portion of the 
country, will in our opinion, recommend the restoration of the whole."(2) 
Their adverse decision was received after Bentinck's return.
To conclude, on finding misgovernment in Mysore in an acute 
form and insurrection in one half of his dominions, Bentinck became con­
vinced of the need to supersede the Raja's authority. Such a step he 
considered to be fully warranted by the treaty of 1799 and by the protective 
character of the British government towards Mysore. Hov^ ever, the report 
of the committee which he had appointed to report on the insurrection brought 
about a change in his views. He came to see that between the two extremes 
of intervention and non-intervention he had not made use of the extensive 
powers of interference vested in the British government by Lord T.7ellesley.
He realised also that his general ideas on the question of interference 
did not suit the Company's connexion with Mysore. This omission on the 
part of his predecessors, and no less of himself, to have used those 
powers before assumption, combined with the Raja's attachment and discharge 
of his financial obligations, caused Bentinck some misgiving. He felt that 
he had not been just to the Raja in having deprived him of all the powers 
of government without a positive warning. On meeting the Raja, he read
(1) Beng. and India Sec* Letters Reed. 14 April 1834*
(2) Despatches to India and Bengal, 25 Sept. 1835* No.45* Vol. 6*
his character favourably and felt sure that he would not fail to benefit 
from his past errors and make a good ruler in the future. Peeling 
confidence in the Raja’s future good behaviour he recommended to his 
superiors the restoration of a part of Mysore to him. He did not fear 
that the interests of the people in the restored territory would suffer 
and he looked hopefully to the acceptance of his plan by the home govern­
ment. But this attitude, and the proposal in which it resulted, while 
showing his uprightness in the highest degree, was an indication of the 
weakness of his position and was not accepted by the home authorities*
CHAPTER IV 
BENTINCK AND NON-INTERVENTION
The instances of Nagpur, Oudh ,and Hyderabad 
show that Bentinck had conceived a radical solution 
of the problem of the Indian states. He not only 
did not interfere in Oudh where misgovernment had 
existed for a long period but he also withdrew British 
control from Nagpur and Hyderabad in the hope that 
these princes when left to themselves would sincerely 
seek to advance the welfare of their subjects. This 
attitude of allowing these princes internal freedom 
was characteristic of his general conduct towards the 
states.
Bentinckfs aim in his relations with the Indian 
states was to secure reform by the princes through 
their own officers. This appeared to him to be the 
most satisfactory way of setting things right. He 
felt that if the princes had the maximum amount of 
internal freedom they could not fail to be influenced 
by their vast power of doing good to their subjects. 
The sheer weight of such responsibility appeared to
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him to he an effective antidote against pleasure- 
seeking and capricious use of authority. An active 
policy of intervention was ruled out. It produced 
bitterness, discord and dual control. It worked when 
the ruler was a minor as in Mysore (under Purnaiya) 
and Nagpur or when the ruler had been deprived of all 
effective authority as in Hyderabad. Even when it 
brought about improvement through European agency it 
could not, he thought, be a permanent arrangement.
It left the Indian state only a nominal existence and 
was not conducive to the growth of co-operation, 
goodwill and understanding on which he wanted to build 
British relations with the Indian states.
He was no admirer of the personal character 
and accomplishments of the Indian princes many of whom 
were seen to be extravagant and indifferent to the 
welfare of their subjects. But he believed that if 
they were given full power and responsibility the result 
would be favourable. Such a belief appeared to emerge 
from his faith in human nature and its capacity for
(l) Bentinck, minute, 15 Nov. 1829 9 Beng.Pol.Cons. 
27 Nov. 1829. No.39.
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advance by education and training. He thought that 
the human mind was in no way static and he found the 
character of the people of India changing and susceptible 
of improvement.^”^  The same belief made him look on 
the princes as capable of being transformed into 
benevolent sovereigns if properly influenced. His tours 
in India strengthened him in thinking of establishing 
closer contact with the Indian princes as a mode of 
influencing their conduct. In a letter to Grant from 
the western provinces he writes:
111 am glad to think that the personal 
intercourse with the chiefs themselves 
and a quick and easy interchange of 
opinions with them upon all public subjects 
which my residence in these provinces has 
enabled me to hold has greatly tended to 
improve our mutual relations. They have had 
the opportunity of better knowing our 
intentions, confidence has been strengthened, 
and measures as much for their benefit as 
ours have been carried through friendly 
explanation. One of these has been, upon a 
simple invitation, an almost general consent... 
to abolish the traffic in slaves which has 
been carried on to a great extent in these 
upper parts of India, particularly in young 
girls...I have also had the opportunity of 
putting a stop to the improper interference 
exercised by our agents in the affairs of 
these chiefs, derogatory to their independence 
and opposed to our true policy. My idea is 
that the greater our power is , and it is by 
all acknowledged to be paramount and irresistible,
(l) Bentinck, minute, 30 May 1829> P.P. 1831-32, VIII, 
General Appendix, 276.
the more carefully concealed should be its 
display on the part of our agents, but they 
all like to play the king."(l)
Bentinck hoped much from influencing the princes
by closer contact. At an early period of his
administration he urged the transfer of the seat of
government to some point in the western provinces which
would among other things enable the Supreme Government
to establish a better communication with the princes.
His proposal was rejected but he urged the change again
(2)on several occasions. f
When giving his opinion on the subject of the
constitution of the Indian government he stated the
advantages of Allahabad as the seat of the Supreme
Government in the following words:
"No spot presents so many advantages for direct 
control, and for ready intercourse with the most 
distant Provinces, and for the despatch of all 
business, as Allahabad. I annex to this Minute 
a Map showing its contiguity to our most 
important affairs. It is immediately adjacent 
to Oude, to the Saugor and Nerbudda territories, 
to Bundlecund; it has under its eye the revenue 
settlements of the Upper Provinces...Gwalior,
Malwa and Rajpootana are all brought within easy
(1) Bentinck to Grant, 22 Dec. 1832, Bentinck Papers.
(2) Bengal Despatches, 3 July 1829, Vol. Ill;
Dalhousie, memorandum on the removal of government 
dated 15 March 1830, Bentinck Papers.
means of immediate superintendence, and of 
personal communication if necessary.fTCl)
That the princes enjoying internal freedom 
should in close association with the British government 
sincerely improve the condition of their people was 
Bentinck's main hope. In pursuit of that aim he would 
make full allowance for the shortcomings of the princes 
and carry non-intervention to great lengths.
The case of Nagpur elicited Bentinckfs most 
optimistic hopes and saw their comparative fulfilment. 
In 1818, after the defeat and deposition of Appa Sahib 
in the last Maratha war, the grandson of Baghuji II 
(1788-1816) was placed on the throne. He assumed the 
name of Baghuji III after the ceremony of adoption in 
the usual Maratha fashion. As he was a minor, affairs 
during his nonage were superintended by the resident 
with the assistance of British officers in the various
(l) Bentinck. minute, 14 Sept. 1831, P.P. 1833, 
XXV (418) 54.
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departments of government.
This system continued till 1826, when the Raja
reached his majority and a treaty was made with him
to define his relations with the British government.
This treaty of 1 December 1826 made British influence
in the state all pervasive. The Raja surrendered some
territories in perpetuity in lieu of the subsidy paid
(2 )by the state for the subsidiary force. ' He further 
assigned a number of districts to the British govern­
ment as a guarantee for the payment of the state forces 
which were to be under Eritish control. The rest of 
the territories were left to the Raja for direct 
administration with a promise that if he governed well 
the assigned districts would also be restored to him 
in the future. * Various limitations however upon 
an independent use of power by the Raja were imposed.
He was required to heed British advice in matters 
relating to the revenues of the state, the administration 
of justice and police, and the regulation of commerce
(1) R. Jenkins, Report on the Territories of the Raja 
of Nagpur, 1826.
R. Jenkins was resident at Nagpur from 1807 to 1827. 
On his retirement he became first a Director and then 
Chairman of the East India Company.
(2) Aitchison, Treaties, I, Treaty of 1 Dec. 1826,
Article 5, 427-
(3) ibid. Articles 8 and 9, 428.
and industry. He was to appoint as ministers such
persons as had British confidence. In all appointments
to civil offices the Raja was also to he guided by
the advice of the British government. In addition he
was to adopt all regulations suggested by the British
government for ensuring "order, economy and integrity”
(1)in every department of government.v J
In case of mismanagement on the part of the Raja
and financial confusion in the state the treaty gave
the British government the right to assume part or the
(2 )whole of the country. 7
It was felt that a literal execution of the treaty 
would hardly leave the Raja, any freedom of action what­
ever , and so the intention of the government was stated
to be ”to interfere as little as possible in the
(*3 )
administration of public affairs.”v 7 This view was 
supported by the Directors also in their despatch of 
26 November 1828. They observed that from the mere 
fact that these powers were possessed it did not follow
(1) ibid. Article 10, 428-429*
(2) ibid. Article 12, 429-430.
(3) G-ovt. to Resident, 8 Sept. 1826, Enclos. to Beng.
Sec. Letters Reed. Vol. 32.
85
that "they should be hastily or vexatiously exercised," 
The right even of giving advice was to be exercised 
with "forbearance" so as to convince the Raja that the 
British government was not inclined to curb his freedom 
of action as long as he managed the internal affairs 
well •
In the limited sphere allowed to the Raja, he 
managed the affairs of his state well, and the resident, 
impressed with his ability, submitted favourable reports 
of his character and endowments. He was described as 
quick, intelligent and painstaking, with a sincere 
desire to promote the happiness and prosperity of his 
subjects. He superintended the administration himself 
with care and efficiency and paid "continued unremitting" 
attention to the affairs of the state. He maintained 
a keen eye on the public expenditure and examined the 
accounts himself. On all important matters the advice 
of the resident was voluntarily sought and unreserved 
and cordial communication maintained with him. In 
short, the resident said, the expectations formed of 
the Raja seemed to have been amply fulfilled and the 
territories given to him could not be said to have
(1) Bengal Despatches, 26 Uov. 1828, para. 5, Vol.108.
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suffered any deterioration in the administration.^^
Bentinck1s attention to British relations with
Nagpur was drawn by the Deputy Secretary to the Bengal
Government, A. Sterling. In a note prepared in
September 1829 he stated that British relations with
this state could be modified considerably to the advantage
of both the Raja and the British government. This, he
said, could be done by making over the assigned districts
to the Raja for an annual money payment. The Rajafs
army, hitherto officered by British officers and under
British control, and for which these districts were held
as assignments, should also be restored to the Rajafs
control. Peace in India and tranquillity in Nagpur had
become well-established and it was unlikely that the
services of the Raja's army would in fact be needed
in future. Hence the change, Sterling said, could be
safely effected to the mutual advantage of both the
governments, one gaining a fixed annual sum for the
British treasury, the other gaining in territory,
(2)"dignity, welfare and prosperity."v J
(1) Resident (P.B.S. Wilder) to Govt., 23 Aug. 1828, 
Beng. Pol. Cons. 13 Sept. 1828 No. 53.
He was resident from 1828 to 1830.
(2) Sterling, Note, 15 Sept. 1829, Beng. Pol. Cons. 
27 Nov. 1829. No. 35.
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Bentinck agreed entirely with Sterling in regard 
to a change in British relations with Nagpur* In a 
long minute dated 15 November 1829 he expressed himself 
strongly in favour of the proposed modification of the 
treaty of 1826* In seeking to effect the change, he 
said, he wished "to promote the interests and welfare, 
as well as to gratify the feelings, of the Rajah, and 
at the same time to secure a considerable pecuniary 
advantage to the Honourable Company." The arrangement 
made after the conquest of Nagpur in 1818 and modified 
by the treaty of 1826 he considered to have justified 
its purpose in establishing good government in Nagpur.
But with British superintendents in charge of all the 
districts, British officers in command of the Raja!s 
army and the Rajafs authority so greatly circumscribed, 
could it be considered a permanent arrangement?
Bentinckfs answer was in the negative. Bor one reason, 
the government of Amherst had considered themselves 
bound to restore Nagpur to a position of independence.^^ 
The treaty also stipulated for the restoration of the
(1) G-ovt. to Resident, 8 Sept. 1826, Enclos. to Beng. 
Sec. Letters Reed. Vol. 32;
Beng. Pol. Letters Reed. 7 July 1826, Vol. 19.
assigned districts to the Raja in the event of his
giving a good account of himself. For another, and
in Bentinck1s opinion, a more important reason, it
ran counter to his policy of "relieving the native
princes of India in alliance with the Honourable
Company from every degree of control and interference
(1)in their internal administration."v '
Holding such views Bentinck had reason to be 
dissatisfied with the arrangement at Nagpur which held 
the Raja in complete subordination to the British 
government. "The entire army of the state of Nagpur," 
he continued, in the minute, "is to all intents and 
purposes, a British force at the exclusive command and 
disposal of the Representative of the British government.. 
Even in that portion of the country which has been given 
up to the Rajah he is not allowed to exercise independent 
authority." The treaty admitted British intervention 
"in the minutest details of his internal administration." 
It even bound him "to be guided by the resident in 
filling up appointments to his civil establishments and 
in regulating the expenditure of his Court and
(l) Bentinck, minute, 15 Nov. 1829, Beng. Pol. Cons. 
27 Nov. 1829. No. 39.
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household. " ^ ^
Bentinck thus saw the Raja in a state of
rithraldom” and was eager to see him as a "Sovereign
Prince in the possession of his whole territory and
the command of the armies of his government.” Bentinck
saw that the British officers in Ragpur would have to
he withdrawn and would he affected adversely if the
(2)change was brought about. ' But he would not shrink
on that account. The Raja was to he left free to
choose his own men as ministers and officers to run
(3)his own affairs. '
Thus resolved on effecting a change Bentinck 
was not slow in taking the initiative. Without the 
prior consent of the home government he pushed through 
the measure. In a demi-official despatch the resident 
at Ragpur was asked to give his opinion as to the 
probable reaction of the Raja to the change. It was 
intended, he was told, that the consent of the Raja
(1) ibid.
(2) Demi-official Letter to Resident, 30 Sept. 1829, Beng. 
Pol. Cons. 27 Rov. 1829, Ro.36.
(3) Govt, to Resident, 27 Rov. 1829, Beng. Pol. Cons.
27 Rov. 1829. Ro. 41, para. 6;
Bentinck to Astell, 1 Rov. 1829, Bentinck Papers.
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should be free and uninfluenced.^^ The resident
sounded the Baja on the proposal and received his
ready consent to the measure. The Baja had not
expected the initiative to come from the side of the
British government and he welcomed the change all the
(2)more on thaf account. 7 A new treaty was the result,
(3)cheerfully executed on both sides.
By this treaty the Baja was given the administration 
of the reserved districts for an annual sum of 8 lacs 
of rupees to be paid to the British government. He 
received further the entire control of the state army 
from which British officers were to be withdrawn. The 
Baja was to hold inviolate all engagements of the 
British government with his tributary chiefs and 
zamindars. ^  ^
The power of unrestricted interference vested 
in the British government by the treaty of 1826 was
(1) Demi-official Letter to Besident, 30 Sept.1829, ibid,.
(2) Besident to Govt., 25 Oct. 1829, Beng.Pol.Cons.
27 Bov. 1829. Bo.37.
(3) Aitchison, Treaties, I, Treaty of 26 Dec. 1829, 
434-436.
(4) ibid.
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also modified. It was, however, stipulated as a 
precaution that the British government would be 
competent to offer advice to the Raja on all important 
matters of internal and external concern which he 
would be bound to accept. Further in the event of 
"gross and systematic oppression and anarchy and 
misrule" the British government could resume the 
management of the affected districts.
Lest Bentinckfs intentions be misunderstood
the resident was asked to apprise the Raja distinctly that
the right of offering advice was not intended to curb
his freedom of judgement in matters relating to the
selection of his ministers and officers and their
conduct in the several departments of government. The
power of assumption, the Raja was also to be told, was
meant only for an extreme situation which it was
(2 )confidently hoped would never arise. '
The treaty with the Raja was ratified and 
implemented but it was not approved by Ellenborough 
at the head of the India Board (1828-30). The 
relinquishment of control over the state army became
(1) ibid.
(2) Govt, to Resident, 27 Nov. 1829, Beng. Pol. Cons. 
27 Nov. 1829. No. 41.
an object of special censure and was altogether 
disapproved. The British supremacy in India, it was 
stated, had been firmly established but for its 
maintenance it was imperative that military power 
in India should remain exclusively in British hands. 
Ellenborough who was viewing with great concern the 
increase of Russian influence in Central Asia con­
sidered this point particularly important. "To what 
purpose," he asked indignantly, "should the Rajah of 
Berar possess an army of his own? We cannot permit 
him to use it in a contest with a native power...
It is against ourselves only that it can be available 
at some moment when a war upon a distant frontier, 
or any internal convulsion may distract our forces." 
And as Bentinck at this time was contemplating similar 
action in regard to the Hyderabad contingent he was 
distinctly instructed not to alter (except in an 
emergency) any existing arrangement without the 
prior consent of the home government.
Bentinck's general policy of non-intervention 
in the internal affairs of the states was also not 
appreciated. Freedom in internal affairs (conceived
(l) Board’s Secret Drafts, 9 June 1830, Vol. 7.
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largely in a military sense), it was held, could not 
fail to produce a desire for freedom in external 
affairs and was thus incompatible with the maintenance 
of "undisputed supremacy" in India.
To the question whether British supremacy so
asserted was an argument for exercising control in
the internal affairs of the states in general in
order to ensure good government, Ellenborough1s despatch
gave no positive answer. It held:
"Where our interference in the internal 
administration of a state is neither directly 
nor indirectly the result of our engagements 
nothing but the just and reasonable apprehension 
that its maladministration may endanger the 
general peace can justify our authoritative 
intervention in its affairs. The benefits 
which in a particular case might attend our 
intervention would be more than counter­
balanced by the danger of violating a principle 
of national law. " ^ 7
This could be said to be a reiteration of the 
old argument of non-intervention but the despatch as 
a whole gave an impression of a strong disapproval of 
the policy of the Indian government and was so under- 
stood by them. 7
(1) ibid.
(2) ibid. para. 30.
(3) Bentinck to Astell, 14 Nov. 1830, Bentinck Papers.
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On receiving this despatch Bentinck made no
official reply in justification of his action hut
privately he thought that he would rather resign
than give up the 11 liberal'1 policy he was pursuing
(1)in relation to the Indian states. 1 By this time
some of Bentinck's other administrative measures had
been alike disliked in England and perhaps he did not
(2)feel inclined to carry the matter further. J
Metcalfe, however, fortified by his long
experience in political matters was not quiescent
and upheld Bentinck's policy in toto in a long minute
recorded on the occasion. He defined Bentinck's policy
in these words:
"We adhere faithfully to treaties. We respect 
the rights of other states. We protect all in 
alliance with us from interference in their 
internal affairs. And when as sometimes happens 
and as happened in the case of Bharatpur, 
interference becomes unavoidable, we hasten to 
restore the sovereignty of the lawful prince 
and recede from interference as soon as possible."^ '
(1) Bentinck to ^Anonymous/ 9 Nov. 1830, Bentinck Papers.
(2) Ravenshaw to Bentinck, 1 Feb. 1830, Bentinck Papers.
(3) Metcalfe, minute, 20 Dec. 1830, Beng.Sec.Cons.
31 Dec. 1830. Bo.l.
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With this he found the views of Ellenborough 
to come into sharp conflict and sought a clear 
definition of the views of the home government on 
the policy to be followed in relation to the Indian 
states.
Despite the censure of the home government
the change effected by Bentinck was continued. It
worked smoothly and Bentinck had reason to feel that
his confidence had not been misplaced. The Baja
continued to govern well in co-operation with the
British government. The zamihdars were kept in check,
the people protected and order maintained in the
country. The Baja's government compared well with
that of other states. Describing the effect of the
change introduced in 1829 the resident in Nagpur,
(2 )H.S. Graemev } wrote in 1834:
"The practical effect of the treaty of 1829 
has been favourable. The Bajah has on all 
occasions evinced a ready attention to the 
wishes of the government and no intrigue has 
sprung up with a view of disturbing or 
weakening the alliance...The zamindars of 
Nagpur have retained indeed their obedience 
to the government of Nagpur... The police it 
is acknowledged has been conducted with a
(1) ibid.
(2) H.S. Graeme was resident from 1831 to 1834.
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vigilance and simplicity superior to that 
of the neighbouring countries and violent 
outrages in the Nagpur country were of a 
rarer occurrence than elsewhere.11
The Raja continued to govern his country till
his death in 1853 , when on account of the failure of
(2)a natural heir it was annexed to British territory. '
In Oudh Bentinck was faced with the task of 
reconciling the British obligation to protect the 
ruler from internal rebellion with the obligation to 
protect his subjects from the incidents of misgovern- 
ment. The one arose from the treaty stipulations of 
the British government with Oudh, the other from its 
paramouht position in India. The policy of the British 
government towards this state wavered between intervention 
and non-intervention for a long time, and no 
improvement in the condition of government was
(1) H.S. Graeme, Memorandum on Nagpur, 10 April 1834, 
Bentinck Papers.
(2) In later years the Raja- 1 s administration appears 
to have declined and many abuses in the government 
crept in.
Mansel (commissioner of Nagpur) to Govt., 29 April 1854, 
P.P. 1856, XLY (82) p.7;
Ramsay (Ex-resident) to Govt., 5 Peb.1855, ibid. 46-52.
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e f f e c t e d . L o r d  Wellesley saw a solution for the
problems of Oudh in its annexation to British territory
and felt irritated when the Nawab evaded what he
considered to be a voluntary offer to relinquish his
(2 )
authority in favour of the British govefnment. 1
The treaty which he forced on the Nawab in 1801
guaranteed him protection against foreign and domestic
enemies and bound him to act always in conformity with
(3)British advice. 1 The course of policy adopted by
Lord Minto and Lord Hastings in regard to Oudh was that
of non-intervention.^^ The British government would
advise and remonstrate but take no action even though
(5)the condition continued to be unsatisfactory. ' A 
strong resident could however exercise great influence
(1) N.B. Edmonstone, Note on Oudh, Bentinck Papers.
It is not dated but refers to Bentinck's period.
H.M. Lawrence, Essays on Indian Army and Qude, 280-343.
(2) P.E. Roberts, India Under Wellesley, 123-124.
(3) Aitchison, Treaties, I, Treaty of 10 Nov. 1801.
Article VI, 126.
(4) Bentinck, minute, 30 July 1831, Beng. Pol. Cons.
30 Sept. 1831 No.2.
(5) Prinsep, "Note on the Policy of Interference and 
Non-interference for the consideration of the 
governor-general.11 18 Dec. 1830, Bentinck Papers.
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in the councils of the Oudh Government and even shape 
events in Oudh, The large sums of money obtained from 
the Nawab in the time of Lord Hastings and Lord Amherst 
against his real wishes indicate that the British 
government could in the last resort hope to see its 
views accepted by the Oudh government. This would 
apply all the more when a weak ruler had to look to
the resident for the protection of his authority against
dU.^coriteriteJL
his dtseent'ed subjects or his powerful minister*
This was abundantly shown in 1827 when King Ghazi-ud-din 
Haidar died at the age of fifty-three and was succeeded 
by his twenty-five year old son Mirza Nasir-ud-din 
Haidar.
During the life-time of Ghazi-ud-din his powerful 
minister Moatamuddaula was found to be in open enmity 
with Mirza Nasir-ud-din. And so it was expected that 
on coming to the throne the king would hasten to 
disgrace the minister. But the minister in fact proved
(1) Baillie, Note on Oudh loans, 20 June 1827, Bentinck 
Papers.
Baillie was resident at Lucknow from 1807 to 1815.
In 1923 he was elected a Director of the East Indea 
Company, Dictionary of National Biography.
See also J. Patonf The British Government and the 
Kingdom of Oudh. edited by B. Prasad. 80-90.
J. Paton was assistant resident at Lucknow in 
Bent inckf s t ime.
For early British influence in Oudh see Dr.C.C.Davies> 
Warren Hastings and Oudh.
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to be too powerful for the new king and so instead of
removing him from his office the king for a time decided
to make a virtue of necessity. He was outwardly all
praise for the minister and sought to placate him with
extravagant gifts. The resident, M. Ricketts was
greatly surprised at the behaviour of the king and he
did not like the continuance of the minister's
ascendancy. Thinking that during the life-time of
the king's father the minister's influence had contributed
to "misrule, oppression, internal disorder and contempt
of law and right," he took it upon himself to bring
about the fall of the minister without authority from
(2 )the government.v *
He made use of the visit of the commander-in- 
chief, Lord Combermere to Lucknow, in December 1827> 
to ascertain the real wishes of the king with respect 
to the minister. At his suggestion, at a conference 
between the king and Combermere at which neither the
(1) M. Ricketts was resident from 1823 to 1830 and was 
followed by Maddock (1830-31)# Col. John Low was 
appointed resident in 1831 and held office till 1843.
(2) Eeng. Pol. Letters Reed. 22 Peb. 1828. Vol. 20.
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resident nor the minister was present, the subject was 
broached by the commander-in-chief and the king 
unreservedly expressed his fear of the minister. He 
stated himself to be entirely in the grasp of the 
minister, told his guest that he was in fact oppressed 
by him and that if the minister came to know the hatred 
he (the king) bore him or the conversation that had 
taken place about him he would unscrupulously contrive 
to have him poisoned. The king wanted to be rid of 
the minister and said that he would be too grateful if 
when the minister accompanied Combermere out of the 
city he would take him away with him for good, or even 
better, if the minister were banished to England.
This verbal expression of the king’s wish to be 
rid of the minister was followed by a letter to the 
same effect. The king also appealed personally to the
(2 )resident to release him from the minister's "thraldom".
The resident welcomed the decision of the king 
and promised assistance if the personal safety of the
(1) Resident to G-ovt. 18 Dec. 1827, Eeng. Pol. Cons.
11 Jan. 1828. Hos. 25 and 26.
(2) Resident to G-ovt., 31 Dec. 1827, Beng. Pol. Cons. 
18 Jan. 1828. Ho. 13. para. 2.
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minister was not threatened and if the minister was
placed under British protection after his dismissal.
The king acceded to this proposal.
The minister was accordingly invited to the
residency and told of the kingfs decision to remove
him from office. He was further informed on behalf
of the British government that if he submitted quietly
to the kingfs decision and did not create any
disturbance in the country he would be allowed to
depart from Oudh in peace under a British guarantee
of protection. Being thus confronted by the resident
(2)the minister agreed to lay down his authority. 7
The residents action in taking upon himself
the removal of the minister was severely criticised
(3 )by the Bengal and home governments. 7 It served, 
however, to show the internal weakness of Oudh and its 
dependence on the British goverhment to a delicate degree.
In other ways the British government exercised 
influence in the councils of Oudh government. One such 
way was to guarantee interest on loans from the Oudh 
government to the wives of Oudh rulers "their relations
(1) ibid. para. 3.
(2) ibid. para. 4.
(3) Govt, to Resident, 8 Peb. 1828, Beng. Pol. Cons. 8 Peb.
1828. No. 31; Bengal Despatches, 28 Jan. 1829.
Vol.109.
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and favourites, their families and establishments.”
The British resident held a weekly Darbar where amidst 
f,the pomp of Eastern state the Vakeels of these Oude 
Princesses, the guaranteed nobles and other individuals 
assembled" to seek redress against the king!s government. 
The issues were often petty but they produced bitter 
feeling between the two governments. The special 
position enjoyed by these people became for them a 
privileged possession, used on occasions to disregard 
the authority of the king's government.
The British government was aware of the evil
effects of this arrangement "the obvious tendency of
which was to impair the legitimate rights of the native
government of Oude and to involve the British authorities
in endless disputes and vexatious interference .regarding
the domestic concerns and private interests of the
(2 )individuals."v 7 Metcalfe condemned the practice as 
setting aside the authority of the ruler and in effect 
establishing "a jurisdiction in counteraction of that of 
the ruler of the country, or at least separate from it,
(1) Baton to Govt., 7 July 1831, Beng. Pol. Cons. 29 July
1831. No. 62;
Baton, British Government, op. cit. 119-121.
(2) Beng. Pol. Letters Reed. 22 Feb. 1828. para. 9*
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a jurisdiction which is unwarrantable and mischievous 
and ought under any circumstances to be abolished.11
Another factor giving the British government 
influence in Oudh arose from the fact that about two 
thirds of the Bengal army derived its recruits from 
Oudh. These soldiers occupied a different position 
from the rest of the people of Oudh inasmuch as they 
preferred their complaints against the local authorities 
or their neighbours not direct to the government.of 
Oudh but to the British government. They would send 
their petitions for redress to the resident formally 
signed by the officer commanding their company and 
countersigned by the officer in command of their 
regiment. The petition would come to the resident 
who in turn would send it to the government of Oudh 
for investigation and redress. These sepoys did not 
hesitate to abuse this privilege. It was often seen 
that in many cases the sepoy had "nothing personally 
at stake in the matter," that interested persons like 
"his uncle, cousin or some distant relations," had made 
the sepoy represent the case as his own. Many
(l) Metcalfe, minute, 17 Sept. 1831, Beng. Pol. Cons.
30 Sept. 1831. Bo. 7.
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zamindars also who by offering bribes or otherwise could 
make use of these sepoys had their claims just or unjust 
settled in their favour. The evil had reached great 
dimensions and was a source of complaint by the government 
of Oudh. It weakened the authority of the government and 
gave an advantage to unscrupulous persons over genuine 
sufferers.
The British government thus came to be closely
associated with the Oudh government in several ways.
N.B. Edmonstone described the connection that had
subsisted between the two governments for more than
half a century as more close and intimate than any other
existing in India, "domestic connection, if it may be 
(2)so called.11 v ' Prinsep considered the British government
as having effective control over the policies and measures
(3)
of Oudh government. J The inhabitants of Oudh also 
according to the assistant resident in BentinckTs time
(1) Paton, British Government, 114-117;
h.M. Lawrence, Essays on Indian Army and Oude, 328.
(2) N.B. Edmonstone, Eote on Oudh, op. cit.
(3) Prinsep, Note, op. cit.
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were "impressed with the belief that the Oude Government
exists merely at the pleasure of the British power...!! ^ ^
Thus while the British influence in Oudh was
considerable the internal condition of the country
remained deplorable. At the root of misgovernment in
Oudh was the Amildari system of farming out the revenues
of the country to the highest bidders - the Amildars.
These officers controlled the revenue, judicial and
police administration of their territories under their
charge. They had often secured their offices after
bribing the minister or other favourites at the court
and felt little compunction or remorse in exacting as
much as they could during their uncertain term of 
(2 )office. * No check was maintained over them. They
had "a complete carte blanche, as to the amount of
f 3 )money they might take from the cultivators.ny ' Even
the Intelligence Department of the government became 
a convenient instrument in their hands. The function
of reporting transactions in the country was assigned
(1) Baton, British Government, 139*
(2) Ricketts to Bentinck, 7 Sept. 1829, Beng.Pol.Cons.
14 Oct. 1829. No.86.
(3) Resident to Govt., 13 June 1832, Beng.Pol.Cons.
6 Aug. 1832. No.42. para. 14.
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to a few individuals who purchased their offices by-
paying large sums as bribes and in turn assigned the
function to their deputies for particular districts.
These persons were often in collusion with the Amils
or were themselves their agents with the result that
the misdeeds of public officers had little chance of
reaching the ears of the king.^^
As Bentinck looked upon British relations with
Oudh he saw that the immense influence possessed by
the British government there was no guarantee for good 
(2 )government. ' If the king was left free to manage
his own affairs he thought a situation might develop
that would be agreeable to the authority of the ruler
and at the same time promote the interests of his
people. Such a course had the danger of making
conditions worse if it did not prove a success but
Bentinck was ready to run the risk. His fondest hope
was to witness benevolent reforms worked out by the
ruler himself. As he himself wrote to the resident:
"No obligation of the Supreme Government is 
in my judgement more imperative than that of 
reforming th^administration of Oude and I am 
determined, if possible to effect it. It is
(1) Ricketts to Govt., 7 Sept. 1829, Beng.Pol.Cons.
14 Oct. 1829. No.86.
(2) Bentinck, minute, 30 Sept. 1831, Beng.Pol.Cons.
30 Sept. 1831. No. 2.
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most desirable that this should be done by 
the royal authority exclusively. Direct 
interference which is in fact nothing more 
or less than the transfer of the government 
from the king to the resident is as far as 
: " ' the very worst course
a new chapter in British relations with Oudh and would 
be a triumph of his policy of non-intervention. It 
would also resolve the dilemma confronted by him of 
reconciling the British obligation towards the king!s 
subjects with !ta due respect for the Sovereign Rights 
of the King of Oude.Tl^ ^
Accordingly a course of non-intervention was 
acted upon. The choice of the minister was left 
entirely to the king. The resident was asked to abstain 
from interference in the internal administration of the 
country. In 1829 the officiating resident opposed the 
appointment of Ram Dayal as minister but was told that 
it was the intention of the government to hold the ruler 
entirely responsible for the choice of the minister and
(1) Bentinck to Maddock, 4 Aug. 1830, Bentinck Papers.
(2) Govt, to Resident, 28 May 1830, Beng. Pol. Cons.
If successful Bentinckfs experiment would open
28 May 1830. Ho. 41
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the government of his c o u n t r y . A  few months later 
the resident’s conduct was thus prescribed:
"Your first endeavour ought to he to obtain 
the confidence of the Court to which you are 
accredited and when it shall appear clearly 
to be neither the intention of the British 
government, nor the personal ambition of its 
representative to assume an authority incon­
sistent with the dignity or offensive to the 
feelings of the Sovereign, or the minister, 
the Court will then probably be anxious to 
court your acbice as heretofore it had been 
■unwilling to submit to the resident’s
dictation.”(2)
In 1830 after some short-lived ministries Hakim
Mahdi was appointed minister by the king. The resident
sought to insist on the prior consent of the British
government to this appointment but was not supported by
Bentinck who had resolved on the uncontrolled choice
of the minister by the king. ' In this case further
Hakim Mahdi appeared to him to be an able minister and
so his appointment was allowed to stand and the resident
in
was asked not to interfere wiih the internal administration
(1) Bentinck to Maddock, 20 Oct. 1830, Bentinck Papers; 
Beng. Pol. Letters Heed. 9 Oct. 1830. Mo. 16. Vol.26.
(2) G-ovt. to Resident, 25 Aug. 1831, Beng. Pol. Cons.
30 Sept. 1831. Mo. 19. para. 8.
(3) Resident to Govt., 10 May 1830, Beng. Pol. Cons. 28 May
1830. Mo. 40; Govt, to Resident, 28 May 1830,
Beng. Pol. Cons. 28 May 1830. Mo. 41.
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of the c o u n t r y . S h o r t l y  afterwards Bentinck paid
a visit to the king at Lucknow and warned him solemnly
that the freedom given to him to run his affairs was
also the right to improve them and not to abuse that
power, and that if he did not take advantage of it
to introduce a better system of government the British
government would not hesitate to assume the government
of the country. The case of Arcot and others were
cited as a warning for him. Bentinck also told him
of his intention of recommending to the home authorities
the taking over of the Oudh administration if this
(2 )warning went unheeded. This reference was made. '
Hakim Mahdi began the important task of 
reconstruction. His way was beset with difficulties.
(1) Bentinck to Maddock (resident,)2 Oct.1830. Bentinck
Papers;
Bentinck to Astell, 5 July 1830, Bentinck Papers; 
Bentinck to Metcalfe, 15 Lee. 1830, Bentinck Papers; 
Eeng. Pol. Letters Heed. 9 Oct. 1830. Ho. 16. Vol. 26.
(2) Hote of a conference between Bentinck and the King of
Oudh on 21 Jan. 1831. Beng.Pol.Cons. 30 Sept.1831. Ho.4; 
Bentinck, minute, 30 July 1831, Beng.Pol.Cons. 30 Sept.
1831. Ho.2;
Gov. Gen's Sec. (Prinsep) to Bengal Govt., 30 July 1831,
Beng. Pol. Cons. 30 Sept. 1831. Ho.l;
Beng. Pol. Letters Heed. 30 Sept. 1831. Ho.16. Vol.27.
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He had to deal with a weak-minded and capricious monarch 
who was led by others in important matters affecting the 
government of the c o u n t r y . H e  had also to curb 
powerful interests that throve on misgovernment. And 
he devoted himself diligently to the task of reform. 
Though venal he was gifted with remarkable powers of 
management which soon began to be felt in every depart­
ment of government. In sevefal districts the Amani 
(2 )system' was substituted for that of revenue farming, 
and tribunals for enquiring into complaints against the 
Amils were set up. Guilty officers were severely 
dealt with. Thanadars found guilty of taking bribes 
were flogged and publicly disgraced by being turned 
out of their districts with "their faces blackened
(1) His deficient education afforded him an easy occupation 
in trivial pursuits. He spent almost "the whole of his 
time in indolence and inactivity or in effeminate 
amusements scarcely ever attending to public 
business..."
Resident to Govt., 13 June 1832, Beng.Pol.Cons. 6 Aug. 
1832. Ho. 42. paras. 3-4.
Henry Lawrence called his whole reign as "one continued 
satire upon the subsidiary and protected system."
H. Lawrence, Essays on Indian Army and Oude, 329.
(2) Under this system an Amildar was not personally 
responsible for a fixed amount of revenue. He
"in fact is a government officer on a fixed salary 
and is only like our own collectors liable to 
removal from office if any failure in the revenue 
be attributable to his negligence..."
Resident to Govt., 13 June 1832, Beng.Pol.Cons.
6 Aug. 1832. Ho. 42. .para. 15.
Ill
and mounted backwards on asses.11 The refractory
zamindars were alike put down with a strong hand and
comparative tranquillity prevailed in Oudh. The task
of reducing the Oudh army was taken in hand and between
11 October 1831 and 13 June 1832 some 14,000 troops
were discharged and an economy of nearly ten lakhs
of rupees per annum was effected.
The measures of the minister, however, aroused
enemies who worked for his removal. Perceiving the
weak character of the king, instead of consolidating
his position in the royal affections he begah to look
(2)to the British government for support. 1 He could 
not forget how Moatamuddaula had been earlier removed 
by British intervention and how vital the British 
support was for the continuance of his authority.
"The people of Lucknow were for many years in the habit 
of thinking that no minister could last for any 
considerable time unless he had been nominated jointly
(1) .Resident to Govt., 13 June 1832, Beng.Pol.Cons.
6 Aug.1832. No.42.
(2) Asst. Resident (Paton) to Govt., 14 July 1831, Beng.
Pol. Cons. 5 Aug. 1831. No.5;
Paton to Govt., 18 July 1831, Beng. Pol. Cons.
12 Aug. 1831. No. 71.
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by the British government and the king..."^"^ And the
minister expected more and more that his measures
would be publicly upheld by the British government*
The king sensed danger in the minister's independence,
which showed itself in a lack of respect towards the
members of the royal house, whose allowances the
minister in his zeal for reform had not hesitated to
clip* The king's mind was constantly worked upon by
self-interested persons who depicted the minister as
getting out of his control and urged him to exercise
(2)his authority directly. J
The favourable view taken by the British government 
of the measures of reform pursued by the minister also 
caused apprehension in the mind of the king. Lucknow 
was full of ill-conceived rumours that the reforms of 
the minister were motivated by the design of facilitating 
the transfer of the country to the British government. 
Lucknow "politicians” believed that the minister was
(1) Resident to G-ovt., 13 June 1832, Beng. Pol. Cons. 
6 Aug. 1832. para. 10.
(2) Resident to Govt., 6 Aug. 1832, Beng. Pol. Cons.
17 Sept. 1832. Bo. 83. para. 25;
Resident to Govt., 10 Aug. 1832, Beng. Pol. Cons.
17 Sept. 1832. Bo. 88. para. 10.
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preparing to make over the country to the British
government, that % e  had reduced troops to render the
transfer more convenient, and that the king had
discovered a copy of a letter from the minister to
one of the members of Council in Calcutta, proposing
to deliver over the Oude country to us in a few
months ...11 ^ Bentinck, who had decided to hold
the king responsible for the internal administration
of the country, did not come to the minister*s support.
He approved of the residentfs conduct in not committing
(2 )British support to him. 7
Left to himself the minister could not maintain
himself long in power. He was dismissed unceremoniously
by the king in August 1832 and replaced by a mediocrity,
(3)Roshan-ud-daula. 7
(1) Resident Lowfs Private Letter to Bentinck, 7 Sept.
1832, Home Misc. Series. Vol.738. p.337.
(2) G-ovt. to Resident, 20 Aug. 1832, Beng. Pol. Cons.
17 Sept. 1832. Ho. 91.
(3) Resident to Govt., 6 Aug.1832, Beng.Pol.Cons. 17 Sept.
1832. Ho. 83;
Resident to Govt., 8 Aug.1832, Beng.Pol.Cons. 17 Sept.
1832. Ho. 84;
Resident to Govt., 18 Oct. 1832, Beng.Pol.Cons. 12 Hov.
1832. Ho. 28.
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Bentinck was soon receiving reports of mis-
government in Oudh after the removal of Hakim Mahdi..
Crime was on the increase and the zamindars rebellious.
Bentinck hesitated to take action. He had in 1831
sought the permission of the home government for a
temporary assumption of the administration in the event
of continued misgovernment and he waited for instructions
(2)before taking any independent action. ' The
Directors' assent to the proposed assumption was
contained in their despatch of 16 July 1834 which was
received in India about the end of 1834 when Bentinck
was preparing to leave the country. This despatch,
while giving the desired authority to the Supreme
Government, left the actual assumption to Bentinck!s
(3)discretion. K 1
(1) Resident to Govt., 6 Oct. 1832, Beng.Pol.Cons.
5 Nov. 1832. Ho. 31;
Resident to Govt., 16 Oct. 1832, Beng.Pol.Cons.
26 Hov. 1832. Ho. 34.
(2) Bentinck to Auber, 21 Oct. 1832, Bentinck Papers; 
Bentinck to Ravenshaw, 11 Dec. 1832, Bentinck Papers.
(3) India and Bengal Despatches, 16 July 1834,
Ho. 11. Vol. 2.
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On receipt of these orders the matter was con­
sidered by Bentinck in Council. The resident was 
summoned to Calcutta to report in person. It was 
found that while the state of affairs in the country 
was still unsatisfactory there had been no gross 
maladministration for a year and a half past.^^
Though fully empowered to do so, Bentinck was not 
inclined to take strong action. He satisfied himself 
with another warning to the king, even when admitting
(2 )the hopelessness of any real improvement at his hands. '
The king was also apprised of the tenor of the
instructions received from the home government to give
(3)weight to the warning conveyed to him. '
Further than that Bentinck did not go. There were 
several reasons for this inaction. He was on the eve 
of his departure and so reluctant to adopt an extreme 
measure. His health had broken down and the energy
(1) Resident, Memorandum on Oudh, 12 Dec. 1834.
Beng. Pol. Cons. 5 Feb. 1835. No.65.
(2) Bentinck, minute, 3 Feb. 1835, Beng.Pol.Cons.
5 Feb. 1835. No. 68.
(3) Bentinck to king, 5 Feb. 1835, Beng.Pol.Cons.
5 Feb. 1835. No.69.
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for a strong policy of taking over the administration
by force if persuasion failed was lacking. The dilemma
of reconciling the internal sovereignty of the ruler
of Oudh with the obligation towards his subjects was
unresolved. The treaty with Oudh did not authorise
assumption, and hence a resort to it would have been
an infringement of that engagement. Bentinck had
by this time already come to doubt the legality of his
action in Mysore and had recommended to the Directors
(2 )a modification of his interference there. 1 He 
feared also that taking over the administration of
(*5)Oudh would be "odious in the opinion of all India”. J 
In Oudh itself the rumours of assumption had upset the 
king and his minister and higher powers were being 
invoked to ward off the apprehended danger. ”A11 the 
pious God-seeking persons,” read a contemporary paper, 
"attached to the Court have been directed to intercede 
with Heaven and to invoke its aid in diverting so great
(1) Paton, British Government. 148-149.
(2) Beng. and India Sec. Letters Reed. 14 April 1834.
(3) Bentinck, minute, 3 Feb. 1835, Beng. Pol. Cons.
5 Feb. 1835. No. 68.
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an evil from all true believers. The astrologers have
also been in great requisition and all the orthodox
modes of pumping the stars resorted to...”^"^ For
all these reasons Bentinck felt inclined nto forbear”
and allow the king "full benefit of the most favourable
(2 )construction of the Courtfs orders.™ J
When considering the question of assumption
Bentinck for a time seemed to have in mind an alternative.
It was the appointment of a minister chosen and supported
by the British government, a mode of intervention to
(3)which he was otherwise opposed. 1 But this idea did 
not mature into action, and the resident was asked to 
report to the government the effect of the warning given 
to the king to enable it to determine the future course 
of action.
(1) Quoted in The Englishman, 6 Jan.1835 from Mofussil Akhbar.
(2) Bentinck, minute, 3 Feb. 1835, Beng.Pol.Cons. 5 Feb.
1835. No. 68.
(3) Low to Bentinck, 9 Jan /l835?7 Bentinck Papers.
(4) G-ovt. to Resident, 5 Feb. 1835, Beng. Pol. Cons.
5 Feb. 1835. No. 70;
India Pol. Letters Reed. 19 Feb. 1835 No.6 . Vol.I.
Bentinck*s abstention from intervention had 
Metcalfe *s consent.
The case of Oudh showed that for an able minister 
to play a useful role he had to command the full support 
of either the king or the British government. If the 
former was the case the principle of non-intervention 
could work advantageously and Bentinck*s policy would 
run a smooth course. But if the latter was resorted to 
the principle of non-intervention would be infringed, 
there would be occasion for a misunderstanding of 
Eritish intentions and the disadvantages of dual authority 
would have to be faced. To this Bentinck preferred a 
direct substitution of British authority. He envisaged 
British intervention only in an extreme situation.
To decide when that situation actually arose involved 
a real difficulty as Bentinck was avowedly seeking reform 
at the hands of the Indian princes.
(1) Bentinck to Metcalfe, not dated, Sunday, Calcutta, 
Bentinck Papers.
He wrote to Metcalfe who in 1834 had taken charge of 
the governorship of the new province of Agra 
(constituted under the Charter Act of 1833)J "We 
have in our last council finally decided upon not 
assuming the administration of Oude which is in 
conformity with your opinion." ibid.
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In Hyderabad Bentinckfs policy was one of drift 
and led to no happy results. It started with high 
intentions and ended in a sad admission of failure.
The very thing he was averse to, the employment of 
Europeans in the Indian states, as curbing the authority 
of the ruler and lessening the chances for the employment 
of Indians, appeared in the end to be the only remedy.
And yet he would not have recourse to it and looked to 
the home government for instructions.
The British relations with this state were 
regulated by the treaty of 12 October 1800. By it 
the subsidiary force (stipulated by the treaty of 
1 September 1798) was increased. In communi-Gai^i-en 
of a money payment for this force the Nizam ceded in 
perpetuity all the territory he had acquired in 1792 
and 1799 (in wars against Mysore). In the event of 
any war with any other power the Nizam agreed to furnish 
six thousand infantry and nine thousand cavalry from 
his own forces.
The Nizam further engaged by this treaty not to 
correspond with any other power directly and to submit 
his differences with other states to the decision of
(l) Aitchison, Treaties, IX, Treaty of 12 Oct. 1800, 
Articles 5 and 12, pp.69, 71.
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the British government. Internally the Nizam was to
be "absolute" the British government having no concern
with any of his "children, relations, subjects, or
servants The treaty also provided for the
employment of the subsidiary force for internal
purposes (viz. in cases of disturbance, rebellion
or unjust withholding of revenue) after "the reality
of the offence" had been ascertained by the British 
(2 )government. '
Though the treaty provided for full internal 
freedom the inequality of the alliance soon came to 
impinge upon the status of the state. Circumstances 
further facilitated it. "The downfall of Tippoo," 
T^etcalfe said, "made a great difference in our relations 
with this Court. After that event the alliance ceased 
to have any feature of equality. Our protection was 
still necessary to the Nizam against the Mahrattas, 
but subordination to his protector was the price to 
be paid."^^
(1) ibid. Article 15, 72.
(2) ibid. Article 17, 72.
(3) Metcalfe, minute, 13 May 1829, Beng. Pol. Cons. 
14 Aug. 1829. No. 6IB.
From this time onwards the British government 
controlled the choice of minister. It appeared as"the 
next important step towards the completion of the 
Nizams dependence" (the first being the stationing of 
a subsidiary force in the state). Supported by the 
Eritish government the minister in course of time 
usurped his master!s authority and the Nizam began to 
fade into obscurity. The ministers Arastu Jah and 
after him Mir Alam both had British support. After 
the death of Mir Alam in 1808 an "extraordinary" 
arrangement took place. The Nizam nominated Munir- 
ul-mulk as his minister but under British influence 
it was agreed that he was to exercise no actual 
authority. All power was left in the hands of a 
deputy, Chandu Lai, who was then in British favour.
"So that from that time in addition to its 
Sovereign Prince, excluded from all concern 
in the management of his affairs, in 
consequence of our interference, the state 
of Hyderabad has had a prime minister in 
the same predicament..."^)
The administration of Chandu Lai from this 
time onward was baneful in its consequences. The 
Nizam, partly because of his own weakness and partly
(1) ibid.;
Henry Russell, Remarks, P.P. 1831-32, XIV, 165.
He was resident at Hyderabad from 1811 to 1820.
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because of the British support commanded by Chandu Lai,
was powerless to control the minister and the British
(l)government was not inclined to do so,' Chandu Lai
consequently had power without responsibility with all
its results. He made a reckless use of public money
to increase his influence in the state. Friends and
foes alike were befriended by money. To maintain his
hold intact he considered it important to ingratiate
himself with the resident and knew how to do it.
"Besides his subservience to the British 
Resident in all public measures, there was 
money in the shape of pension, salary, or 
donation, for any one whom the Resident 
recommended. Any gentleman supposed to 
have influence, directly or indirectly, 
with the British Government, could command 
a share of the revenues of the Nizam’s 
country. This was the origin of his lavish 
waste of public money on Sir V/illiam Rumbold 
and Mr. W. Palmer and their c o n n e x i o n s . ’1^ )
The indiscriminate use of public resources 
involved financial embarrassment. Extortion and borrowing 
on a large scale followed. Large portions of the country 
were farmed out to self-seeking adventurers and by them 
sub-let to others. These farmers used their power
(1) Henry Russell, Remarks, ibid. 165.
(2) Metcalfe, minute, 13 May 1829, cons. ibid*
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unscrupulously to hoard money and the cultivators 
suffered grievously* There was no appeal against the 
tyranny of farmers and they were unchecked in their 
rapaciousness. They even had the power of life and 
death in their hands.
The administration failed in the task of
maintaining order and many villages were depopulated
t!Almost all government,” stated a witness,” had ceased,
the country was in the possession of organized hands
of plunderers, the roads were only to he travelled
under the protection of armed bodies of men, and life
(2)and property were every where insecure.”v '
British intervention became unavoidable. Under 
Metcalfe as resident (1820-25) English officers were 
appointed to superintend the revenue and police 
administration in several districts. To check 
extortion village settlements with the heads of 
village communities were effected under British 
guarantee. The British officers received complaints 
of any breach of engagements by the M z a m fs officers 
and reported them to the resident. The system worked.
(1) J. Sutherland, Sketches, 55.
(2 ) ibid. 56.
There were mistakes and difficulties but on the whole
the plan was a success. The assessment was later seen
to be high. This arose from the error of "taking too
much into consideration the means of the people to
extend cultivation, and of fixing an yearly increase
on the village accordingly.n There was also the
underhand opposition of the minister who saw his
authority greatly curtailed as a result of these
settlements and who, while outwardly acquiescing,
secretly worked for the subversion of the plan. But
notwithstanding these handicaps the plan on the whole
bore fruit. Comparative tranquillity prevailed in
Hyderabad during these years, agriculture was extended
and the people had greater security and justice than
(1)before. ;
Metcalfe was followed by Martin (1825-1830) and 
under him the village settlements were continued.
On 13 September 1828 Martin submitted a long report 
on the subject of the revenue administration in 
Hyderabad since the period of British intervention.
In the last four years of the q^uinquennial settlement 
he reported a deficit of about 60 lakhs of rupees and
(1) Resident (Martin) to Govt., 13 Sept. 1828, 
Beng. Pol. Cons. 14 Aug. 1829. Ho. 61A; 
Sutherland, Sketches, 57.
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gave it as his opinion that though much had been done 
to promote agricultural prosperity and to increase 
security of life and prosperity under British officers, 
British intervention could not be considered financially 
successful or to have afforded complete protection 
to the people against oppression,
This report of Martin was not recorded till 
14 August 1829 and with it was recorded a minute by 
Metcalfe dated 1 3  May 1829 in which he outlined 
British relations with Hyderabad and replied to some 
of Martin's charges against his administration of 
Hyderabad affairs. The British government, he said, 
had originally intervened to control the nomination 
of ministers in Hyderabad and hence it was bound to 
check their extravagance. Chandu Lai was a creature 
of British creation. His "vicious conduct and 
incorrigible propensity to extortion were the real 
causes of our interference." Under Martin the minister 
had not been properly controlled. Indeed, he pointed 
out, Martin had entertained a high opinion of the 
ability and public-spiritedness of Chandu Lai. The
(1) Resident to Govt., 13 Sept. 1828, Beng. Pol. Cons.
14 Aug. 1829. Wo. 61A.
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result had been that with the relaxation of British 
supervision under Martin British control had not been 
effective.
Metcalfe also drew attention to another result
of British intervention that was still growing. Portions
of the Nizam*s forces, disciplined and commanded by
British officers, were absorbing a large portion of
(2 )the state revenues. * Above forty lakhs rupees per 
annum of the Nizam*s revenues were being spent to 
maintain a force which was "commanded entirely by 
British officers and was under the exclusive orders and 
control of the British resident.” The auxiliary 
force, he said, had in fact become "a sort of plaything" 
for the resident and "an extensive source of patronage 
at the Nizam*s expense." This, he said, was rendered 
possible by the complete subservience of the minister
(1) Metcalfe, minute, 1 3  May 1829, Beng. Pol. Cons.
14 Aug. 1829. No. 6IB.
(2) By the treaty of 1 Sept. 1798 the Nizam was bound to 
furnish six thousand infantry and nine thousand 
cavalry in the event of war. But as the Nizam*s 
forces were seen to be inefficient British super­
intendence of the Nizam*s military establishment was 
started.
An account of the origin and history of these forces 
under British control may be read in Calcutta Review. 
1849, XI, 141-219.
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to the British government. The number of British 
officers in the Nizam’s service was increasing. The 
"temptation” could not be resisted. As against 83 
British officers in the Nizam’s service maintained at 
a cost of 9,16 ,260 rupees in 1825 the number had 
increased to 123 in 1828 at a cost of 13,49,380 rupees.
Metcalfe suggested that at a future date British 
interference, both civil and military, might be withdrawn 
when some opportunity, like the accession of a new 
sovereign, occurred. Withdrawal of military control 
from the state Metcalfe considered a serious thing in 
an empire where military power was everything. The 
existence of an efficient force paid by the Nizam, 
commanded by British officers and under full British 
control was a great political advantage. It was an 
accession of military power costing nothing to the 
British government. But, in spite of this consideration 
on the whole Metcalfe favoured complete British with­
drawal from Hyderabad. The restoration of the Nizam's
independence he deemed to be an object worthy of British
(2)consideration and accomplishment when the time came. '
(1) Metcalfe, minute, 13 May 1829, Beng. Pol. Cons. 
14 Aug. 1829. No. 61B.
(2) ibid.
This was the background against which Bentinck 
decided on a major change in British relations with 
Hyderabad. Metcalfe’s views on the subject of non­
intervention approached his own. Like Metcalfe also 
he thought that the Nizam had had no freedom in the 
past and that the British government had exercised 
real power there. And he looked forward to see the 
Nizam managing his own affairs. The opportunity came 
in 1829 with the accession of a new ruler. In May 
1829 the Nizam died and was succeeded by his eldest 
son N a s i r - u d - D a u l a . I n  July 1829 when the 
resident went to the new Nizam to deliver Bentinck’s 
letter of congratulation the Nizam expressed a wish
that British interference be withdrawn and he left
(2)to manage his own affairs.v 7
(l) The accession of the new sovereign was also made 
use of by Bentinck for a change in the style of 
correspondence between the Nizam and the British 
government. Hitherto the Nizam spoke of himself 
as "our royal self" and the position of the 
Governor-General appeared to be inferior. This 
was corrected and henceforward the heads of the 
two governments corresponded on an equal footing. 
Govt, to Resident, 30 May 1829, Beng. Pol. Cons. 
19 June 1829* No. 91;
Resident to Govt., 7 Oct. 1829, Beng. Pol. Cons. 
30 Oct. 1829. No. 58.
(2) Resident to Govt., 21 July 1829, Beng. Pol. Cons. 
21 Aug. 1829. No.55.
Bentinck was all admiration for the Nizam’s 
wish to be relieved of British control. It seemed to 
him to be both "natural and reasonable." The Nizam 
he considered to have been held hitherto in the back­
ground by his minister under British control. British 
intervention in Hyderabad had been necessitated under 
peculiar circumstances in which the minister Chandu 
Lai, enjoying British support, went astray. The 
British government therefore interfered to check his 
oppressive conduct. Now that the Nizam had expressed 
his willingness to govern his affairs himself Bentinck 
welcomed the opportunity of placing Eritish relations 
with Hyderabad on a footing more consistent with"the 
dignity and independence" of the Nizam. The resident 
was accordingly instructed to leave to the Nizam the 
uncontrolled choice of his minister and other officers. 
In order to enable the Nizam to discharge all the 
duties devolving on him as "a Sovereign Prince" the 
resident was asked not to interfere in his internal 
affairs from this time onward. An exception was 
however made in the case of revenue settlements that 
had been formed under British guarantee, till the 
period of their expiry when even that control was to
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b e withdrawn. ^  ^
Bentinck wrote a letter to the Nizam expressing 
his great satisfaction in complying with the Nizam’s 
wish to manage his affairs , ”a desire worthy of a great 
prince.” With the exception of revenue agreements, 
the M z a m  was told, in every other respect he would be 
’’absolute”. At the same time his attention to the 
welfare of his subjects was emphasized by the quotation 
of a Persian verse:
”By all means do not wound the hearts of your people, 
If you do you will dig up your own root,
Govt is a sin (or misplaced) in the hands of those, 
Prom whose hands (i.e. from whose acts) hands are
raised (in distress) to God...”
And with this Eentinck fervently hoped that
under his rule the prosperity and happiness of the people
(2)would increase. J
Having thus resolved on the internal freedom of 
the Nizam Bentinck first withdrew British intervention 
from the Nizam’s civil affairs. British superintendents 
were told that they were being retained temporarily in
(1) Govt, to Resident, 21 Aug. 1829, Beng. Pol. Cons. 
21 Aug. 1829. No. 58.
(2) Bentinck to Nizam, not dated, Beng. Pol. Cons.
21 Aug. 1829. No. 57.
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the Nizam's civil administration to maintain the revenue 
engagements guaranteed by the British government,
Bentinck would have preferred the British officers to 
be withdrawn at once from their .civil functions uhder 
a pledge by the Nizam's government that the revenue 
engagements would be faithfully observed, but it was 
then thought that this might not be a sufficient 
guarantee against their violation. Hence their 
temporary continuation was decided on. The resident 
was however asked to apprise the Nizam clearly that 
they would be precluded from any interference in the 
civil administration and that their duty would be 
confined to receiving complaints of the infraction of 
the revenue engagements. These complaints, if well- 
grounded, would be forwarded by them to the resident, 
who in his turn would send them to the Nizamfs government 
for consideration and necessary orders. The Nizam 
was further to understand that if some time later it 
appeared that the employment of these officers was no 
longef necessary then they would be withdrawn even 
before the expiry of the revenue engagements.^^
(l) Govt, to Resident, 30 Oct. 1829, Beng. Pol. Cons.
30 Oct. 1829. No. 60;
Resident to Govt., 15 Oct. 1829, Beng. Pol. Cons.
7 Nov. 1829. Nos. 59-60.
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In accordance with this decision British control 
from the Nizam1s civil affairs was withdrawn. Bentinck 
at this time (1829) even appears to have intended with­
drawing control from military affairs which was maintained 
at a large expenditure of public money. In May 1829 Astell 
sent Bentinck a copy of an anonymous letter he had 
received from India containing a list of civil and 
military officers in the Nizam*s service with their 
salaries. Astell*s own comment was that "a system so onerous 
to the Ni&am, so open to abuse...and so discreditable 
to our character cannot too soon undergo revision.1 
Eentinck found himself in entire agreement with Astell 
and "promised1 him that "whether the contingent be kept 
up or not, the cost shall be much diminished and the
corps shall be made to assume, its natural native 
(2)character."v '
New rules were accordingly drawn up for regulating 
the number, pay and allowances of British officers in the 
Nizam*s civil and military services. The duties of some
(1) Astell to Bentinck, 5 May 1829, Bentinck Papers.
(2) Bentinck to Astell, 1 Nov. 1829, Bentinck Papers.
officers were combined while some posts were altogether 
abolished. The posts of Principal Commissary of Stores, 
Superintending Surgeon, Judge Advocate, Medical Store­
keeper and Surgeon to the Darbar were abolished.
Emphasis was laid on retrenchment in the Nizam’s 
administration. At the same time the appointment and 
promotion of officers in the Nizam’s service was taken 
away from the hands of the resident.
Though these changes were effected Bentinck’s 
intention of doing away with the military control of 
the Nizam’s affairs as he had done in Nagpur was not 
encouraged by the home government. The secret despatch 
of 9 June 1830, of which Ellenborough was the author, 
censured Bentinck’s relinquishment of military control
in Nagpur and forbade similar action in respect of
(2 )Hyderabad in definite terms. 7 After its receipt 
Bentinck did not pursue the mattef further.
The retention of military control however presented
(1) G-ovt. to Resident, 19 Pec. 1829, Beng. Pol. Cons.
19 Pec. 1829. No. 55;
Govt, to Resident, 8 Jan. 1830, Beng. Pol. Cons.
8 J&n. 1830 No. 83;
Govt, to Resident, 5 Peb. 1830, Beng. Pol. Cons.
5 Peb. 1830. No. 41.
(2) Board’s Secret Prafts, 9 June 1830. Vol. 7.
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difficulties and to an extent jeopardised the success
of Bentinckfs experiment. The Hyderabad contingent
was the only efficient force in the state and its
control by the resident made the Nizam and his minister
look to him for the vindication of their government’s
authority against discontented and rebellious subjects.
Public confidence in the effectiveness and permanence
of the Nizam’s authority could not develop. The
officiating resident E.B. Bavenshaw in November 1830
testified to the existence of a general belief in
Hyderabad that the withdrawal of British interference
was not lasting.
”An impression also appears to be very generally 
entertained among the natives, that the lion 
will not permanently withdraw his foot from the 
spot where he has once imprinted its mark, and 
that the temporary abandonment of our inter­
ference is but the prelude to a more complete 
and durable possession.”^ )
It was thus seen that the Nizam's authority was 
never effectively established and from the beginning 
the success of non-intervention hung by a delicate thread. 
As early as October 1829 the resident was reporting to 
the government the difficulty he found himself in on
(l) Bavenshaw to Govt., 3 Nov. 1830, Beng. Pol. Cons.
19 Nov. 1830. No. 25.
account of the new system which had transferred civil
control to the Nizam while military control was still
vested in the British government. A Kiladar in the
south-west had risen in rebellion against the Nizam’s
government and the resident had been asked for the
assistance of the contingent in putting down the
rebellion. If the authority of the Nizam was to be
treated as real the aid of the contingent, which was
technically the Nizam’s force, could not be denied.
If the aid was given it involved the British government
in disputes between the Nizam and his subjects, and
if it was denied the refusal cut across Nizam’s internal
freedom. The resident in this dilemma sought the
instructions of the government.
Bentinck, who was at this time considering the
possibility of withdrawing Eritish control from the
Nizam’s military affairs, decided a,s a temporary measure
that when a requisition for the employmeht of the contingent
was made by the Nizam the resident should first satisfy
himself that the object for which these forces were being
(2 )employed was just and necessary. 7 The incident was a
(1) Resident to Govt., 12 Oct. 1829, Beng. Pol. Cons.
30 Oct. 1829. No. 62.
(2) Govt, to Resident, 30 Oct. 1829, Beng. Pol. Cons.
30 Oct. 1829. No. 64.
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small one but it served to show how civil and military 
control could not be easily separated.
Meanwhile, these forces were more and more in 
demand, and in 1832 Bentinck was finding himself in an 
embarrassing position. The resident had reported a case 
of the apprehension of two rebellious zamindars at the 
requisition of the Nizam's government. After they 
had been arrested it became known that they had been 
driven into rebellion by the oppressive conduct of the 
Nizam1s government. Thus it was felt by the resident 
that the British government ran the risk of becoming 
involved in the punishment of the Nizam's subjects even 
when they were really not to blame. As the resident 
found "a general spirit of insubordination and violence" 
in the country he feared that such instances might 
increase and he sought specific instructions from the 
government for the regulation of his conduct.
The resident's report put Bentinck in a difficult 
situation. The accounts received from Hyderabad so far 
had shown that the effects of non-intervention in civil 
affairs had not been favourable and he had come to regard
(l) Resident to Govt., 11 June 1832, Beng. Pol. Cons.
13 Aug. 1832. No. 2.
the cause of reform in Hyderabad as disappointing. It 
appeared "hopeless to expect that the Hyderabad government 
will establish such a system as to leave its subjects 
no excuse for resistance to the authority of its 
officers..." And he now felt perplexed. After the 
definite orders of the home government to the contrary 
the withdrawal of military control from Hyderabad was 
out of the question. And if military control was 
maintained it appeared to point to the control of civil 
affairs also. To do so would be to abandon the principle 
of non-intervention, to admit failure and to revert to 
civil intervention which had been relinquished. Being 
thus confronted Eentinck thought fit to submit the 
whole question to the decision of the home government.
Metcalfe to whom the case had been referred for 
opinion found the embarrassment in Hyderabad easy to 
understand. It arose in a great measure, he said, 
from the continuance of military control while civil 
interference had been withdrawn. It was scarcely 
possible, he said, "to maintain a military interference 
which leads to our taking part against the people in
(1) Gov. Gen's Sec. to Bengal Government, 19 July 1832,
Beng. Pol. Cons. 13 Aug. 1832. No.l;
Beng. Pol. Letters Heed. 22 Aug. 1833 paras. 226-227.
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the event of rebellion, and at the same time to abstain
altogether from civil interference...n He had earlier
expressed himself in favour of removing British control
both from civil and military affairs. But as the military
control had been retained he now suggested that the
authority to use the Nizam1s forces "under British control
for putting down outbreaks should be given to the resident
along with the power of listening to the complaints of the
people in arms and settling the dispute in conc'ert with
the Nizam's government.^
The Directors in their despatch of 8 September 1835
upheld the earlier views of Bentinck (page 135 ) that
these forces should be employed only after the resident
was satisfied that they were being used for a good
(2)purpose.v 7
If the retention of military control in Hyderabad 
created difficulties, Bentinckfs withdrawal of civil 
interference brought him increasing disappointment.
Soon after the withdrawal of British control Eentinck 
was receiving unfavourable reports of the state of affairs 
in Hyderabad. In November 1830 the officiating resident,
(1) Metcalfe, minute, 9 Aug. 1832, Beng.Pol.Cons. 13 Aug. 
1832. No. 12.
(2) India and Bengal Despatches, 8 Sept. 1835. No. 39. 
paras. 14-16. Vol. 6.
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describing the effects of British withdrawal, stated 
that from several villages complaints of the infringement 
of revenue engagements had been received„ Robberies and 
murders were increasing and zamindars becoming more and 
more unruly, at one time fighting among themselves, at 
another withholding the payment of public revenue. It 
was further stated that troops were being used frequently 
for maintaining order.
Time passed and matters wore no better an aspect.
(2 )In December 1831 the resident, J. Stewart, 7 submitted 
reports from several superintendents in charge of revenue 
engagements showihg the unsatisfactory state of the 
country. To remedy affairs he recommended that the 
system of non-intervention should be modified and the 
superintendents entrusted with police powers in their 
respective areas. This plah, he said, had the merit of 
being effective without being expensive. The period of 
the expiration of the revenue engagements was approaching 
and the superintendents, who were discharging restricted 
functions at the time, could easily undertake this duty
(1) Officiating Resident (Ravenshaw) to Govt., 3 Nov.1830, 
Eeng. Pol. Cons. 19 Nov. 1830. No.25#
(2) J. Stewart was resident from 1830 to 1838.
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without any increased expenditure. He thought that this 
plan was calculated to secure the lives and property of 
the people and would he acceptable to the Nizam1s 
government.
The position was reviewed by Bentinck in a minute 
dated 24 February 1832. He considered the state of affairs 
in Hyderabad serious enough to require the attention of 
the British government. But he seemed to vacillate in 
thinking of any definite action. To intervere or not to 
interfere was the question and he saw no clear way.
The resident had recommended partial interference, the 
control of the police by the superintendents. But this 
to Bentinck appeared as lending support to the Nizam*s 
government and becoming identified with it in its 
oppressive acts. He feared also that the British 
officers so employed would become involved in the whole 
of civil administration (in enforcing revenue collections 
and in apprehending offenders) and thus the whole 
edifice of non-intervention would topple down. The 
resident*s plan in its conception was a partial measure 
and hence in his opinion not likely to be effective.
(1) Resident to G-ovt. , 28 Dec. 1831, Beng. Pol. Cons.
19 March 1832. No. 63.
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He also disliked it as "detracting essentially from the 
independence and sovereignty" of the Nizam, The resident 
was therefore told that his proposal was not approved 
and that he should seek an improvement in the Nizamfs
(1)administration by personal influence and remonstrance. '
At the same time, Bentinck1s expectations in the
Nizam were disappointed. When he had withdrawn British
control from Hyderabad he had ardently hoped that the
new Nizam, with a sincere desire to promote the welfare
of his people, would bring to bear the weight of his
(qualities upon the task of governing his country.
Experience, however, revealed his limitations. He had
"hardly ever been out of his Zenana till his fortieth
year" and had received no training in the art of government.
Consequently, soon after his accession he was seen to be
withdrawing from public affairs, leaving more and more to
(2 )his minister Chandu Lai. "The hopes," said Metcalfe
in his minute of 9 August 1832, "which rested on the new 
prince have been entirely disappointed. He has taken no 
interest in the welfare of his people. He has exercised
(1) Bentinck, minute, 24 Peb. 1832, Beng. Pol. Cons. 
19 March 1832. No. 76;
Govt, to Resident, 7 April 1832, Beng. Pol. Cons. 
14 May 1832. No. 5.
(2) Sutherland, Sketches, 60-61.
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no salutary control over the conduct of his minister
whose power continues absolute.1 It was anything
but this that Eentinck could have hoped for.
Matters drifted till the Directors1 despatch of
17 December 1853 was received in May 1834. This despatch,
while regretting the effects of British withdrawal
from Nizam's affairs, urged Bentinck to take action.
Should remonstrance with the Nizam's government fail,
and this was anticipated, Bentinck was to consider the
means of compelling the Nizam to reform his administration.
(2 )Such a course was positively ordered. J
On receiving this despatch Bentinck asked the
resident to report the existing situation of the country.
He was required to say if any improvement in the Nizamfs
administration had taken place recently and if he
deemed any intervention necessary on the part of the
(3 )British government. 7
The resident in reply submitted the reports of the
(1) Metcalfe, minute, 9 Aug. 1832, Beng. Pol. Cons.
13 Aug. 1832. No. 12.
(2) Eengal Despatches, 17 Dec. 1833, No. 17. paras. 20-22. 
Vol. 124.
(3) Covt. to Resident, 27 May 1834, Boardfs Collections.
Vol. 1494.
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superintendents he had called forth on getting the 
above orders. These reports, the resident said, 
giving his own opinion, suffered from overstatement.
They depicted a state of extreme disorganisation in 
every department of government. These officers 
compared things with what had gone on under their 
personal supervision in former days and were hence 
prone to exaggeration. But nonetheless, he said, 
the condition of Hyderabad was deplorable and needed 
serious reform. And he recommended as a remedy the 
partial employment of European agency in civil admin­
istration which he had earlier suggested.
Though empowered and asked to act by the home 
government Eentinck did not take any action. The 
introduction of Eritish officers with limited powers 
of government appeared as an alternative. Eut on the 
whole he considered it ineffective and as constituting 
no lasting solution. Cure in his opinion could be 
effected when all the powers of government had been 
taken away from the hizam and the British government 
had become responsible for every branch of administration. 
He seemed to admit the failure of his policy in Hyderabad
(l) Resident to Govt., 11 July 1834, ibid.
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and to anticipate a period when increasing confusion 
in the state would lead to the taking over of the whole 
administration by the British government. And though 
he expressed his concurrence in the opinion of the 
resident that the picture of disorganisation given by 
the superiiitendents was somewhat overdrawn his dis­
appointment was writ large. He did not take or recommend 
any definite step and asked the home government for 
further instructions.^^
In respect of another matter also relating to 
Hyderabad Bentinck did not like to interfere. It was 
the late banking house of Palmer and Co. The house had 
in the past to a great extent usurped the authority of 
the government of Hyderabad and was to Bentinck another 
objectionable aspect of British relations with Hyderabad 
and another reason for a policy of non-intervention.
He thought that the Nizam when left to himself would 
be able to settle this question like other internal 
ones. In 1828 Sir William Rumbold was allowed to return
(l) India Pol. Letters Reed. 25 July 1834. No. 6. Vol. I. 
The reply to his communication was received after his 
return in the Directors1 despatch of 8 Sept. 1835.
No. 39. India and Bengal Despatches, Vol. 6 .
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(1 )to India to realise the claims of this firm. *
Bentinck, while wishing to follow a course of non­
intervention , was cautious. The British government, 
he said, had become deeply involved in the success 
and failure of the firm in the past. The matter had 
not rested on justice. Lord Hastingsfs favour had 
given "unlimited credit and authority to the House.
The positive disfavour of a succeeding government
accomplished their ruin as completely as the former 
%
had its excessive prosperity.1 And he would on his
part "obey the orders of the Court whether favourable
(2)or otherwise", and not stir the "hornets* nest."v 1
In this attitude he was also encouraged from England.
Astell asked him to be careful in dealing with this
matter, reminding him how the Indian government had
(3)been affected by it in the past. '
(1) The firm had been repaid at the rate of 12$ interest 
but they claimed the full interest of 18$ at which 
they had advanced the money.
(2) Bentinck to Lindsay, 20 May 1828, Bentinck Papers; 
Bentinck to John Loch, 21 Feb. 1830, ibid;
Bentinck, minute, 17 Feb. 1830, Beng. Sec. Cons.
18 June 1830. No.l.
(3) Astell to Bentinck, 20 Jan. 1829, Bentinck Papers.
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In England the cause of the late firm was 
supported by the Board of Control and opposed by the 
Directors, After a protracted controversy^^ the 
Directors were compelled by the Board by a mandamus 
from the Court of King's Bench to transmit their orders 
to India. The despatch of 15 March 1835 containing 
these orders provided for one of two modes of settling 
finally the claims of the late firm, either by 
arbitration, or by a commission appointed under the
(2 )joint authority of the Nizam and the British government. 7
These orders on their arrival in India were conveyed to
the resident, and arbitration was eventually resorted
(3)to. 7 The result was that a sum of about ten lakhs 
of rupees was awarded by J.M. Macleod of the Madras 
Civil Service, who had been chosen by Bentinck to act 
as u m p i r e . T h u s  the matter was brought to an end.
(1) An account of this controversy is given by Prof. C.H. 
Philips in East India Company, 280-282.
(2) Bengal Despatches, 15 March 1833. No. 8. Vol. 122.
(3) Beng. Pol. Letters Reed. 2 Sept. 1833. No. 8. para.
47. Vol. 29.
(4) India Pol. Letters Reed. 20 April 1835. No. 17. Vol. I.
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These were not the only instances in which
Bentinck's attitude was that of non-intervention.
In the same way, in Bajputana, in Gwalior, and in
other states Bentinck deliberately refrained from
intervention. His purpose was the same - his desire
to see reform at the hands of the princes through their
own officers. Where Bentinck saw any hope for the
success of the experiment he was willing to go to an
extreme length in creating conditions for its success.
His withdrawal of civil and military control from
Eagpur and his contemplating similar action in Hyderabad
show the intensity of his desire and efforts to find a
solution of the problem of the Indian states. The
British government was deemed to be paramount, but
paramountcy was exercised at the last resort in the
interests of the people in a particular state and was
powerfully asserted by depriving the ruler of all the
powers of government. Bentinck would rather advise,
persuade and warn than coerce the rulers. Between two
unequal powers the stronger in his opinion must
necessarily "forbear rather to a fault” in dealing
(1)with its less strong partner. 7 Failure in his efforts
(l) Bentinck to Henry Pottinger, 25 Feb. 1834, Bentinck Papers.
filled him with disappointment^"^ and led him in some
(2 )casesv ' to think of annexation. But on the whole it 
may he said that his set purpose in following a course 
of non-intervention was to see the emergence of well- 
governed states living in harmony and co-operation with 
the Eritish government.
(1) Bentinck to Metcalfe, 4 Peh. 1834, Bentinck Papers.
(2) Thus in Gwalior where non-intervention led to 
internal dissensions and confusion Bentinck wrote 
that he would he glad if the state came into 
British hands.
Bentinck to Stewart, 17 July 1834, Bentinck Papers.
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CHAPTER V 
BENTINCK*S ANNEXATIONS 
Bentinck1s annexations of the three relatively small 
states of Cachar, Jaintia and Coorg do not indicate a policy 
of expansion or a solution of the problem of the Indian states 
as he conceived it. Nor do they appear to be a development 
of the policy of non-intervention pursued by him as a whole 
towards the Indian states. In one of the largest states of 
India, Oudh, even after having received the instructions of the 
Directors giving him full authority to assume the government 
of the country Bentinck satisfied himself with another warning 
to the king. In Hyderabad, while recognising that his policy 
of non-intervention had not been successful, he shrank from 
thinking in terms of annexation or decisive intervention. The 
existence of the Indian states, in his opinion, was to continue, 
and he sought in a peaceful way to build up relations with them 
on a basis of mutual co-operation and understanding.
In making these annexations, however, Bentinck was 
consciously extending the bounds of paramountcy, the concept 
that was developing to govern British relations with the Indian 
states over and above the treaty stipulations. Thus in Cachar 
the British government asserted the right of determining the 
future of a state under certain circumstances, and it wanted
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the rulers of Jaintia and Coorg to recognise rights which it 
claimed as the paramount power and not "because they were stipu­
lated by the treaties. In place of coercing the rulers into 
acquiescence Bentinck however sought a peaceful recognition of 
such a position by the Indian princes.
The ruler of Cachar was thus expected to secure the 
consent of the British government for adoption in the absence 
of a natural heir. In Coorg the British government sought to 
assert its claim to give protection to fugitives from the state 
on humanitarian grounds, and went to the extent of hostilities 
with the ruler in maintaining that position. In Jaintia the 
ruler was asked to apprehend and deliver up the murderers of 
three British subjects in his state, and in the last resort 
when he failed to comply and was even found to be privy to the 
crime he was deprived of nearly half of his territories as a 
measure of punishment.
Such insistence on rights not stipulated by the 
treaties was not considered a deviation from the general 
principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the 
states which recognised the right of rulers to manage their own 
affairs until things went grievously wrong. It was on the 
other hand a recognition of the increasing responsibility of 
the British government as the paramount power to play a
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benevolent role in its relations with the Indian states* The 
same role that his government was playing in British India as 
the guardian of social and moral reform Bentinck also wished to 
exercise in respect of the Indian states with the co-Gperation 
of the rulers.
Thus in Nagpur, where instances of Sati were dis­
covered, the resident was instructed to secure its discon­
tinuance by every possible means. It was not Bentinck's
wish, he was told clearly, that
"any thing should be done for this purpose which would 
be inconsistent with the independent rights of those
states but no reason exists to prevent us from using
the fair means of persuasion and influence which 
naturally attaches to us as the paramount power of 
India to effect an object so desirable to humanity 
as the abolition of these horrid rites throughout 
the continent of Asia."(l)
These ideas can be exemplified in the annexations of
Cachar, Coorg and Jaintia made respectively in 1832, 183U and
1835.
Cachar was a small state of 3>769 square miles in 
Assam. It was taken under British protection in 182U to ensure 
the security of the north-east frontier of Bengal against the
(l) Govt, to Resident, 20 Aug. 1832, Beng. Sec. Cons,
2h Sept. 1832. No.U3.
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mounting aggression of the Burmese* (l) The Burmese had by 
182U established themselves in Upper Assam and were contem­
plating further advances into British territory.(2) The 
importance of Cachar as affording a passage to the Burmese for 
incursions into Bengal was recognised by the Supreme Government, 
and it was considered expedient to establish an alliance with 
Rada Govind Chandra of Cachar. Owing to the usurpation of 
his authority by the rulers of Manipur he had been compelled 
to seek refuge in the Company’s district of Sylhet.(3) By a 
treaty concluded on 6 March 1821* the British government became 
responsible for the protection of Cachar against external 
aggression, and the Rada on his part bound himself to abide by 
the advice of the British government in the internal administra­
tion of his country. He further relinquished control over 
his foreign policy and was to pay an annual tribute of 10,000 
rupees in return for the protection of his state by the British 
government, (h)
On the defeat of the Burmese Govind Chandra was 
restored to his possessions in Cachar. He did not however
(1) Beng. Sec. Letters Reed. 9 Jan. 182h, paras.19-20;
Beng. Sec. Letters Reed.31 Jan. 1825# para.13*
(2) G.T. Bayfield, Relations with Ava in R.B. Pemberton’s 
Report on the Eastern Frontier of British India. 37-Ul«
(3) Amherst to Wynn (President of the Board of Control),
11 Feb. 182i|, Home Misc. Series, Vol.673* pp.U67-U75;
Beng. Sec. Letters Reed. 9 Jan. 182h, para. 12.
(U) Aitchison, Treaties. II, Treaty of 6 March 18259 1U9-150.
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prove to be a strong ruler who could make good his authority in 
the whole of Cachar. The hilly regions of his kingdom were 
held by a usurper, Tula Ram, who exercised an independent 
authority over them, (l) The internal aflminist rat ion of 
Govind Chandra was also not conducive to his popularity. His 
government was regulated by no fixed system and recognised 
little personal freedom. Trade was hampered by restrictions 
and agriculture suffered from the arbitrary demands of the 
subordinate officers. The revenue of the government was not 
large, being estimated at 30,000 rupees, but it was held that 
under proper management and by giving an impetus to agriculture 
and industry it could be greatly improved. (2) The Raja further 
had no children. He was also subject to severe attacks of 
asthma which were aggravated by his corpulency. (3) Thus while
(1) Fisher to Jenkins, 17 March 1832, Beng. Pol. Cons. lh May 
1832. No.112.
Thomas Fisher was in charge of Cachar affairs for 
sometime before the murder of Raja Govind Chandra in 1830.
F. Jenkins was in the survey department of the Bengal 
government.
Tula Ram was an orderly in Govind Chandra1 s ser­
vice who after the assassination of his father by Govind 
Chandra escaped into the hills and successfully established 
himself there. Tula Ram joined the Burmese in the invasion 
of Cachar in 182h and after the peace continued to exercise 
independent authority over the hills. Attempts to reduce 
him to submission were unsuccessful.
(2) Tucker to Govt., 18 Feb. 1829, Beng. Pol. Cons. lh May 1832. 
paras. 3-5; Scott to Govtv 27 Aug. 1829> Beng. Pol. Cons. 
Ik May 1832. No. 93*
Tucker was commissioner in Sylhet and Scott was 
agent to the governor-general on the north-east frontier.
(3) Tucker to Govt., 18 Feb. 1829, Beng. Pol. Cons. 1U May 1832. 
No. 81. para. 6.
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the internal condition of the state was unsatisfactory, its 
political future was uncertain.
The internal condition of Cachar and the fact of the 
Raja’s having no heir induced Amherst to think of taking over 
the state after the death of Govind Chandra. Moreover, it 
controlled communications between Sylhet and Manipur, and in 
case of hostilities with the Burmese its, possession by either 
side was considered to be of strategic importance. So in 
1827 Charles Tucker, the commissioner in Sylhet was instructed 
to make an approach to the Raja on the subject of the transfer 
of his country to the British government after his death.(l)
The Raja before his state was taken under British 
protection in 1821* had himself shown some predilection for such 
a transfer. But now when sounded by Tucker on the subject he 
was loth even to consider any such arrangement. Though Tucker 
hinted that his annual tribute could be commuted for the rest 
of his lifetime in case he agreed to the suggestion, the Raja 
showed himself to be resolutely opposed to it. The payment 
of the tribute was considered by the Raja to be the mainstay 
of his power by exalting him in the eyes of his people and 
entitling him to British protection. Tucker thought that the 
Raja’s objection to the transfer of his country to the British
(l) Govt, to Tucker, 23 Nov. 1827, Beng. Pol. Cons. Ik May
1832. No. 79-
155
government on his death arose from a feeling that such a 
measure might throw aspirants to the throne into rebellion if 
they found the door to their ambition closed. The Raja, 
however, would not even consider Tucker’s proposal and showed 
himself anxious to adopt a son from the families of the Rajas 
of the neighbouring states. Tucker advised the Raja to con­
sult the British government before he made any adoption, (l)
In the correspondence that followed his interview with 
the Raja, Tucker further emphasized the desirability of secur­
ing the prior consent of the British government to any adoption 
the Raja might make. He even let the Raja know that if any 
adoption was made without prior British consent the British 
government would not feel itself bound to support the adopted 
heir if his succession was disputed by other claimants*
The Raja on his part maintained that it was not incumbent on 
him to consult the British government on this subject though 
he would communicate the news when the adoption was made. (2)
Bentinck’s proceedings were characterised by modera­
tion and a willingness to go a long way to meet the wishes of 
the Raja. He approved of the Raja’s having been informed that
(1) Tucker to Govt., 18 Feb. 1829, Beng. Pol. Cons. lU May 
1832. No.81.
(2) Tucker to Raja and Raja to Tucker, not dated, Beng. Pol.
Cons. 1U May 1832. No.83*
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without prior consent the British government would not he 
hound to extend its protection and support to the adopted 
heir* But Bentinck'did not want to alienate the Raja by 
carrying the matter further. David Scott, agent to the 
governor-general on the north-east frontier, was informed that 
the proposal of transfer should not he urged upon the Raja any 
more. Such a consummation, when it came, was to accomplished 
hy the voluntary consent of the Raja. The government’s 
intention, Scott was further told, was not to prevent the 
adoption of an heir, if that proceeding was in harmony with 
the usage of Cachar.(1)
A little later Bentinck opposed Scott*s recommendation 
that the British government should intervene in Cachar to 
abolish the rice monopoly which was stated to he working in­
juriously to the interests of his subjects. Scott also sug­
gested intervention for the regulation of poppy cultivation, 
in Cachar. But Bentinck upheld the Raja’s right to manage 
his affairs and Scott was informed accordingly. A policy of 
setting things right hy advice and persuasion was enjoined.(2) 
Though asserting his right of adoption the Raja in 
fact made none. But in April 1830 the question of the future
(1) Govt, to Scott, not dated, Beng. Pol. Cons. Ik May 1832.
No. 8k.
(2) Scott to Govt., 19 June 1829, Beng. Pol. Cons. 11+ May 1832.
No.85; Govfcto'SDottv.;t., 3 July 1829, Beng. Pol. Cons.
11+ May 1832. No.86.
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of Cachar was suddenly re-opened by his murder. It necessitated 
the temporary assumption of the government till the future of 
the country could be determined. Lieutenant Thomas Fraser, 
the Deputy Quarter-Master General in Sylhet, was placed in 
charge of the affairs of Cachar and was directed to take his 
instructions from Scott.(l) He was to conduct enquiries into 
any claims to the vacant throne and to report on the history 
and usages of Cachar relating to succession,(2)
The situation was made complex by an offer of Raja 
Gambhir Sing of Manipur, after Govind Chandra’s assassination, 
to hold Cachar on lease for an annual rent of 15#000 rupees.
His request was supported by Captain F. Grant, the commissioner 
in Manipur, (3) But Gambhir Sing’s hand in the murder was 
suspected, and so a detailed investigation became necessary 
before a final decision could be made. (1+) Bentinck was 
inclined to accept Gambhir Sing’s proposal, if his innocence 
could be established, in place of the outright annexation of 
the state to the British territories.(5)
(1) Govt, to Fraser, 18 June 1830, Beng. Pol. Cons. 18 June 
1830. No.63.
(2) Govt, to Scott, 18 June 1830, Beng. Pol. Cons. 18 June 1830. 
No.62.
(3) Grant to Govt., 12 Oct. 1831# Beng. Sec. Cons. 25 Nov. 1831. 
No.60.
(k) Scott to Govt., 27 May 1830, Beng. Pol. Cons. 18 June 1830. 
N0.U8.
(5) Oov* Gen.’s Sec. to Bengal Govt., 30 Dec. 1830, Beng. Sec.
Cons. 30 Jan. 1832. No.30. para. 1.
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The result of the enquiries into the murder of 
Govind Chandra was obtained in 1832. The evidence supporting 
Gambhir Sing’s complicity in the murder was not conclusive, but 
he was not cleared of suspicion, and this alone was considered 
to set at naught his claim on Cachar. Even a consideration 
of his claim appeared to give an impression of countenancing 
an offence.(l)
Other claimants to the throne were the widow of the 
late Raja, and Tula Ram. The widow’s claim was found to be 
inconsistent with the custom of the country: there had been
no instance of a woman succeeding to the throne since the 
accession of the dynasty to which the murdered Raja belonged. (2) 
As for Tula Ram, even his hands did not seem to be clean of the
murder. (3) In addition, he seemed to be a man of low
extraction, the son of an attendant by a slave girl. As he
had successfully established his authority over the hills it 
was thought that his claim would be more than satisfied if he 
was left undisturbed in his possessions there. (U) A body of
(l) Beng. Pol. Letters Reed. 28 Aug. 1832. No.5* para.3* Vol.28. 
(2; Scott to Govt., 13 Oct. 1830, Beng. Pol. Cons. Ik May 1832.
No.99. para.l+.
(3) ibid. para.3*
(U) Fisher to Govt., 27 Sept. 1830, Beng. Pol. Cons. Ik May
1832. No.100. para.15;
Beng. Pol. Letters Lecd. 28 Aug. 1832. No.5. para.I;. Vol.28.
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forty chiefs known as the forty "Sempongs’1, which claimed the 
right of electing a successor and would hare supported the 
claim of Tula Rara, could not in Fisher1 s opinion justify the 
validity of its claim, (l) Thus from all the enquiries that 
were made it appeared that there was no person who could 
legitimately claim the throne.(2)
Apart from the question of the legal rights of the 
claimants to the throne Bentinck also took into consideration 
the advantages which the people of Cachar and also the British 
government would derive from annexation, Fisher expressed 
himself in favour of annexation and the opinions of R,B. Pem­
berton and F, Jenkins (both in the survey department of the 
Bengal government) were asked for on the subject of the future 
of Cachar.(3)
The opinion of these officers was decisively in 
favour of annexation and against farming Cachar to Gambhir 
Sing. (1+) It was shown that Cachar was sparsely populated and
(l) Fisher to Govt,, 27 Sept. 1830, ibid. paras. 13-H4-.
(2; Scott to Govt., 13 Oct. 1830. Beng. Pol. Cons. 11+ May 1832. 
No.99* para.2.
(3) Gov. Gen.’s Sec. to Bengal Govt., 30 Dec. 1830, Beng. Sec.
Cons. 30 Jan. 1832. No.30.
(1+) Fisher to Govt., not dated, Beng. Pol. Cons. 11+ May 1832.
No. 106;
Pemberton to Govt., 6 April 1832, Beng. Pol. Cons. 11+ May 
1832. No.109;
Jenkins to Govt., 21 April 1832, Beng. Pol. Cons. 11+ May 
1832. No.110;
Private Letters of Fisher to Jenkins, Beng. Pol. Cons.
11+ May 1832. No. 111.
l6o
under good management would attract people from the neighbour­
ing territories* There was plenty of waste land in Cachar 
that could easily he brought under cultivation, and as the 
soil was fertile it could not fail to attract people from the 
neighbouring territories* Under a proper stimulus to agri­
culture and commerce Cachar could be an economic asset of 
great value yielding a large surplus revenue* Under British 
administration this money could be profitably employed to 
promote works of public utility* If placed in the hands of 
Gambhir Sing the surplus would be spent for puerile purposes 
as experience had shown* A lakh of rupees on a former 
occasion, Pemberton said, had been employed for the construction 
of a temple when half that sum would have
1 stacked the valley of Muneepore with cattle and 
by the purchase of a few mares have renewed the 
breed of horses now nearly extinct. I!(l)
Even European capital c ould be profitably employed 
in the improvement of the country.(2) In fact, it was pointed 
out, the process of reclamation had already set in, and since 
the British management of the state after the death of the 
Raja about 12,000 persons from the district of Sylhet had come 
to settle in Cachar and a general improvement in the face of
(1) Pemberton to Govt., 6 April 1832, Beng. Pol* Cons* 1U May 
1832* No.109.
(2) Fisher to Oenkins, 2 March 1832, Beng. Pol. Cons. Ik May 
1832. No.111.
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the country had "become visible. To yield Cachar to the 
arbitrary rule of Gambhir Sing, which wa3 conceived to be the 
only alternative to annexation, would be a retrogressive mea­
sure that might set people to emigrate to the Company’s 
territory.(l)
There was also the problem of the tribal people 
(Nagas) on the borders of Cachar. Gambhir Sing, it was 
stated, would find it difficult to pacify these people or 
elicit obedience from them. Failing in that he would not 
hesitate to follow a ruthless policy and threaten them with 
mass extermination.(2) The people of Cachar, it was also 
stated, shared with the people of the Company’s neighbouring 
district of Sylhet an affinity of customs and manners which 
were different from those of Manipur.(3)
The importance of Cachar in case of hostilities with 
the Burmese was also pointed out. It controlled the route 
between Sylhet and Manipur and in case of a war would easily 
supply the requirements of the British forces from a near point, 
an advantage which under a native government in Cachar could
(1) Pemberton to Govt., 6 April 1832, ibid. No.109.
(2) Jenkins to Govt., 21 April 1832, Beng. Pol. Cons. 11+ May 
1832. No.110.
(3) Pembfertoh t© Govt., 6 April 1832, Beng. Pol. Cons. 14 May 
1832. No.109.
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"be retarded, If not altogether lost.d)
These arguments were decisive enough in the deter­
mination of the future of Cachar and carried entire conviction 
with Bentinck at Simla. The annexation of Cachar to the 
British territories was therefore finally decided on 9 July 
1832* A provision was made for the widow of the late Raja, 
and Tula Ram was confirmed in his possessions in the hills. (2)
The small state of Jaintia on the north-east 
frontier of India was taken under British protection in 1824 
for reasons similar to those of Cachar. (3) By the treaty of 
10 March 1824 the British government became responsible for 
the protection of Jaintia against foreign attack and the Raja 
agreed to surrender control over his foreign policy and to 
listen to British advice for the removal of any Unforeseen 
abuse1* in his administration. (4) He was further to co-operate 
whole-heartedly in any war that the British government might
(1) Jenkins to Govt., 21 April 1832, Beng. Pol. Cons, 14 May
1832. No. 110;
Pemberton to Govt., 6 April 1832, Beng. Pol. Cons. 14 May
1832. No.109.
(2) Gov. Gen.'s Sec. to Bengal Govt., 13 June 1832, Beng. Pol. 
Cons. 9 July 1832. No.l5»
Govt, to Agent on N.E. Frontier, 9 July 1832, Beng. Pol. 
Cons. 9 July 1832. No.l6.
(3) Beng. Sec. Letters Reed. 23 Feb. 1824, para.38;
Beng. Sec. Letters Reed. 9 Jan. 1824, paras.19-20.
(4) Aitchison, Treaties. II, Treaty of 10 March 1824, Articles 
2 and 3, p.164.
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wage east of the river Brahmaputra.(l) The treaty, however, 
differed from that of Cachar in that it did not provide for 
an annual tribute, and allowed the Raja a greater measure of 
freedom in the administration of his country.(2)
The co-operation stipulated by the treaty was, how­
ever, not received in the Burmese war (182J+-1826) • (3) More­
over, after the war Raja Ram Sing encroached on territories 
belonging to the Manipur state which was friendly to the British 
government. In 1830 he was asked by David Scott, the agent 
on the north-east frontier, to remove an outpost he had 
established at the Confluence of Kopli and Dimla rivers.(U)
The Raja evaded compliance, and before any measures could be 
taken against him a fresh cause of dispute arose in 1832 when 
four British subjects passing along the high road in Assam 
were seized by his officers for human sacrifice* One of these 
men managed to escape into British territory and narrated the 
dreadful story. On the news being known repeated demands for 
the surrender of the offenders were made by the British
(1) ibid. Article U. p.l6i+.
(2) ibid. Treaty of 6 March 182U with Cachar,. pp.1U9-150;
Treaty of 10 March 182U with Jaintia^, p.liSU.
(3) Robertson to Govt. 27 Oct. 1832, Beng. Pol. Cons.
5 Nov. 1832. No.56.
Robertson held the office of agent on the north-east 
frontier after Scott.
{k) R*B. Pemberton, Report on the Eastern Frontier of British 
India. 212-213.
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government “but without success, (1) The involvement of the 
government of Jaintia itself was suspected. Investigations 
were made hut it was not till 1835 that the British government 
could come to a conclusion on the fact of sacrifice and the 
privity of the Raja to the crime,(2)
Another factor that turned into a dispute between 
the two governments was the exemption of the state of Jaintia 
from the payment of tirbute to the British government while it 
enjoyed British protection. The matter attracted the attention 
of T.C. Robertson, the agent on the north-east frontier, on 
the death of Raja Ram Sing in September 1832. He pointed out 
that the state was entirely dependent upon British protection 
for its existence and that a tribute of 10,000 rupees a year 
could be realised from the grand nephew and successor of Ram 
Sing, Raja Rajendra Sing as the price of British protection.(3) 
The question was decided by the Vice-President in Council(h) in 
November 1832 in favour of Robertson’s proposal. Robertson
(1) Robertson to Govt. 6 Oct. 1833# Beng. Pol. Cons. 12 Dec.
1833. No.70;
Govt, to Robertson, 12 Dec. 1833# Beng. Pol. Cons. 12 Dec.
1833. No.72.
(2) India Pol. Letters Reed. I*. May 1835. No.l. Vol.I.
(3) Robertson to Govt., 27 Oct. 1832, Berig. Pol. Cons.
5 Nov. 1832. No,56.
(U) Bentinck was on his tour in the western provinces at 
the time.
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was told that the treaty of 10 March 1821+ could he considered 
as personal with the late ruler. Therefore the British 
government need not extend their protection to his successor 
unless he paid for it. Rohertson was accordingly instructed 
to negotiate a new treaty with the new ruler stipulating for 
an annual tribute of 10,000 rupees.(1)
The Raja was however unwilling to accept that the 
treaty of 182U could he considered as personal and not entitling 
him to protection unless he paid for it. The demand for 
tribute he considered as directly opposed to the treaty and to 
l!the established regulations of the Company” and as injurious 
to him. His country, he said, was a small one. Instead of 
a regular revenue the: people rendered personal services when 
required. And so he considered it impossible to pay a regular 
tribute to the British government. The Raja also complained 
of the arrogant behaviour of Robertson at a meeting between 
the two, when he would not accept a Nazar for the governor- 
general from him and would not recognise his title of ’Raja* 
unless he agreed to pay 10,000 rupees annually to the British
(l) Govt, to Robertson, 5 Nov. 1832, Beng. Pol. Cons.
5 Nov. 1832. N0.58.
The home government expressed doubts in the contention of 
the Indian government that the treaty of 10 March 1821+ 
could be considered as a personal one.
India and Bengal Despatches, 3 Dec. 1831+. No.lU. 
paras. 93-9U. Vol.3*
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government.(1)
Robertson, on the other hand, assessed the income 
of the state at 30,000 rupees and considered the Rada capable 
of paying even a much greater tribute than the amount called 
for* He further suggested that the Raja in correspondence be 
addressed as "Jemadar” in place of the term “Rada” in order to 
bring pressure upon him to accede to the British demand, (2)
The matter was considered by the Vice-President in 
Council, It was decided that the demand for tribute was not 
to be given up though it was felt that the amount of 10,000 
rupees proposed by Robertson, which,came to about one-third of 
the state revenues, might be f,a greater proportion as tribute 
than could be discharged with facility”. It was further 
decided that the ruler of Jaintia was entitled to the dignity 
of the Raja and was therefore to be addressed as such.(3)
Early in 1835 the case of Jaintia came for decision 
by the governor-general in Council. The evidence submitted 
by Captain P. Jenkins, commissioner and agent to the governor- 
general in Assam, who had enquired into the matter, established
(1) Raja to Gov. Gen., not dated, Beng. Pol. Cons. 6 Feb.
1834. No.141.
(2) Robertson to Govt., 28 Feb. 1834* Beng. Pol. Cons. 25 March 
1834. No.40.
(3) Govt, to Jenkins, 25 March 1834, Beng. Pol. Cons. 25 March
1834. No.41.
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the fact of the sacrifice of the three British subjects and 
also of the Raja’s complicity in the matter while he was yet 
the heir-apparent to the throne* And it was on these twin 
factors that Bentinck took his stand* He wrote a letter to 
the Raja in which he referred to a warning given to the Jaintia 
government in 1821 when some Jaintia subjects had been seized 
in the Sylhet district while in the act of dragging away a 
young man for sacrifice. It had then been stated that if such 
an attempt were repeated the British government would demand 
suitable action from the Jaintia government. Now three 
British subjects had been sacrificed and the Raja was unable 
to apprehend and deliver up the culprits. In addition, the 
evidence suggested that the Raja himself, while he was heir- 
apparent, was cognisant of the offence.(l)
It had been decided therefore, the letter said, to 
confiscate his territories on the plains* These amounted to 
about half of his kingdom. He was further asked to bear in 
mind that if the offence was repeated the remainder of his 
territories would also be confiscated and such other punish­
ment administered as was deemed appropriate.(2) At the same
(1) Bentinck to Raja, 23 Feb. 1835* Board’s Collections, 
Vol. 1532.
(2) ibid.
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time Jenkins’s proposal that the Raja might he deposed 
altogether was not accepted hy Bentinck on the ground that 
it was too extreme a step,(l)
The Raja, however, saw no point in exercising his 
authority over the hilly regions of his state, which were 
the most unprofitable parts of his country and where his 
authority was weak, and at his request his territories over 
the hills were also taken over and he was pensioned off#
Thus the whole of Jaintia came under British rule in 1835.(2)
(1) Govt, to Jenkins, 23 Feb. 1835* Board's Collection. Vol.1532. 
Pemberton states that the reason for confining Raja’s rule 
to the hills was that the hills offered less opportunity
for the human sacrifice. Pemberton, Report. 213.
(2) India Pol. Letters Reed, k May 1835* No.l. Vol.I.
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The relations of the British government with the
state of Coorg were governed by the treaty of 31 March 1793 by
which it was taken under British protection and bound itself to
pay an annual tribute of 24,000 rupees. The British government
was further not to interfere in the internal administration of
the country so long as the Raja governed well.(l) In the war
of 1799 against Tipu the Raja of Coorg co-operated fully with
the British government. In recognition of his assistance, for
which he did not accept any pecuniary compensation, and with a
lYY\ltoL.tXor\
view also to encourage "the invitation of his example among 
other tributaries of the Company," Wellesley decided to relin­
quish the tribute payable to the Company by the treat^of 1793*(2) 
The Raja was accordingly required, in lieu of his tribute and as 
a token of his allegiance and devotion to the Company, to present 
a trained elephant to the British government annually.(3)
Vira Raja, with whom the treaty of 1793 was made, died 
in 1809, and in accordance with his latest wishes his daughter 
Devammaji became the Rani of Coorg. But before long she was 
supplanted by her wily uncle Linga Raja who in a short time made 
himself absolute in Coorg. As the British government had 
pledged itself to recognise the wishes of the late tfuler in the 
matter of succession, Linga Raja could not be sure of the support
(1) Aitchison, Treaties, IX^Treaty of 31 March 1793, 280-281.
(2) Wellesley to Raja, 30 April 1799, Madras, Sec. Cons.
25 March 1834« No.2.
(3) Aitchison, Treaties, IX,Sandd dated 16 Oct. 1799, 281.
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of the British government and so he sought t o ‘isolate his country 
from British intercourse and be even suspicious of the British, 
Colonel James Welsh on a private visit to Coorg in 3*811 found 
him distrustful of the British even to the extent of apprehending 
an invasion of his kingdom. He found the Raja hospitable but 
saw with surprise that he could not hold free communication with 
people and that every word he uttered was promptly conveyed to 
the Raja.(l)
Linga Raja died in December 1821 and was succeeded by 
his son Vira Raja. His installation had taken place even during 
his father’s lifetime in order to avoid a disputed succession.
But he did not feel his position secure any more than his father 
and was willing to adopt a ruthless policy to get rid of his 
rivals. Soon after his accession he put to death a number of 
persons he considered dangerous to himself. He inherited from 
his father a cruel and vindictive disposition and also a sus­
picion of the British government. And he walked also on the 
path trodden by his father. The country was cut off from British 
intercourse, and Vira Raja had no mercy on those who incurred his 
suspicion or enmity. To screen the affairs of his kingdom from 
the eyes of the British government he tightened restrictions on 
the people leaving and entering Coorg. This had the effect of ,
(1) J. Welsh, Military Reminiscences, I, 351.; H.S. Graeme,
Report, 20 March 1834, Madras Sec. Cons. 25 March 1834. No.2. 
H.S. Graeme conducted negotiations with the Raja of Coorg 
for a few months in 1833-34.
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practically sealing off his country from the surrounding 
territories* Visitors and travellers were permitted to enter 
his country only after obtaining a passport and were closely 
watched during their stay there* Any infringement of these 
regulations was summarily punished.(1)
Because of these restrictions no reliable information 
reached the resident(2) about conditions in Coorg and he was 
inclined to give credit to the stories of Rajafs cruelty that 
reached hi® from time to time. In 1826 J.A. Casamaijor, the 
acting resident, on hearing of a number of public executions in 
Coorg, deputed Captain T.H* Monk, one of his assistants, to 
visit the Raja in order to know the real situation. He was 
also to inspect a road through Coorg which the government of 
Madras had desired to be re-opened(3) for the use of troops and 
Europeans under the impression that on the road becoming a 
frequented route !1much of the present system of suspicious 
vigilance over all travellers would gradually relax.11C4)
Monk accordingly proceeded to Coorg and had interviews 
with the Raja. He was not satisfied with the information that 
he could gather there, and wrote that the people were suspicious
(1) Resident to Govt., 10 Oct. 1826, Madras Sec. Cons.
22 May 1827 No.12;
Resident to Govt., 12 Dec. 1829, Madras Sec. Cons.
21 June 1831. No.l.
(2) The resident at Mysore was also in charge of relations with 
C&org and so the residency was in Mysore and not in Coorg.
(3) The road had formerly existed but its use was found 
unhealthy and it had been discontinued.
(4) Resident to Govt., 10 Oct. 1826, Madras Sec. Cons.
22 May 1827 No.12.
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and would not give out anything about their country and 
government. The Raja himself showed a suspicious reserve on 
the subject of his relations and family. When asked he would 
merely say, f1I am the only male, the rest are all females, I 
have said sot!. On the whole, however, Monk formed a favourable 
impression of the Raja and considered him to possess ucapacityu 
and to be !,naturally well-disposed.11 The Raja appeared 
curious to know about European things and his questions showed 
a keen and intelligent mind.(l)
Shortly afterwards, in November 1826, Casamaijor 
visited the Raja himself and stayed at the capital for three 
days. He was also impressed with the Raja*s disposition and 
inclined to discredit the several stories of his cruelty over 
his subjects that had reached him. On the subject of the Raja*s 
government he wrote to the government of Madras(2) of the 
difficulty of arriving at the truth under the system of 
restrictions established by the Raja, which precluded anything 
being said with !,a thorough conviction of its accuracy.11 The 
Raja himself would give no definite information and Casamaijor 
saw that he was suspicious, uncommunicative and evasive when 
asked about his country, his government or his relations,(3)
The Raja further wanted to know from Casamaijor in
(1) Monk to Resident, 10 Sept. 1826, Madras Sec, Cons.
22 May 1827 No.12.
(2) The relations with Coorg were under the control of the 
government of Madras.
(3) Resident to Govt., 20 Nov. 1826, Madras Sec. Cons.
22 May 1827, No.13.
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detail the motives of the British government in asking him to 
re-open the road through his country as, he said, his people 
had started talking vaguely about it. He also assured the 
resident that the system of passports and of restrictions 
prevailing in Coorg, which the resident advised him to modify 
was not vexatious, that it had existed in the time of his father 
and that it was Uquite essential11 to his scheme of government,CL) 
In May 1827 the government of Madras under Sir Thomas 
Munro took into consideration its relations with Coorg. It 
was decided that the nature of those relations precluded "any 
minute or habitual interference with the Raja's administration,11 
The system of passports was therefore not considered to calljffor 
intervention. The resident was however asked to call for a 
report from the Raja on capital punishments in his country.(2)
The demand for a report on capital punishments was 
accordingly made by the resident. The Raja refused to comply 
with it as he considered it as inconsistent with his authority 
and as l!an encroachment upon the established usage." The 
matter was not pursued further by the government of Madras but 
it seemed to have strengthened the Raja in his intention to stick 
tenaciously to what he considered as his sovereign authority.(3) 
This desire to safeguard his authority made the Raja
(1) ibid
(2) Govt. to Resident, 22 May 1827, Madras Sec. Cons.
, 22 May 1827. No,15.
(3) Graeme, Report, 20 March 1834, Madras Sec. Cons.
25 March 1834. No.2.
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insist on a strict observance of the established practices 
between the two governments. One such practice was the repat­
riation of fugitives or offenders seeking asylum in one another1s 
territory. Though there was no written agreement to that effect 
the repatriation of such persons had become usual and a kind of 
reciprocity had been maintained in its observance. The Baja 
had invariably acted in conformity with it.(!) The British 
government, though it had not departed from it, was finding it 
difficult to continue it as the fate of persons restored to the 
Raja was found to be uncertain and even insecure.(2)
Thus a person named Channa Vira was restored by 
A.H. Cole, the British resident, in 1823 at the requisition of 
the Raja. When later enquiries were made about him by the 
resident it was given out by the Raja that Channa Vira with his 
whole family and relations had been carried off by cholera which 
had swept away hundreds of persons in his country.(3) The 
veracity of this statement could not be ascertained and a strong 
suspicion was felt that the man had been put to death at the 
Raja*s order.(4)
(1) Resident to Mysore Commission, 18 Juny 1833, Madras Sec.
Cons. 26 July 1833. No.l.
(2) Govt, to Magistrate of Canara, 8 Jan. 1833, Madras Sec. Cons.
, . ^ 8 Jan. 1833. No.12.
(3; Raja to Resident, 8 Sept. 1826, Madras Sec. Cons.
. x 22 May 1827. No.12.
(4) Resident to Govt., 20 Nov.1826, Madras Sec. Cons. 22 March
The Raja*s statement was that Channa Vira was 1827 No.13. 
an ordinary ryot who had run away from Coorg after coming 
into dispute with the local authorities but the residents 
information suggested his being a relation of the Raja and 
so his death might have had political reasons behind it. No 
positive cause of his death or of his being offensive to the 
Raja was ascertained.
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The government of the Raja, though not particularly* 
oppressive and exacting was arbitrary* The land-tax which 
formed the principal source of revenue was stated by J.S. Fraser 
in the later years of the Raja*s rule to be “extremely light11, 
being 15 per cent* on the gross produce.(1) The land produced 
abundant rice of the finest kind, which, besides fulfilling the 
needs of the people, was exported in large quantities to Mysore.(0 
Law was customary and was allowed to run its ordinary course 
unless vitiated by the royal caprice. Thefts and robbery among 
the people were uncommon and their life was not characterised by 
litigious disputes. In the later years of the Rajafs rule the 
demand for personal labour on forts, buildings etc. was carried 
to excess but it seemed to have proceeded from the efforts of the 
Raja to strengthen the countryfs defende for an emergency rather 
than from any malicious intent to bring misery upon his subjects.® 
But though not characterised by tyranny the Rajafs 
government was despotic and as such governed by his moods and 
eccentricities. The Raja was an upholder of the absolute 
authority of kings. He received the homage of his people and 
was the object of almost blind reverence among them.(4)
(1) Fraser to Govt., 14 July 1834, Board1s Collections, Vol.1515. 
Fraser was appointed Political Agent to the governor-general 
for the affairs of Coorg at the beginning of war against 
Coorg in 1834.
(2) Resident to Govt., 20 Nov. 1826, Madras Sec. Cons.
22 May 1827. No.13.
(3) Graeme, Report, 20 March 1834, Madras Sec. Cons. 25 March 
1834 No.2; Information given by Mudiah, Madras Sec. Cons.
25 March 1834 No.2. Mudiah had been in the Raja!s service 
for a long time.
(4) Information given by Mudiah, ibid.
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They approached his person with ” the utmost awe, not daring to 
raise their eyes but with their bodies and looks bent to the 
ground they answered Mahaswamy (the Supreme Lord) when spoken 
to.‘H D  The majesty that hedged in his person and the exalted 
notion cherished by him of his sovereignty, however, did not 
prevent him from making an arbitrary use of his authority. He 
was remorseless in punishing offences against the state and 
unscrupulous in getting rid of persons he considered dangerous.
He was also at times eccentric in inflicting heavy punishments 
for trifling causes. Thus it was stated by Mudiah, a person 
who had been in the Raja’s service for a long time, that when a 
wild elephant had escaped which the Raja had ordered to be 
detained within a certain area some fifty persons were put to 
death.(2) Even if this statement were not true, the eccentric 
disposition of the Raja was testified by other persons also.
What was needed was a clear assertion at an early 
period of the right of British intervention to prevent a 
capricious use of authority. But no such action was taken till 
in 1832 matters were forced to a decision by the flight from 
Coorg into Mysore of the Raja’s brother-in-law, Channa Basava and 
sister Devarnmaji with a body of followers. Channa Basava was
under watch when he contrived his escape. He with his party
(1) Graeme, Report, 20 March 1834. Madras Sec. Cons. 25 March
1834. No.2. para.136.
(2) Information given by Mudiah, Madras Sec. Cons. 25 March 1834.
No.2; Resident to Govt., 15 Jan. 1833, Madras Sec. Cons.
23 Jan. 1833. No.13.
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reached the British residency (in Mysore) on 13 September 1832. 
The original party seeking to leave Coorg consisted of 68 
persons. In their flight they excited suspicion and were 
prevented by the Raja hs officers from proceeding further. An 
encounter was the result in which two of the Raja's soldiers were 
shot dead and one wounded on the right arm. In the confusion 
that followed Channa Basava with his wife and 21 followers was 
able to escape and cross into Mysore. The rest were seized by 
the Raja's soldiers including an infant son of Devammaji who had 
been left behind in the flight. Before leaving his house in 
Coorg Channa Basava had also drugged a guard who watched him at 
his residence and this man was also stated by the Raja to have 
died as a result of the intoxication.(1)
The fugitives told the resident that the reason for 
their flight was that the Raja entertained a criminal passion 
for his sifter Devammaji and had made an incestuous proposal to 
her through a confidential female servant Badri and had threat­
ened her with dire consequences if she refused.(2) The story 
could have been a mere concoction told by the fugitives to escape 
repatriation, which they knew to be certain under the practice 
between the two governments unless they could say something to 
excite sympathy and support. But the resident had heard some
(1) Resident to Govt., 17 Sept. 1832, Madras Sec. Cons. 26 Sept.
1832. No.l; Raja to Governor of Madras, not dated, Madras
Sec. Cons. 15 Jan. 1833. No.4; Memorandum by Sheristadar,
5 Dec. 1832, Madras Sec. Cons. 21 Dec. 1832. No.2.
(2) Resident to Govt.,, 17 September 1832, Madras Sec. Cons.
26 Sept. 1832. No.l. para.5.
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rumours previously of the gross sensuality of the Raja and of 
his acts of severity* He had formed an impression that the 
mind of the Raja was somewhat abnormal. And so he was inclined 
to believe the story on account of thef,distinctness and 
simplicity11 with which it had been told and to give protection 
to the fugitives. His action was upheld by the government of 
Madras.(1)
The Raja put forward a demand for the restitution of 
these persons who he stated besides causing death to three of 
his subjects were guilty of attempting a tumult in hisT country 
and of declaring Channa Basava the Raja of Coorg.(2) But the 
RajaTs statement seems to have received little consideration.
To the resident Channa Basava appeared to be an innocent and 
injured person though he by no means seems to have been such a 
saintly figure.(3) The ease with which he could rally some 66 
persons when himself under watch without exciting any suspicion 
in a country where espionage was strong indicates an uncommon 
degree of tact and adroitness. It was stated by K.K. Menon, a 
Sheristadar in Malabar, on the basis of enquiries he had instit­
uted among persons returning f£om Coorg at that time, that Channa 
Basava had a large following in the country and his cause would
(1) Govt, to Resident, 26 Sept. 1832, Madras Sec. Cons.
26 Sept. 1832. No.2.
(2) Raja to Resident, not dated, Madras. Sec. Cons.
13 Nov. 1832. No.l.
(3) Resident to Govt., 18 Oct. 1832, Madras Sec. Cons.
13 Nov. 1832. No.l.
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have "been supported by them against the Raja.(l)
It was further stated by a rice merchant, Puliket 
Watan, who had gone to Coorg to purchase paddy and returned 
after a stay of a few days there, that Channa Basava had put 
up the claims of his son to sovereignty.(2) It was also a 
fact that the Raja had no children of his own-alive-at the time 
and that after him two sisters of the Raja, Devammaji and the 
Rajammaji and the male child of the former were the rightful 
claimants to the throne.(3) After the annexation of Coorg 
also in 163^ 4- Channa Basava had not failed to show his political 
ambitions. Much to the annoyance of Fraser he assumed the title 
of Raja. Then Fraser reprimanded him for his boldness. (4 )
That he might have tried to stir up trouble for the Raja and in 
some way become obnoxious to him was likely but this consider­
ation was lost sight of in the fruitless negotiations and 
controversy that followed the flight of the fugitives.
Be that as it may the successful flight of some 23 
persons from his country and their refuge in the British 
territory confirmed the fears the Raja had entertained with 
regard to his sovereignty and his state. The departure from
(1) Information collected by K.K. Menon, Madras Sec. Cons.
11 Dec. 1832. No.lj..
(2) P. Watan’s evidence, Madras Sec. Cons. 8 Jan. 1833* No.4*
(3) Resident to Govt., 17 Sept. 1832, Madras Sec. Cons.
26 Sept. 1832. No.l. para.6.
(4) Fraser to Govt., 26 May 183U> Madras Sec. Cons.
3 June 183U* No.3* psra3
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the practice was manifest and the Raja took alarm and- the;; Raja 
took alarm and grew more suspicious. In the past not only had 
the British government delivered up persons fleeing from Coorg, 
it had also taken no definite action in cases of detention of 
its own subjects in Coorg.(l) And now not only did it refuse 
compliance with the Raja’s demuand for the restoration of his 
own subjects charged by him with rebellion and murder, it also 
asked the Raja to send for investigation persons who had been 
apprehended in Channa Basava^s flight.(2)
The Raja wrote letters to Sir Frederick Adam, the 
governor of Madras, requesting that the fugitives be restored 
to him and no violation of the practice between the two 
governments permitted. In reply he was told that the British 
government had no hostile intention towards his government but 
was obliged by the law of nations and the dictates of humanity 
not to hand over persons seeking shelter from his. persecution.(3) 
In December 1832 the matter was considered by Bentinck 
on receiving a detailed account of the event. He left it to be 
settled by the government of Madras with the remark that it 
appeared clear to him that the refugees should not be given up^U)
(1) G-ovt • to Magistrate of Canara, 8 Jan. 1833> Madras Sec. Cons. 
8 Jan. 1833* Ho.12; Govt, to Resident, 16 Dec. 1831 * 
Madras Sec. Cons. 16 Dec. 1831 • No.2.
(2) R esident to Raja, not dated, Madras Sec. Cons. 13 Nov.
1832. No.l.
(3) Adam to Raja, 18 Jan. 1833 9 Madras Sec. Cons. 12 Feb. 1833*
N 0.7U; Graeme, Report, 20 March 183k t  Madras Sec. Cons.
25 March 183U* No.2. 
(U) Gov. Gen’s Sec. to Bengal Govt., 7 Dec. 1832, Madras S&c.
Cons. 18 Jan 1833• No.l.
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His attitude “became more clear in a letter to the Raja on
i -
21 November 1833. Its tone though conciliatory was firm. It
reminded the Raja of the co-operation of his ancestors with the 
British government and expressed a wish for the continuance of 
amicable relations between the two governments. The Raja was 
asked to rid his mind of any suspicion of the intentions of the 
British government with regard to his state or authority. But 
at the same time Bentinck asserted the right of the British 
government as the paramount power to decide the repatriation of 
the refugees. The British government, Bentinck said, had no 
desire to shelter offenders in its territories but
"it must rest with the Paramount Power to determine from 
the evidence adduced in each case, whether the refugees are 
really criminals or innocent persons who seek an asylum from 
unmerited persecution.ft(l)
There was no reference in this letter to the terms of 
the treaties or to the existing practice between the two 
governments, but instead a straight and matter-of-fact assertion 
of the right of the British government as the paramount power 
to decide things in a given situation.
The force of these assertions was however lost upon 
the Raja who looked to the practice between the two governments 
and who failed to comprehend why when fugitives had been restored 
to the Coorg government in the past such persons whom he con­
sidered particularly obnoxious should be granted protection.
(1) Bentinck to Raja, 21 Nov. 1833 > Madras Sec. Cons.
13 Dec. .1833. No.l.
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A number of factors had contributed to upset the Raja’s 
mind. He had viewed askance the re-opening of the road through 
his country. The requisition of the government of Madras for 
a report on capital punishment had also filled his mind with 
misgiving. Further in 1831 the assumption of the Mysore gov­
ernment was carried out. It set people in Coorg talking 
vaguely about the fate of the Raja’s country. Accor/Lng to an 
observer, after the dispossession of the Raja of Mysore his own 
days appeared to him to be numbered. (1) In this context the 
flight of the fugitives would appear to be the last straw to 
unsettle him. Some strong expressions of Casamaijor that his 
country was small and surrounded on all sides by British
territory and as such should modify its form of government also
LYkY~i.tcx'ti-OrL 
added to his irritat-ionril(2)
In his heated imagination he waw a conspiracy against
his rule countenanced and supported by the British government.
Before long he expected to find British forces marching into
his country to dispossess him. (3) The invasion of his country
became so much an obsession with him that the best assurances
of the governor of Madras and the governor-general that the
British government nourished no hostile intention or ill-feeling
towards him and that it would permit no attack on his territory^
(1) C. Naik’s evidence, Madras Sec.^ons# ^  March 1834, No.9 
He was a sentry in the Raja s service.
(2) Resident to Raja and Raja to Resident, Madras Sec.Cons*
11 Dec. 1832 no.l; Graeme, Report, 20 March 1834, Madras 
Sec.Cons.25 March 1834, No.2.
(3) C. Naik’s evidence, ibid.;
Husain’s evidence, ^adras. Sec.Cons. 25 March 1834, No.3.
He was a servant of the Company. He went to Coorg 
occasionally.
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from any quarter appeared to him to be of little consequence 
unless accompanied by the restitution of the fugitives.
The nervous mood of the Raja rendered all efforts at 
negotiation fruitless# The degree to which his mind had been 
affected was overwhelming# In his imagination he saw prepar­
ations for an attack and British forces round his kingdom#
When, under the orders of the government of Madras, Casamaijor 
paid a visit to the Raja in January 1833 to dispel his fears of 
an armed invasion, the Raja thought that Casamaijor having 
posted forces around Coorg was coming with a large army 
accompanied by Channa Basava# And so he desired Casamaijor to 
bring with him the same number of people as he had brought when 
he had visited him in November 1826#(l) In the same way when 
H.S# Graeme, the resident at Nagpur, was sent on a similar 
errand in October 1833* at the request of Casamaijor, whom the 
Raja considered to be personally hostile to himself, the Raja 
thought that he too was coming on no friendly purpose and 
refused to receive his visit#(2) Consequently both the 
missions proved ineffectual#
A s a  last hope Graeme deputed two Indians named Dara 
Set, a Pars! merchant of Tellicherry and K.K. Menon, a
Sheristadar in Malabar, to go on a friendly visit to the Raja#(3)
(1) Resident to Govt#, 28 Jan. 1833* Madras Sec# Cons# 7 June 
1833* No#i*$ Raja to Resident, not dated, Madras Sec. Cons.
7 June 1833* No. 6.
(2) Graeme, Report, 20 March 183*+* Madras Sec. Cons.
25 March 183^* No# 2.
(3) Graeme to Raja, 2 Dec. 1833* Madras Sec. Cons.
7 Jan. 183^- No#35.
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This to the Raja seemed to afford an opportunity of avenging 
himself upon the British government and so he resolved to detain 
one of these envoys !las a hostage and for the restitution11 of 
Channa Basava.(l) In a distracted state of mind the Raja 
prepared to risk his all, believing that his cause was righteous 
and that 11 the Pure God Maha Deva11 would not desert him. He had 
made frantic preparations for repelling a British attack which 
he had seen in the offing soon after the flight of Channa Basava 
from his country. He had enlisted as large a number of people 
as he could in his own kingdom for military service, and efforts 
were made also to secure men from outside. At the same time, 
everything was done to strengthen the country1s defences by 
felling trees across the roads, digging trenches and fixing 
stockades into them, and erecting batteries at the side.(2)
In February 1834 Bentinck left for Madras.(3) He saw 
the difficulty of an amicable settlement with the Raja after his 
warlike preparations and after the detention of Menon. But he 
thought without much hope that the Raja*s !,pride may possibly 
induce him to prefer submission to me, than to the local 
authority11. nI shall avoid the contest11, heinote to Auber Mif I 
possibly can and d6 it effectively if I cannot11. (4)
(1) Graeme, Report, 20 March 1834, ibid. para.31.
Dara Set was allowed to return to Tellicherry.
(2) Graeme, Report, 20 March 1834, ibid. ; C. Naikfs evidence, 
Madras Sec. Cons. 25 March 1834. No.9.
(3) His visit to Madras; was prompted by his desire to see in 
person the working of the Mysore government which had been 
taken over in 1831.
(4) Bentinck to Auber, 15 Feb. 1834. Bentinck Papers.
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On reaching Madras he wrote yet another letter to the 
Raja. . The Rajars conduct in detaining K.K. Menon was described 
as a "violation of the law of nations” which the British 
government could not tolerate. He was asked to desist from the 
insolent tone of his communications to the British government. 
Further the right of the British government as the paramount 
power to demand an explanation from him for his conduct was 
affirmed. The letter spoke also of Bentinck*s conciliatory 
disposition and of his generous feeling towards the Raja. There 
was something warm and affectionate in his tone. "My feelings 
towards you are those of parental kindness and solicitude and I 
still venture to entertain an expectation of your return to 
better feelings, and-that recourse to hostile operations may yet 
be averted”. (i)
It was a hope against hope. Bentinck*s expectation 
did not materialise. The Raja was obdurate. Menon was not 
released and so the issue was settled by a. resort to war. On 
15 March 1834 a proclamation of war was issued by the British 
government, on 6 April the Raja*s capital was taken, and on the 
10th the Raja himself made an abject surrender. His men had
(2)
fought bravely and shown courage and spirit in the short campaign.
The Raja was removed with his family to Bangalore and 
finally sent to Benares.
(1) Bentinck to Raja, 17 Feb. 1834, Madras Sec. Cons.
17 Feb. 1834. No.2.
(2) India and Bengal Despatches, 23 June 1835, No.26. para.9.
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After the conquest came the question of the disposal 
of the country. By the right of conquest after a formal 
proclamation of war Coorg belonged to the Company. Coorg, says ■ 
Lee-Warner, which received the honour of war also paid the 
penalty of international law.(1)
In his minute of 3 March 1834, before the commencement 
of hostilities, Bentinck stated that if there should be any legal 
heir of the family and if it should be the wish of the people 
that the country should be governed by him, the preferable course 
would be to give the country to such an heir. (2) The spirited 
resistance of the army of Coorg however drew the attention of the 
authorities more clearly than before to the geographical position 
of the state which was said by Fraser to be "impregnable if 
properly defended11. The political advantages also of retaining 
Coorg were advocated with force by Fraser in his despatch to the 
government of 20 April 1834:-
«--- the central position of the district among the disturbed
provinces around, to the turbulent and disaffected inhabitants 
of which it has long offered a refuge and exemption from punish­
ment, its conversion at once from being a source of extrenBevil 
and even danger, to one of our strongest points of support, all 
these circumstances combined, will render I should imagine our 
possession of Coorg though of trifling value as a revenue 
acquisition, yet of the very highest consequences as a political 
one".(3)
From a military viewpoint also Brigadier P. Lindesay, 
in command of the Coorg force, had strongly impressed on Fraser
that Coorg was to southern India what a citadel was to a town and
(1) Lee-Warner, The Native States of India. 109.
(2) Bentinck, minute, 3 March 1834, Madras Sec. Cons. 14 March
(3) Fraser to Govt., 20 April 1834, Madras[_1834. No.l. para.5. 
Sec. Cons. 25 April 1834. No.3. __________________________
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had consequently recommended that it should not merely be 
occupied **but so strongly occupied as to preclude the possibility 
of our losing it**.(l) The government also therefore held that 
the possession of Goorg would be of ‘incalculable value** in a 
political point of view in addition to the advantage it would 
confer on the inhabitants,(2) Before surrendering, the Baja 
had put several of his kinsmen to cruel death# Bentinck was 
shocked. His palace had been **a positive charnel-house and 
his immediate relations his principal victims**# The'^Joorg War** 
he said had resulted in the overthrow of "one,of the most bloody 
tyrants that ever reigned**#(3) The absence of a legitimate 
male heir further helped him to decide in favour of annexation(^) 
And so on 7 May 183U Coorg was annexed by a proclamation.
In short, the conflict in Coorg was between two 
powers, one of which holding itself paramount, insisted on being 
so recognised in effect. The assertion of such a role, however, 
was resisted by the other as a deviation from the established 
practice* Bentinck1s letters to the Raja did not refer to the 
terms of the treaty or to the practice between the two govern­
ments. It was clearly implied that British authority could not
(1) Lindesay to Fraser, not dated, Madras Sec. Cons. 6 May 1834*
No.10*
(2) Macnaghten (Sec. to Gov. Gen.) to Fraser, 22 April 183U* 
Madras Sec. Cons. 6 May 183*+* No.lOi India Pol. Letters 
Reed. 12 May 183U# No.ij.. para.5* Vol.I.
(3) Bentinck to (anonymous) 11 May 183*4-> Bentinck Papers.
(4) Macnaghten to Fraser, 1 May l&3bf Madras Sec. Cons. 16 May 
1834* No.2.i India Pol. Letters Rec. 12 May 183U* No.h* 
para.2. Vol.I.
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be so circumscribed. His insistence was on the Raja's recog­
nition of the paramount position of the British government, the 
refusal of which led to hostilities# The Coorg case showed 
that the British government might even resort to war to enforce 
its claims# It also showed that any extension of the 
authority of the British government beyond what the rulers 
considered to be its legitimate bounds was fraught with friction 
and that the sooner the position was clarified and understood 
the less would be the chances of such conflict#(1)
In conclusion, it may be said that Bentinck's 
annexations, while not pointing to annexation as a solution of 
the problem of the Indian states showed an increasing assumption 
of the role of the paramount power by the British government. 
British supremacy involved not merely an observance of treaties 
by the Indian princes it could also be exercised for settling 
questions affecting the internal affairs of the states* As a 
last step Bentinck upheld the corrective role of the British 
government and hoped that it would be accepted by the princes to 
the convenience and advantage of both parties.
(1) The ex-Raja, while in England, in a petition to the British 
government dated 8 July 1858, said that his "crime” while 
he was the ruler of Coorg was "a mistaken assertion of his 
rights of sovereignty”. The petition contained a request 
that he should be allowed to reside in England or India 
according to his liking. P.P. 1863f XLV (1+80), 3*
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CHAPTER 6. BENTINCK AMD THE MOGHAL.
British relations with the Mughal affected Indian states in a 
particular way. Not till the influence exercised by the Mughal over 
the minds of the Indian princes had withered could the British 
government stand in their estimation as the paramount power in India,
Not till then could the problem of British relations with the Indian 
states be taclfled in a realistic way. As British supremacy became more 
firmly established the British government saw the anomaly of the 
position of the Mughal emperor. It was evident that the fiction of the 
nominal sovereignty of the Mughal had to make way sooner or later for 
the de facto authority of the British government, Bentinck was a firm 
supporter of the British supremacy and consequently frowned upon Mughal 
influence as a factor in British relations with the Indian states. He 
also considered British power in India to be unchallengeable and 
consequently regarded Mughal authority to be of no practical importance. 
And he sought to make the existing relationship between the Mughal and the 
British government on the one hand and the Mughal and the Indian princes 
on the other conform more truly to the realities of the existing 
situation. This he meant to do without much display or a blatant 
exercise of British power. Indeed, he was anxious not to bring a sense 
of humiliation upon the emperor while asserting British supremacy.
The wars in the time of Lord Hastings had raised the Company 
to a position of virtual paramountcy but nominally it continued to hold
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an inferior position vis-a-vis the Mughal emperor. The Company's 
coins were struck in the emperor's name, the emperor bestowed titles 
and honours upon.the Indian princes and in Delhi the British resident 
offered Nazars (l) in the name of the governor-general to the Mughal 
four times a year. (2)
Lord Hastings decided to depart from the existing practice 
of presenting Nazars by a governor-general when he might call on the 
Mughal at Delhi. He further resolved to discontinue in his correspondence
t
with the Indian princes the use of a seal which had inscribed on it a 
title "Fidvee Akbar Shah" or "Vassal of King Akbar." The emperor refused 
to accept this and all correspondence between him and the governor- 
general ceased from this time (1819-20). (3) In the time of Amherst the 
Mughal relinquished his demand for a Nazar as a condition to his meeting 
the governor-general, while Amherst for his part admitted his superiority 
of rank.(4) The meeting took place in 1827 in Delhi on an equal footing 
and was considered by Amherst as "a sufficient acknowledgement by the 
Court of Delhi that the relation of Sovereign and Vassal had ceased to 
exist, even in name, between the representative of the House of Timoor and
(1) Token gifts of homage.
(2) Govt, to Resident at Delhi, 6 Dec.1826, Beng.Pol.Cons.22 Dec.1826.No.9b. 
The four occasions were those of Nauruz, Jashan and the two Ids*
(3) Note by Persian Secretary A. Sterling, 6 Sept.1827, Beng.Pol.Cons.
21 Sept. 1827« No. 68;
Beng. Pol. Letters Reed. 3 July 1828, para. 64, Vol. 20.
(4) Govt, to Resident at Delhi, 6 Dec. 1826, Beng.Pol.Cons. 22 Dec.1826.
No.9b.
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the British Government in India," (l) On his return from this visit to 
the emperor, Amherst further decided against the existing practice of 
the resident presenting Nazars to the emperor on Behalf of the governor- 
general on certain occasions* (2)
Amherst also proposed to revive the correspondence with the 
Mughal which had been discontinued since the time of Lord Hastings. The 
form of correspondence between the governor-general and the Shah of Persia 
was taken as a model. It acknowledged the superior rank of the latter but 
did not indicate any "vassalage or political dependence" on the part of 
the former. Negotiations for arranging the correspondence on this basis 
were successful and from this time onwards the correspondence between the 
Mughal and the governor-general involved "nothing derogatory" to the 
British government and approximated "as near to equality" as could be 
expected under the circumstances. (3)
Before Amherst's departure from Delhi the emperor in a paper 
presented to the governor-general put forward a claim to the augmentation
(l) Gov. Gen's Sec. to Bengal Govt., 3 March 1827* Beng. Pol,Cons.
25 March 1827. No.11;
Beng. Pol. Letters Reed. 3 July 1828, para. 62. Vol. 20.
(2^  Govt, to Resident, 1 Feb.1828, Beng.Pol.Cons. 1 Feb.1828, No.3*para.2.
(3) Govt, to Resident, 27 July 1827, Beng.Pol.Cons. 21 Sept.1827* No.65; 
Note by Persian Secretary, A.Sterling, 6 Sept.1827, op.cit.
The governor-general even after this change addressed himself as 
"Niyazmund-i-Durgal-i-Illahee" i.e. "suppliant of the Throne of 
Almighty," a phrase used in correspondence with the King of Persia.
192
of the royal allowance on the basis of a communication (l) made to the 
late emperor by the resident at Delhi in 1805• This claim was not 
accepted by Amherst and the emperor was informed accordingly. (2)
Against this decision the emperor made an appeal to the home 
government in Bentinck!s time. He selected as his agent the reputed Indian 
Ram Mohan Roy and conferred on him the title of Raja. Bentinck was greatly 
annoyed at this appeal over his head. Ram Mohan's title was consequently 
not recognised by the Supreme Government and copies of certain official 
papers asked for by the emperor were not furnished. But the emperor 
was firm in his resolve to approach the home government and Bentinck*s 
attitude softened. He made a virtue of necessity. Official opposition to 
the mission was withdrawn. (5) Privately, however, he expressed himself 
against Ram Mohan's mission being officially accepted by the home 
government. (4) Nor did he favour any augmentation of the emperor's 
allowance. He could not see an end of the "evil", he told Auber, if the 
British government continued to encourage and maintain "all the children, 
wives and concubines that this family in its multiplying sub-divisions
(lj For a discussion of this paper see J.Sutherland, Sketchest 172-175
(2) Govt, to Resident, 1 Feb.1828, Beng.Pol.Cons. 1 Feb.1828. Ho. 5*
(5; P.Spear, Twilight of the Mughuls, 46-47*
(4) Bentinck to Auber, 11 May 1852, Bentinck Papers.
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will be too happy to beget -—  " (l)
In England a long controversy raged between the Directors and
the Board of Control over Ram Mohanfs mission, (2) and eventually it
was decided to increase the emperor*s allowance to fifteen lakhs of
rupees per annum on the condition that the increase be accepted by the
Mughal emperor "in full satisfaction of all claims of every description."
The actual amount of three lakhs which the increase amounted to was left
to the discretion of the Supreme Government for distribution among the
members of the royal family. (3) The emperor, however, refused to accept
the increase on these conditions, and so the provision came to nothing.(4)
Bentinck sought also to discourage the Indian princes from
looking to the Mughal for titles and honorary distinctions. In November
1829 the resident at Hyderabad, W.B.Martin, forwarded an application from
the Nizam and the heir-apparent with Nazars on the occasion of the Nizam*s
accession to the throne to be presented to Mughal.(5) Bentinck did not
approve of Martin's receiving the application and the Nazars. Martin was
told in future to conform to the policy of the government of discouraging
Indian princes from observing forms expressive of "fealty to the pageant
(1) Bentinck to Auber, 2 April 1832, Bentinck Papers.
(2) For a description of this controversy see P.Spear, Twilight of the
Mughuls, 46-49> 53-54
(3) Bengal Despatches, 13 Feb.1833> No.5* Vol. 121.
(4) Beng.Pol. Letters Reed. 2 Sept. 1833* No.8. paras. 42-44*Vol. 29;
India and Bengal Despatches, 1 May 1835• No.14* Vol. 4*
(5) Resident to Govt., 25 Nov.1829, Beng.Pol.Cons. 26 Dec.1829* No.57«
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throne of Delhi." (l)
At the same time Bentinck did, not seek to assert British
supremacy so agressively as to bring a sense of humiliation to the
emperor. In October 1829 the acting resident at Delhi, F.Hawkins,
urged on the Supreme Government the discontinuance of "unnecessary and
humiliating disbursements"- in the form of Nazars made by the resident
and his assistants to the Mughal and his family (principal wife and heir-
apparent) butwas told that no change in the existing practice was desired.
(2)
Hawkins was temperamentally averse to such deference as was 
shown to the emperor and the emperor disliked him intensely. At the end 
of 1830 matters came to a head when the emperor complained of studied 
disrespect received from Hawkins from the moment of his assuming the duties - 
of the residency. He was stated to have humbled the royal dignity in a 
number of ways. He had, the emperor said,entered into the inner courts 
of the palace on horseback with his retinue all mounted, had presented a 
Nazar to the heir-apparent with one hand, had sat on a chair in the 
presence of the queen and had on one occasion even refused a royal 
present. Other breaches of etiquette were also cited. (3) Bentinck 
on hearing these charges expressed surprise and grief at the "extraordinary 
conduct" of Hawkins, which was calculated "to excite in the bosom of that
fl) Govt, to Resident, 19 Dec. 1829, Beng. Pol.Cons. 26.Deq.1829.No.59*
(2) Acting Resident to Govt., 8 Oct. 1829, Delhi Residency and Agency
Records, Vol.I, 378;
Govt, to Acting Resident, 30 Oct.1829, ibid, 381-382.
(3) King to Gov.Gen., not dated (Reed. 1 Jan.1830)Beng.Pol.Cons. 8 Jan.1830
No.42;
King to Gov. Gen., not dated (Reed. 1 Jan.1830) Beng.Pol.Cons. 8 Jan 1830
Nos.43-44.
dignified and venerable personage the feelings of alarm, disgust and 
resentment." And feeling that the king’s complaints were not without 
foundation he decided to afford him immediate satisfaction. Hawkins 
was accordingly deprived of his charge pending a satisfactory explanation 
of his behaviour, (l) In a letter to the emperor Bentinck spoke of his 
solicitude for his "welfare and happiness" and his desire to prevent the 
occurrence of any further "annoyance and distress" to him. (2) Bentinck 
was not satisfied with Hawkins’s explanation. It did not remove from 
his mind the impression that Hawkins had been "wanting in the proper 
observance of the established forms of etiquette to which all natives 
of rank attach so much importance and which are peculiarly due from the 
British representatives towards the Royal Family at Delhi-— ".
Accordingly he was not re-instated in his former position. (3)
Deference shown to the emperor was however in Bentinck's 
opinion to give way when it might prejudicially affect British 
supremacy. In 1832 a controversy arose when the Mughal emperor claimed
(1) Govt, to Hawkins, 5 Jan. 1830, Beng. Pol. Cons. 8 Jan.1830. No. 45; 
Beng. Pol. Letters Reed. 14 Oct. 1830, paras. 142-145* Vol. 26.
(2) Bentinck to King, 5 Jan* 1830, Beng. Pol. Cons. 8 Jan. 1830. No.47*
(3) Govt, to Hawkins, 19 March 1830, Beng. Pol. Cons. 19 March 1830. No.7; 
Beng. Pol.Letters Reed. 14 Oct. 1830. paras. 147-148* Vol.26.
In his minute of 17 Feb. 1830 Bentinck stated that he would have 
liked to confirm Hawkins in his appointment at Delhi but for the 
"miserable squabble" in which he had been engaged with the emperor 
"upon points of etiquette and state, totally opposed to that conside­
rate and kind, if no longer necessary policy of respecting the 
dignity and of treating with respect that fallen Family."
Bentinck, minute, 17 Feb.1830, Beng.Sec.Cons. 18 June 1830. No.l.
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the right of bestowing ad limitum any title or honour on any prince 
who applied to him without any reservation. This claim was founded on 
a Persian version of an English despatch from the government to the 
resident written in 1828, The Persian version seemed to warrant the 
interpretation put forward by the emperor and the agent referred the 
matter to the decision of the government, (l) The immediate occasion for 
this dispute was the desire of Lakshman Sing of Patun, a feudatory of 
Jaipur state, to receive some honorary title from the emperor* (2)
The claim made by the emperor on this occasion was not accepted by 
Bentinck and it was decided that in future the privilege of the emperor 
to confer titles was to be strictly confined to the members of the royal 
household and whenever other persons of respectability presented Nazars 
or received dresses they should be admitted to these honours only with 
the consent of the British government, (3)
More instances of princes looking anxiously to the emperor 
for honours were found and likewise discouraged. In June 1832, the 
political agent at Ambala, G.R. Clerk, reported the "tenacity" of the 
states of Rajputana in clinging to "the observance of forms" which 
indicated their acknowledgement of Mughal supremacy • He also brought 
to the notice of government that the agents of protected Sikh states were
(1) The residency was converted into an agency in 1832 and V/,Fraser 
appointed agent to the governor-general,
(2) Agent (Fraser) to Govt,, 16 June 1832, Beng, Pol, Cons. 30 July I832.
No,16,
(3) Govt, to Fraser, 20 Aug.1832, Beng.Pol.Cons. 24 Sept. 1832. No.33*
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clandestinely attending the Mughal palace in Delhi in search of honours.
It seemed "preposterous" to him that these states should be "squandering 
their resources in cultivating the goodwill of the king's ministers" and 
should be anxious to secure favours that were still being dispensed from 
the "ruins of the Mussulman Tukht." (l) To put a stop to this the agent 
at Delhi was told that the emperor was not to be allowed to receive the 
agents of the Indian princes without a reference to the British 
government. Agents of other states, he was told, could be introduced 
in his presence to the Mughal but no unrestricted intercourse was to be 
permitted. (2)
As time went it became more and more clear that the Mughal sceptre 
had become a thing of the past and was giving way to the inexorable facts 
of the day. In 1855 when a reform of the currency was undertaken and 
a rupee of 180 grains established as the uniform coin of all the 
presidencies the name of the Mughal emperor was conveniently dropped.(3)
It was as if another nail had been driven into the coffin of Mughal 
sovereignty.
(lj Agent (Clerk) to Govt., 4 June 1832, Beng.Pol.Cons. 30 Judy 1832.No.6. 
(2; Govt, to Fraser (agent at Delhi), 20 Aug.1832, Beng.Pol.Cons. 24 Sept.
1832, No.32;
Bengal Govt, to Gov. Gen's Sec. 30 July 1832, Beng.Pol.Cons.
30 July 1832. No. 7.
(3) Beng. Fin. Letters Reed. 8 April 1835* No.10. Vol. 46.
The actual reform of the currency was carried out shortly 
after Bentinck's return but the decision was taken by Bentinck 
in council, ibid.
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CHAPTER 7. OPENING THE INDUS.
In the nineteenth century the security of the north-western 
frontier of India was a source of constant anxiety to the Indian 
government. Early in the century the danger from Zaman Shah's 
threatening power on the north-west led Lord Wellesley to send a 
mission to Persia, which, according to him, by forcing Zaman Shah 
back to his dominions kept India safe, (l) The political treaty 
concluded with Persia by Captain Malcolm in 1801 provided for mutual 
assistance against aggression either from the French or the Afghans. (2)
A few years later Tilsit, marking the height of Napoleon's 
power, led the Indian government to despatch a series of missions to 
Persia, Afghanistan, the Pan jab and Sind for establishing friendly 
relations. After 1815 a new factor emerged in the increased strength 
of Russia. She had played an important part in the fall of Napoleon, 
by 1815 she had gained enormously in territory and resources, and she 
was thenceforward looking for further gains. The treaties of 1814-15 
providing for the settlement of Europe and determining the relations of 
the European states made Russian expansion in Europe difficult. Her 
advance in Asia, with the Persian and Turkish empires tottering into 
decay, was easier. It meant no breach of treaties with the European 
states and offered less chance of friction with them. To Britain, however, 
with an empire in the east, Russia's expansion in Asia, bringing her
(1) Wellesley, memorandum of 7 Aug. 1840. The Wellesley Papers
(L.S.Benjamin) II, 5^7*
(2) Aitchison, Treaties, XII, Treaty of January 1801, 41-42*
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influence nearer India, was a matter of considerable anxiety and 
British policy towards the Central Asian states was influenced by that 
consideration*
By the time of Bentinck*s governor-generalship the danger of 
a Russian advance on India was engaging the attention of the authorities 
in India and England, (l) In India the Supreme Government had in 1824 
considered it of great importance that "the British influence in the 
councils of Persia should be maintained unimpaired" and that "the 
intrigues and designs of Russia in that quarter should be watched with 
a jealous eye." (2) Malcolm both in England and India emphasized the 
importance of maintaining "the independence and respectability" of Persia 
and of not destroying in her a strength which could enable the British 
government to resist the encroachments of Russia "from the banks of 
Araxes to those of the Ganges." (3) Lord Canning in England showed 
himself to be no alarmist and was willing to effect a negotiated
settlement with Russia on Persian and Turkish issues and "to meet
confidence with confidence." (4) The Duke of Wellington, on the other
hand, felt that British interests were so deeply involved in Persia and
Turkey as to render co-operation with Russia difficult in view of her
(1) C.W.Crawley, "Anglo-Russian Relations 1815-1840," Cambridge Historical
Journal. Vol.Ill, No.l. (1929) 47-73- 
(2j Beng. Sec. Letters Reed. 16 July, 1824*
(3) Malcolm to Wellington, 12 Dec. 1826, Kaye, Malcolm, II, 454-455.
(4) Canning to Strangford, 1825, quoted in Crawley, op. cit. p.53*
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designs on those powers, (l) In contrast with Canning* s compromising 
attitude and Wellington*s caution Ellenboiough, who became the 
President of the Board of Control in September 1828, showed himself to 
be thoroughly imbued with the fear of Russian designs on India.
In the decline both of Persia and Turkey he saw incalculable danger to 
India. (2) The defeat of Turkey by Russia at Erzerum in 1829 caused 
him deep mortification. It was a personal affront, he wrote in his 
diary, "a victory gained over me." (3) The treaties of Adrianople 
(September 1829) and of Turkmanchai (February 1828) which increased the 
influence of Russia in the councils of Turkey and Persia disturbed him 
greatly. He further aspired to the Foreign Office and did not hold 
a high opinion of the ability of Lord Aberdeen as Foreign Secretary.
And he was himself preparing despatches for the Foreign Office on 
Turki sh affairs• (4)
(1) Wellington to Canning, 21 Nov. 1826, Malcolm, II, 453?
Wellington to Ellenborough, 9 Oct.1828, Wellington*s Despatches (A.R.
(Wellesley), V, 117-119;
Journal of Mrs. Arbuthnot, II, 211, 303-304*
(2) Ellenborough to Wellington, 22 Aug. 1829* Wellington*s Despatches
(A.R. Wellesley? Vi', 100j ------
Ellenborough to Wellington, 15 0ct*1829, ibid. 227-231.
(3) Ellenborough, Political Diary, II, 22 Aug. 1829. p.88.
(4) Ellenborough to Wellington, 15 0ct.l829> Wellington*s Despatches,
(A.R. Wellesley), VI, 227.
201
As he regarded a Russian advance on India as not only 
practicable but also easy he was willing to adopt a forward policy to 
counteract the Russian menace. If the Russians occupied Khiva, he 
wrote in his diary, the British government was to retaliate by occupying 
the Pan jab and Kabul, (l) He found the chairs sharing his fears of 
the Russian designs and therefore willing to co-operate with him. (2)
In his views he was also influenced by his assistant in the secret 
department of the Board, B.S. Jones. Jones had well defined views 
on the subject of the Company’s foreign policy and urged a forward 
course in relation to the Central Asian countries. In regard to the 
Indian states also which were misgoverned his advice was to interfere 
with a strong hand and even to annex them. (3) In him, it has been 
observed, Ellenborough found a person whose views were in happy harmony 
with his own, and the result was a series of despatches on the subject 
of external policy. (4)
Soon after the treaty of Adrianople Ellenborough decided to 
act in a determined manner. To bolster up Persia against Russia he 
called upon the Indian government to supply 12,000 small arms to the 
Persian government. (5) A few days before the Treaty of Adrianople
(lj Ellenborough, Political Diary, II, 30 Oct. 1829, 123*
(2; Ellenborough, Political Diary, II, 3 Sept. 1829, 92;
Ellenborough to Wellington, lj Dec.1829, Wellington’s Despatches
(A.R. Wellesley ), VI, 328.
(3) B.S. Jones, Papers relative to the Progress of British Power in India,167.
(4) C.H. Philips, East India Company, 268.
(5) Board’s Secret Drafts, 7 Dec. 1829* Vol. 7*
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he had asked the Indian government not to refuse Persia the assistance 
of British officers for training Persian troops, a step he considered 
necessary for strengthening Persia, (l) In December 1829 he desired 
the Foreign Office to supply the Board with the fullest information 
about the Russian position and establishments in the Caspian, and the 
military and political condition of the states of Khiva, Bokhara and 
Kokand, and the Indian government was asked to obtain similar information 
from the envoy in Persia. (2) He looked upon commerce as the means of 
establishing British influence in the Central Asian states and told 
the Duke that the chairs Mlend themselves most willingly to the 
project of repelling the Russian commerce from Cabul and Bokhara, by 
carrying our goods directly up the Indus," and that his instructions 
upon that subject would be ready to go to India by the first ship in 
January 1830. (3)
These instructions were detailed in a secret despatch of 
12 January, 1830 (4)* This despatch referred to the ambitious designs of 
Russia in Asia. Even if, it was stated, a Russian attack on India might 
not succeed the "moral effect" it was likely to produce in India and 
among the princes made the British government view such a possibility 
with anxiety. (5) The government of India was therefore to seek to 
establish its influence in the Central Asian states commanding the route 
to India by trading with them. For that purpose it was intended to
establish a direct way for British goods up the Indus in place of their
being sent first to the western provinces of India and then through the
(1) Board1s Secret Drafts, 24 Aug.1829* No.2.,Vol.7*
(2) Board’s Secret Drafts. 19 Dec.1829* No.2., Vol.7*
(3) Ellenborough to Wellington,19 Dec.1829.Wellingtonfs Despatches
(A.R.Wellesley) , VI, 328.
(4) Board’s Secret Drafts, 12*Jan. 1830, Vol.7* (Continued over....)
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Panjab and Kabul to Bokhara, (l)
The political effects of commerce were to be kept in sight»
With a view to explore the commercial capacity of the Indus it was 
suggested that a present of English dray horses to Ranjit Sing in 
return for the present he had sent to England should be conveyed by 
the Indus. The objections of the Amirs to the passage of the horses 
through their territories were anticipated. And it was held that while 
the British government did not intend any hostilities with them it could not 
also ’’permit any jealous feeling on their parts (sic) to close the 
navigation of the Indus, should it appear to offer results not only 
commercially but politically important which but for them would be 
attained/'7 (2)
Not satisfied with the official despatches alone Ellenborough 
was also writing privately to Bentinck to explain his point of view. (3) 
Bentinck did not share Ellenborough*s exaggerated fear of 
Russian designs on India. If they were real he considered the danger to 
be distant and not worth serious attention. On the other hand Russian 
expansion in Asia appeared to him to be natural and obvious. As Russia, 
he thought, could not match her strength with Britain in Europe her
(Continued from previous page)
(5) ibid. para. 8.
*****
(l) ibid. para. 17*
(2^  ibid. para. 38*
(3) Ellenborough to Bentinck, 22 May 1830, Bentinck Papers.
Similarly G. Everest who went to India as Surveyor General in 
1830 let Bentinck know Ellenborough1 s view on the subject.
Everest to Ellenborough, 16 Nov. 1830, Ellenborough Papers. Box 12.
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ambition was likely to take an easterly direction and she would therefore 
make it a point to extend her influence in Persia. The Russo-Persian 
war£ of 1826-27 showed that Persia was powerless to resist Russian 
influence. As Persia could not resist Russia in arras he considered it 
likely that the two countries might combine. It was the interest of 
Persia herself, he held, to maintain her independence, and if she did 
not choose to do so, no amount of money and resources that Britain might 
spend in bolstering her up could save her from coming under the Russian 
influence, (l)
Russian influence in Persia was no cause of alarm and Bentinck
apprehended no immediate danger from Russia to India. The best way of
providing against Russian designs was to be in full possession of the
proceedings of Russia, Persia, and other countries of Central Asia to
enable the British government to act quickly in an emergency. He did
not share the zeal of Malcolm, then governor of Bombay, who held the
Persian connection to be of supreme importance to the British government
and who later urged that if Russia became predominant in Persia Mwe must,
as an act of preventive policy, establish a commanding influence in Sinde.”
(2)
He rather found himself in agreement with Metcalfe who stated that if 
Russia resolved to establish her influence in Persia, the British 
government could do little to prevent it. (5)
(1) Bentinck, minute, 28 Oct.1828, Beng. Sec. Cons. 29 Nov.1828. No.66
2^; Malcolm, minute, 1 Sept. 1828, Beng. Sec. Cons. 29 Nov.1828. No.59;
Malcolm, minute, 9 Aug. 1850, Beng. Sec. Cons. 14 Oct.1850. No. 4*
(5) Metcalfe, minute, 2 July 1828, Beng. Sec. Cons. 5 July 1828. No. 1;
Bentinck, minute, 28 Oct.1828, Beng. Sec. Cons. 29 Nov.1828. No. 66
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In the commercial schemes of Ellenborough, Bentinck was, however, 
willing to co-operate fully. They not only served a political purpose 
in establishing British influence but they also suited his own enthusiasm 
for employing the great rivers of Indiaas channels of communication and 
commerce* He believed in the laissez faire economics of his time and in 
the removal of impediments to trade* (l) The Indus seemed to him to 
have great commercial potentialities and he wanted to exploit them.
Soon after his arrival in the country his attention was drawn 
to "the practicability and advantage of establishing a steam navigation 
up the Ganges" as an aid to commerce* If the rivers could be opened 
as channels of transport he saw great benefits to the country. It would 
encourage commerce, facilitate contact between people of different 
parts and contribute to the efficiency of administration by establishing 
greater control over the localities. It would also strengthen the 
government in a military point of view by shortening the lines of 
communication. It would further make possible a reduction in the 
military establishments of the country and the saving could be used for 
erecting works of public utility. In short, the development of river 
transport he considered to be a means of all-round improvement. (2)
Inland steam navigation was a subject upon which he bestowed considerable 
attention and at the close of his administration he prided himself upon 
its comparative success* (3)
(1) Supreme Govt* to Directors, 5 Feb.l833> No.l.Boards Collections.
Vol.1506;
Supreme Govt.fs Notice on the regulation of trade on the Ganges 
and the Jumna, dated 12 Dec. 1832, ibid.
(2) Bentinck to Loch, 12 Aug.1828, Bentinck Papers.
(3) Bentinck*s address to the mercantile community, The Friend of India,
12 March, 1835*
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Urged by Ellenborough he resolved to explore the commercial 
capacity of the Indus, the use of which he considered to be the 
monopoly of no single state# On the receipt of the secret despatch 
of 12 January, 1830 he asked the government of Bombay which conducted 
British relations with Sind to supply information on the subject of 
the Indus navigation, (l) It was to report also on the feasibility or 
otherwise of the plan suggested by Ellenborough of sending the horses 
for Ranjit Sing by the Indus. (2) The findings of the investigation; made 
by the government of Bombay were strongly in favour of the project.
Malcolm exphasized the importance of Sind in a political and military 
sense and considered the proposal to send horses to Ranjit Sing to 
be "quite feasible.” (3)
The survey of the Indus had indeed engaged the attention of 
Malcolm quite independently of the Supreme Government. In 1829 
Lieutenant Alexander Bumes of the Bombay Service had been employed by 
him in the work of exploring the Indus but Bentinck did not approve of 
this because of the offence it might give to the Amirs, and before 
Bumes could finish his work he was recalled. And so Bumes because of 
his previous experience was now recommended by the government of Bombay as
(1) Sind was divided into three separate principalities - Hyderabad 
(Lower Sind), Khairpur and Mirpur. Hyderabad and Khairpur commanded 
the main route by the Indus and it was their governments that were 
principally concerned with the navigation. Hyderabad was governed 
at the time by Murad Ali, Khairpur by Mir Rustum and Mirpur by
Sher Muhammad.
(2) Supreme Govt, to Bombay Govt., 14 May 1830, Beng. Sec. Cons.
14 May 1830. No. 3.
(3) Malcolm, minute, 9 Aug.1830, Beng. Sec. Cons. 14 Oct.1830. No. 4»
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admirably qualified for the task of exploring the Indus# (l)
At the suggestion of the government of Bombay a large carriage 
was added to the dray horses to be presented to Ranjit Sing and the 
whole plan was put into operation in the face of strong opposition from 
Metcalfe. In a long and forcible minute Metcalfe described the attempt 
at a survey of the Indus without the consent of the Amirs and without 
disclosing the object, as unwarranted, inexpedient and above all unneces­
sary. It was unwarranted, he said, as it contravened the law of nations. 
The Amirs had the same right to object to "the surveys of their river and 
their territories that any power of Europe has to protect its fortresses 
from the inspection of foreign engineers." The British government, he 
said, had no right to interfere with the sovereign rights of the Amirs 
within their own territories. It was further inexpedient as it would 
tend to alienate the Amirs and defeat the very object worth striving for 
in case the fear of Russia at any time turned out to be real, namely 
union and friendship with the Amirs. (2)
Lastlty he considered the attempt at surveying the river 
unnecessary. Its underlying reason was a fear of Russian invasion which 
he considered exaggerated. A large army of invasion Russian finances 
and resources could not support; a small one would be inadequate to the 
task. The difficulties of supplying the needs of a regular army on 
the march through the intermediate countries, of making good the ravages 
of disease and climate and of keeping open the line of communication with
(1) Malcolm, minute, 9 Aug.1830, Beng.Sec.Cons. 14 0ct.l830. Ho. 4
(2) Metcalfe,, minute, 25 Oct.1830, Beng.Sec.Cons. 29 Oct.1830. No. 1.
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the home country for reinforcements and supplies were obstacles difficult 
to overcome. Further, a Russian attach could not come as a surprise. 
Russia had first to establish herself in the intermediate countries 
before she could think seriously of invading India and the British 
government would have time enough to prepare for and cope with the 
invasion when it really occurred. The best thing, he said, was not to 
be alarmed and “to do nothing until time shall show what we ought to 
do." (1)
Bentinck!s interest in commerce, however, strengthened by the 
orders of the home government, was too great to be overcome by the 
opposition of Metcalfe and so the plan went ahead. Bumes was put in 
charge of the mission to Lahore. He took with him five dray horses 
(one stallion and four mares), a carriage and a letter from Ellenborough 
for Ranjit Sing. He sailed from Mandvi in Cutch on 21 January, 1831 in 
a fleet of four boats. The objection of Murad Ali, the Amir of 
Hyderabad, to the passage of the boats by the Indus had been anticipated 
and the expedition had therefore been launched without his prior consent. 
Bumes, therefore, and not unexpectedly, met with an uncivil reception. 
His boats were searched, he was deprived of all supplies and on the whole 
treated with abuse. He decided to return. A second voyage by him a few 
days later was equally unsuccessful. His little fleet was scattered by 
a powerful storm and he himself was not permitted to land. Proper 
negotiations were therefore begun for the reception of his mission, and 
he sailed from Mandvi for the third time on 10y March. (2)
(1) ibid.
(Continued over ••••)
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This time no hostility was shown to him and he was allowed to 
land* But once in the country every attempt was made to dissuade him 
from proceeding further* The difficulties of the voyage were magnified* 
Rocks, quick sands, whirlpools and shallows, he was told, rendered passage 
impossible. A successful journey to Lahore by boat, it was said, had not 
been heard of in the memory of man. If at all successful, the Amir said 
confidently, it would be three years before it could be accomplished, (l) 
The Amir was full of suspicion about the objects of the mission 
and believed that Bumes would soon be followed by an army of conquest.(2) 
He showed himself to be as afraid of the superior power of the British 
government as he was suspicious of their ulterior motives. His letters 
to the British government were couched in friendly and conciliatory terms 
while he did all he could to prevent Bumes fs advance by water. When 
pressed by Bumes he consented to allow the boats1 ascent by the Indus
(Continued from previous page)
(2) Bumes, personal narrative and journal, 25 Sept.1851* Beng.Sec.Cons.
• 25 Nov. 1851. No. 25;
Native agent in Sind to Pottinger, 1 Feb.1851, Beng.Sec.Cons.
18 March 1851* No. 6.
*****
(1) Murad Ali to governor of Bombay, not dated, Beng. Sec. Cons.
18 March. 1851. No. 10;
Bumes, personal narrative, Beng.Sec.Cons. 25 Nov. 1851. No. 25•
(2) Bumes, personal narrative, Beng.Sec.Cons. 25 Nov. 1851. No. 25; 
Native agent in Sind to Pottinger, 1 Feb.1851, Beng.Sec.Cons.
18 March 1851. No. 6.
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provided Bumes himself took the land route* This seemed to defeat 
the whole object of the mission and Burnes refused emphatically to 
advance a step unless accompanied by his charge* He quitted the boats 
to remonstrate in person* Eventually, after a weekfs negotiation at 
Tatta, he obtained the Amirfs consent to his passage* (l) Another 
influence that prevailed on the Amir in allowing Bumes to pass was 
a threat from Ranjit Sing* Ranjit had learnt of the deputation of 
Burnes's mission to him and had sent a large force under Ventura in 
the direction of Shikarpur* (2)
On 19 April, Bumes had an interview with the Amir. Bumes 
followed up the interview by presents consisting of various European 
articles including a clock and two pairs of glass candle-sticks*
Contact with the Amir showed his extreme simplicity in some matters.
He sent Bumes anxious messages to the effect that the presents which 
the latter had brought should be sent to himself alone and on their 
receipt was not satisfied with all of them. He even naively sent his 
minister to Bumes to know if the clock and candle-s ticks, which he did 
not find of much use, could not be exchanged for some other presents 
which Bumes might be carrying for others. (3)
From Hyderabad Bumes passed into Khairpur where his reception 
was "cordial and kind." The Amir showed himself in every possible way 
to be a friend of the British government and anxious for a treaty
(l) Bumes to Pottinger, not dated, Beng.Sec. Cons* 17 June 1831. No. 2
(2; Wade (Political agent at Ludhiana) to Govt., 21 May 1831*
Beng. Sec. Cons. 24 June 1831# No. 6*
(3) Bumes, personal narrative, Beng. Sec. Cons. 23 Nov. 1831. No. 23*
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alliance with it. (l)
From Khairpur he went to the country of Bhawal Khan, the chief
of Bhawalpur, where his reception was no less friendly than at Khairpur.
(2)
Finally he reached Lahore in July 1831 and delivered the 
presents to Ranjit Sing. Ranjit was gratified to receive them and the 
good wishes they conveyed. He gave Bumes a warm and cordial reception. 
At the same time he showed little tenderness for the Amirs of Sind who 
had held up Burnes *s passage and told him that for some time he had 
been holding his army ready in order Mto chastise the barbarians of Sind’1 
in case they delayed Burnes fs advance any longer. (3)
Bumes *s voyage occupied sixty days in a favourable season.
His daily progress averaged twenty miles by the course of the river and 
gave him a good opportunity of exploring the region. (4) As a keen 
observer of men and things he submitted long reports on different 
aspects of Sind history, politics and geography. (5)
He reported the uninterrupted navigation of the Indus from the 
sea to Lahore, a distance of about a thousand miles. Besides affording 
every facility for navigation the river was particularly suited for the 
application of steam. "There are few rivers in the world where steam 
might be used with better effect than on the Indus, it has no rocks or
(lj ibid.
(2) ibid.
(3) ibid.
£4) Burnes to Govt. 12 Sept. 1831, Beng.Sec.Cons. 25 Nov.1831* No. 21 
(5J Burnes to Govt., 12 Sept.1831, Beng.Sec.Cons. 25 Nov.1831* Nos. 20-21.
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rapids to obstruct the ascent, and the current does not exceed 2^ miles 
an hour.'1 (l) He dwelt also on the condition of the people, the 
government and the military importance of the Indus which formed "the 
grand boundary of British India on the West," It was, he reported, 
navigable for a fleet from Attock to the sea and would conduct an invading 
army to the heart of India, (2)
After the successful termination of his voyage Burnes went to 
Simla to give an account of his mission to Bentinck in person. Both 
the official reports of Bumes and personal communication with him 
justified Bentinck*s "most sanguine expectations." (3) He felt 
satisfied, he told the governor of Bombaythat "the importance of the 
river Indus in a political point of view not less than as a route of 
commerce has not been over-rated." (4)
But he had to settle whether commerce or politics was to be 
the main object of his pursuit and it was in favour of the former that 
he decided. Burnes*s mission showed the political weakness of Sind and 
seemed an admirable opportunity for establishing British influence. Of 
the three principal Amirs, those of Hyderabad, Khairpur and Mirpur, the 
last two were jealous of the Hyderabad government and showed themselves 
anxious for protective alliances with the British. (5) In Hyderabad
(l) Bumes to Govt., 12 Sept. 1831 (No.l.) "A General View of the Indus"
Beng. Sec. Cons. 25 Nov.1831* No.21 para 5*
(2} ibid. para. 8.
(3) Supreme Govt, to Bombay Govt., 22 Oct.1831*Beng.Sec.Cons. 25 Nov.1831*
No.27.
(4) Bentinck to Governor of Bombay, 22 0ct.l831>Beng.Sec.Cons.25 Nov.1831
No.30.
(5) Burnes, personal narrative, Beng.Sec.Cons. 25 Nov.1831* No. 23•
Bumes, memorandum on Mirpur, 14 Oct.1831, Beng.Sec.Cons. 25 Nov.1831.
No.29.
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itself the apprehended death of the sixty year old Amir Murad Ali 
presaged before long a struggle for the succession among his sons and 
cousins* Of the two sons of Murad Ali who were likely to make good their 
claims to the throne, Nur Muhammad Khan and Nasir Khan, the latter made 
approaches to the British government to obtain i ts support in the impending 
contest for the succession and did all he could to facilitate Bumes fs 
passage by the Indus to Lahore by interceding with his father on his 
behalf, (l)
Thus circumstances favoured British intervention and the matter 
came before Bentinck for decision* The British resident in Cutch, Henry 
Pottinger, whose personal inclinations were for decisive action, 
emphasized the importance of the issues involved and urged quick decision.
It meant, he pointed out, deciding the question of "our acquiring a 
footing there, which should place at our command, in case of necessity 
the resources of the country together with the unrestricted navigation 
of the river Indus.'* (2)
But Bentinck wanted no entanglement in Sind (3)* His experience 
had shown that political alliances ensuring British protection to states - 
whether in Oudh, Mysore or elsewhere - brought little satisfaction and 
more embarrassment. He resolved on avoiding such connection with Sind and 
confining himself to commerce. His great object, he told Murad Ali, was
(l) Bumes (Ho.2) "On the Government and Political importance of Sinde"
Beng. Sec. Cons. 25 Nov.1831* No.21 paras 8-10.
(2j Pottinger to Govt., 16 April 1831, Beng.Sec.Cons. 17 June 1831* No. 2.
(3) Supreme Govt, to Bombay Govt., 30 May 1831, Beng.Sec.Cons. 17 June 1831f
No. 3*
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to see the Indus like the Ganges swarming with boats carrying goods and 
passengers from one part to another, (l)
Meanwhile Bentinck secured information from other sources. 
Lieutenant Arthur Conolly of the Bengal Military Service, who had just 
returned from an overland journey in Central Asian countries, submitted 
his report on the commercial and military advantages offered by the 
Indus. (2) Bentinck employed Charles Trevelyan to collect information 
on the subject of the Indus navigation. Trevelyan had risen high in 
Bentinck*s estimation on account of his fearless exposure of Sir Edward 
Colebrooke's proceedings at Delhi (3) and had been raised by him to the 
position of Deputy Secretary in the Political Department of the Supreme 
Government. (4)
Trevelyan's enthusiasm for reform knew no bounds and he was 
greatly interested in commerce. His mind was "full of schemes of moral and 
political improvement, and his zeal boils over in his talk. His topics, 
even in courtship, are steam navigation, the education of the natives, 
the equalisation of the sugar duties, the substitution of the Roman for
(lj Bentinck to Murad Ali, not dated, Beng.Sec.Cons. 25 Nov.1831. No. 34
(2) Conolly, Report, not dated, Beng.Sec.Cons. 25 Nov.1831. No. 8.
(3) A detailed account of these proceedings is given by Dr.Spear in 
^Twilight of the Mughals, "The Colebrooke Case," 167-181.
(4) Bentinck, minute, 12 June 1830, Beng. Pol.Cons. 18 June I83O. No. 28; 
Bentinck, minute, 23 Aug. 1831, Beng.Sec.Cons. 25 Nov.1831. No. 2. 
Bentinck to Auber, 2 April 1832, Bentinck Papers.
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the Arabic alphabet in the Oriental languages." (l) On being asked 
by Bentinck to collect information he pursued the subject diligently and 
reported in favour of opening the river for commerce. He considered this 
necessary not only for extending commerce in Central Asia and through it 
British influence in that region, but also for introducing an ordered way 
of living in Afghanistan, Bokhara and Khiva. If opened to unrestricted 
navigation the Indus would become "the means of introducing into the heart 
of Asia a taste for the comforts and enjoyments of civilised life." The 
Amirs, he held, could not be permitted to baulk this enterprise of the 
British government and were to be coerced into submission if persuasion 
was of no avail. (2)
In a political point of view, he argued, the opening of the Indus 
would supplant Russian influence in Central Asia. Russian goods, he said, 
even though of inferior quality, sold in large numbers in the markets of 
Central Asia because they suffered no fair competition from British goods, 
which were severely handicapped by the numerous duties levied on their 
way to those markets. If those barriers were removed and an open and easy 
way found by the Indus, British goods would soon drive Russian products out 
of Central Asian markets by underselling them, (j)
All the evidence collected by Bentinck was conclusively in 
favour of opening the Indus as a channel of commerce and he resolved to 
do so. But then arose the principal difficulty. Would the Amirs co-operate
(1) Macaulay to Mrs.Cropper, 7 Dec.1854* G.O. Trevelyan, The Life and Letters
of Lord Macaulay, I, 356$
Macaulay to Ellis, 15 Dec.1834> ibid. 395*
(2) Trevelyan, Report, not dated, Beng.Sec.Cons.. 25 Nov.1831* No. 9*
(3) ibid.
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in the venture? Their states were outside the British frontier and 
technically outside British protection also* (l) Besides, the Amirs 
were suspicious of the British government - more suspicious, Metcalfe 
said, than any other power in India* They had heard rumours of an 
alliance between Russia and Persia and their combined advance towards 
India and they showed themselves alive to this fear* They were alike 
afraid of the Sikhs and the Afghans. Pottinger1 s mission in 1831-32 
showed that they would have liked mutual defensive alliances with the 
Company, which would afford them protection against the Sikhs and the 
Afghans and be at the same time a safeguard against possible British 
designs on Sind, of which they were also afraid* Commerce by itself 
did not signify much to them;
But Bentinck was not willing to extend the sphere of the 
Companyfs political alliances* Hence Pottinger who was deputed by 
Bentinck in 1831 to negotiate commercial treaties with the Amirs of
Hyderabad and Khairpur had his clear instructions. He was to be cautious
in his proceedings and to commit the government to no political under­
taking. In fact he was given no authority to conclude any political
alliance binding the British government to the support or protection of
the Amirs. He was told to employ persuasion and friendliness as his chief 
weapons in making the Amirs see the advantages of commerce* Bentinck 
ruled out coercion for it could defeat its own object. If coerced, the 
Amirs might try to subvert navigation by covert means. Pottinger was 
also to explain to the Amirs the law of nations as elaborated in Vattel^
(l) Select Committee Report, P.P. 1831 - 32, XIV, 3»
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book which did not permit any single country to monopolise the 
advantages bestowed by nature on many countries, (l)
Left to himself, Pottinger favoured a different policy 
towards the Amirs. He had little tenderness for their suspicions and 
pinned little faith in the course of persuasion enjoined on him by 
Bentinck. In 1808 when on a mission to Sind under Hankey Smith he had 
been impressed by their "arrogance and superiority." Their government, 
he asserted, was characterised by "extortion, ignorance and tyranny" 
which he considered was "unequalled in the world". (2) The only thing, 
he thought, that the Amirs appreciated was force and he would have liked 
to adopt a strong attitude towards them - as suited his own active 
disposition. The importance of Sind in a political and military point 
of view meant to him that the British government should not allow itself 
to be defeated from achieving its purpose in order simply to feed the 
prejudices of the Amirs. (3) Nor did Bentinck's policy of non-involvement 
in the internal affairs of Sind appeal to him. He would have liked to
(l^  Govt, to Pottinger, 22 Oct.1851, Beng.Sec.Cons. 25-Nov.1831. No. 27*
(2) An account of his mission and impressions is given in his book 
Travels in Beloochistan and Sinde published in 1816. In 1810 disguised 
as a Muslim he made another journey to explore the regions between 
India and Persia. In the course of his travels he visited Kirman, 
Shiraz and Baghdad. In 1825 he was appointed resident in Cutch.
National Biography
(3) Pottinger to Govt., 16 April 1831, Beng.Sec.Cons* 17 June 1831. No. 2; 
Pottinger to Govt., not dated, Beng.Sec.Cons. 18 March I83I. No. 6.
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interfere to settle the succession in Sind and establish British influence 
there, (l) He would have liked to see it under British protection and 
to offer it mediation in disputes with the Sikhs and the Afghans. (2)
Failing that he was not averse to see the subjugation of Sind by a power 
friendly to the British Government (Shah Shuja). (3) On more than one 
occasion when disappointed in the course of negotiations with the Amirs he 
looked to Bentinck for instructions to pursue a strong policy in Sind, 
but was chagrined to find him dwelling on the virtues of forbearance when 
a strong power was dealing with a weak and suspicious government like that 
of the Amirs. (4)
Pottinger1s difficulties began to manifest themselves even 
before he reached Sind. Before he could embark he was informed on behalf 
of the Amir that the time announced for his visit would coincide with the 
latter*s hunting season and that he should therefore postpone his mission 
to a later date. (5) Pottinger considered it a frivolous excuse and 
decided not to postpone his visit. (6) The Amir had been told by his
(1) Pottinger to Govtv 21 Jan.1832, Beng.Sec.Cons. 2 April 1832. No. 3
para. 13.
(2) Pottinger to Govt. 22 Feb.1832, Beng.Sec.Cons. 28 May 1832. No.9*para 26.
(3) Pottinger to Govt. 3 Feb.1834» Beng.Sec.Cons. 10 April 1834.No.22 para 9*
(4) Bentinck to Pottinger, 25 Feb.l834> Bentinck Papers;
Govt, to Pottinger, 21 June 1834> Beng.Sec.Cons. 6 Aug.1832., No. yi.
(5) Pottinger to Govt. 23 Dec.1831, Beng.Sec.Cons. 6 Feb.1832 No.2.
para 9•
(6) ibid. para. 11.
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agents that Pottinger was coming with arms in the boats and was to he 
followed by soldiers. Instructions were therefore issued by the Amir for 
the boats to be detained and searched on entering Hyderabad before they 
were allowed to proceed further. So seriously did the Amir think that 
Pottinger was coming with forces that he took precautionaiy measures in 
order not to be forestalled if his apprehensions proved correct, (l)
The forces, however, did not appear, and Pottinger reached Hyderabad to 
carry out his instructions.
He found the Amir's conduct a mass of contradictions. At one 
time the Amir wished to see him early in order to dispose of his mission 
as quickly as possible, at another he would delay the interview and 
tell Pottinger to be at his ease. (2) Pottinger did not want to spoil 
the chance of success in the negotiations by any precipitancy and hence 
did not show any anxiety for an early interview. Much to his resentment, 
however, he discovered that the Amir had put a different construction upon 
this. Pottinger's boats had been detained and left behind, and so the 
Amir concluded that his apparent hesitation in not seeing him was because 
of his not having any presents with him. Pottinger found it so unbearable 
that he let the Amir know in plain language that presents (which in fact he 
had brought and which he later made over to the Amir) were meant to be a 
sign of friendship for the government of Hyderabad and were in no sense 
to be regarded as an obligation on the British government. (3)
When finally the interview took place the Amir was full of
(1) Pottinger to Govt. 31 Jan.1832.Beng.Sec.Cons. 2 April 1832. No. 7»
Native Agent to Pottinger, 15 Jan.1832, Beng.Sec.Cons.19 March 1832.No.3*
(2) Pottinger to Govt., 31 Jan.1832, Beng.Sec.Cons. 2 April 1832. No. 7*
(3; Pottinger to Govt., 31 Jah.1832, Beng.Sec.Cons. 2 April 1832. No. 7«»
paras 5 -6.
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professions of friendship for the British government and enquired after 
the health of the governor-general and the governor of Bombay in warm 
terms, (l) Negotiations on the subject of Burnes1s mission were begun 
and the Amir appeared anxious to gain his own object before meeting the 
wishes of his guest. Commerce was not a significant thing for him, and 
he was agreeably surprised to find Bentinck*s letter, which Pottinger 
brought, referring only to the advantages of commerce if the uninterrupted 
navigation of the river were permitted. He had heard of the Russian 
designs in the east and showed himself to be equally concerned to prevent 
an attack on India which spelled the ruin of his own dominions. In return 
for opening the river to commerce and for his co-operation in any measure 
that the British government might undertake against the Russian designs 
he wanted some provision for the safety of Sind against the Sikhs and 
the Afghans. (2)
It was however difficult to weigh the Amir*s fear of the Sikhs 
and the Afghans against his fear of British intentions. The draft of 
the treaty submitted on his behalf to Pottinger showed that he feared the 
British government as keenly as he did the Sikhs and the Afghans.
Articles 3 and 6 of this draft provided for the navigation of the Indus 
and stated that the friends and enemies of one party should become the 
friends and enemies of the other. Article 9 said that the British 
government would expect the Afghan and the Panjab governments to respect 
Sind territory as much as if it were a part of British possessions. But
(1) ibid. para. 23*
(2) Pottinger to Govt., 31 Jan. 1832, Beng. Sec. Cons. 2 April 1832.
No. 7.
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article 5 provided for a special promise on the part of the British 
government that they would not attempt to seize Shikarpur and other 
places mentioned, (l)
The Amir was also “boastful. He asserted that the British 
government had no good soldiers to match his own. He let Pottinger 
know that if only the Sindian soldiers and the British money could combine 
the two governments could easily hold the world in defiance. (2) To 
Pottinger the whole behaviour of the Amir appeared "a mass of outward 
friendship, distrust, gasconade and puerility mingled with extreme pride 
and ignorance.’* (3) And he emphatically refused even to discuss the 
draft treaty, which spoke of the Amir!s suspicions in such an avowed 
manner and which also went beyond the scope of his instructions. (4) 
Negotiations with the Amir could not be conclusive, though the Amir con­
sented to the navigation of the river and Pottinger asked for his permission 
to proceed to Khairpur. But Khairpur was close to Shikarpur and the Amir 
was all suspicion about British intentions with regard to this territory. 
Every attempt was therefore made to dissuade him from going there. But 
Pottinger pressed the point and the Amir at last consented. (5)
But before Pottinger could leave for Khairpur came the disturbing 
news that the eldest son of Ran jit Sing, Kharak Sing, was coming in the
(l) ibid. para. 42.
'(2) Pottinger to Govt., 5 Feb.1832.Beng.Sec.Cons. 2 April 1832. No.13*
(3) Pottinger to Govt*, 31 Jan.1832.Beng.Sec.Cons. 2 April 1832.No.7•para 45*
(4) ibid. para. 43;
Pottinger to Govt., 3 Feb.1832, Beng.Sec.Cons. 2 April 1832.No.9*para 3*
(5) Pottinger to Govt., 5 Feb.1832, Beng.Sec.Cons. 2 April 1832.No.13*
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direction of Shikarpur with a large army, (l) The Amir was upset. He 
suspected collaboration between the Sikhs and the British government 
against the Sind. Bentinck was then in the western provinces. He had 
previously met Ranjit at Rupar in October 1831, and the Anglo-Sikh 
solidarity which this betokened seemed ominous to the Amir. (2) Pre­
parations for meeting the apprehended Sikh invasion were begun and 
Pottinger was told that under such circumstances the safety of the countiy 
was the paramount consideration, that his mission in Sind was over and 
that he could return. (3) Pottinger understood the extreme fear of 
the Amir and showed his readiness to postpone his departure for Khairpur 
till circumstances were favourable and the Amir m s  willing. His conduct 
appeared to afford great satisfaction to the Amir. (4)
The apprehended invasion of Sind by Kharak Sing did not take 
place and Pottinger was allowed to proceed to Khairpur (1832). He met a 
friendly reception. Mir Husturn agreed to accept all the conditions of 
the commercial treaty proposed by Pottinger. But as negotiations proceeded 
Pottinger learnt that Mir Rustum was not a free agent, and was under the 
influence of his relations. Eventually a treaty was signed stating that 
the Khairpur government would accept the same conditions for the use of 
the Indus and of the roads of Sind as were accepted by the Amir of 
Hyderabad. (5)
(l^  Pottinger to Govt. 11 Feb.1832,Beng.Sec.Cons. 28 May 1832.No.5*pa^a.27«
(2) ibid. paras. 28-29*
(3) Pottinger to Govt. 22 Feb.1832,Beng.Sec.Cons. 28 May 1832. No. 9*
(4) Pottinger to Govt. 11 Feb.1832.Beng.Sec.Cons. 28 May 1832. No. 5*
paras. 30-31
(5) Pottinger to Govt., 14 April 1832. Beng.Sec.Cons. 2 July 1832. No.9»
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Pottinger came back to Hyderabad and after some further 
negotiations a commercial treaty was signed providing for the use of the 
Indus and of the roads of Sind on three conditions (l)
1. No person was to carry military material by the Indus 
and the roads of Sind.
2. No armed boat was to be taken by the river.
3. British merchants were not to settle in Sind. Having 
come and transacted their business they were to return 
to India.
By.means of a passport system the government of Hyderabad was 
to know in advance of the arrival of merchants in its territories. (2)
The two governments also agreed "never to look with the eye of covetousness 
on the possessions of each other." (3)
It was further stipulated that the government of Hyderabad was 
to fix "certain proper and moderate duties" on goods passing Sind. (4) 
However, the statement of duties brought forward on the Amir's side 
appeared to Pottinger to be 'fexorbitant",(5) and eventually the matter was 
left open for further discussion and settlement between the Hyderabad and 
British governments. (6)
(1) Pottinger to Govt., 1 Mayl832, Beng.Sec.Cons. 6 Aug.1832. No. 18; 
Aitchison, Treaties. VII, Treaty of 19 June 1832, 354-355•
(2) Aitchison, ibid. Article 4* 355•
?3J ibid* Article 2. 354*
(4) ibid. Article 5» 355•
(5) Pottinger to Govt., 1 May 1832. Beng.Sec.Cons. 6 Aug.1832. No.18.para 9*
(6) Aitchison, Treaties, VII, Supplementary Treaty of 19 June 1832,
Article I, 356.
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Apart from obtaining the consent of the Amirs for the 
navigation of the Indus Pottinger had also been told by the government 
to keep in mind the question of the suppression of plunderers inhabiting 
Parkur, a dependency of Sind. After the negotiations for the opening of 
the Indus had been almost concluded the subject was brought forward by 
Murad Ali himself. The Amir urged the need for co-operation between the 
British, Jodhpur and Sind governments for the suppression of these 
predatory gangs whose strength was estimated at 2,000 men. After some 
negotiations an article was arranged in the treaty for this purpose, (l) 
Thus Pottinger*s perseverance and firmness succeeded, and the 
Amirs yielded their reluctant consent to the navigation of the Indus*
The question of tariffs remained to be settled between the two governments* 
A report on the subject of the Indus tariffs was prepared by Trevelyan 
under Bentinck*s instructions. The Bombay government and Pottinger were 
asked to submit their remarks on the subject. Eventually Bentinck 
decided that a toll of 570 rupees per boat would be the highest amount 
that could be imposed from the sea to Rupar, and Pottinger was asked to 
negotiate with the Amir of Hyderabad on that basis. In order to ensure 
the smooth working of the system Pottinger was asked also to secure the 
Amir*s consent to the residence of a British European agent at the mouth 
of the Indus where the goods were to be transferred from the sea boats 
to the river boats and the toll realised. (2)
(1) Pottinger to Govt. 1 May 1832, Beng.Sec.Cons. 6 Aug.1832. No. 18;
Aitchison, Treaties, VII, Supplementary Treaty of 19 June 1832,
Article II, 356•
(2) Govt, to Pottinger, 10 Oct.l835> Beng.Sec.Cons. 10 Oct.1835* No.l4«
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A week later after the issue of these instructions Murad Ali 
died and the negotiations had to be suspended for some time. In the 
confusion that followed his death, BentinckTs attitude was one of non­
intervention. (l) The Amir’s death brought four persons into power, 
with Nur Muhammad Khan as the principal Amir. The four Amirs delayed 
coming to terms on the subject of the Indus tariffs. (2) They were 
firmly opposed to the stationing of an European agent in their territories 
and to any attempt at surveying the mouths of the river. In 1854 a 
difficult situation arose when a number of boats engaged in surveying 
were seized. (5) Pottinger wrote to the government urging strong action, 
but Bentinck counselled patience and forbearance. (4) Not until the Amirs 
were convinced that procrastination would not pay did they yield.
Pottinger on his part consented to their opposition to an European agent 
in Sind, and a treaty acceptable to both the parties for the regulation 
of the tariffs was drawn up. But when the Amirs were presented with the 
draft of the treaty for their signatures they stated that the draft had 
to be referred to the Amir of Khairpur for his consent. Pottinger felt 
disgusted at the “chicanery" of the Amirs and suggested that the government 
should blockade the ports of Sind and assemble forces in Cutch to bring 
the desired pressure upon the Amirs. (5) Even Bentinck’s patience 
appeared to be at an end and Pottinger was instructed to inform the Amirs
(1) Govt, to Pottinger, 21 Nov.l833> Beng.Sec.Cons. 21 Nov.1833* No. 4»
(2) Pottinger to Govt. 6 Dec. 1833> Beng.Sec. Cons. 3 Jan. 1834* No. 95
Pottinger to Govt. 3 Feb.1834* Beng. Sec. Cons. 10 April 1834* No.22.
(3) Pottinger to Govt., 5 Feb. 1834* Beng.Sec.Cons. 10 April 1834» No.23*
(4) Bentinck to Pottinger, 25 Feb. 1834* Bentinck Papers.
(5) Pottinger to Govt., 10 Aug; 1834> Beng.Sec.Cons. 5 Sept.1834* No. 1.
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that the British government would not be trifled with in securing the 
Amirs1 compliance with their plighted word* (l) At length the Amirs 
put their signatures to the draft of the treaty which provided for a toll 
of 570 rupees per boat from the sea to Rupar to be divided between Sind, 
the Panjab, Bhawalpur and the British governments. (2)
Similar treaties for the navigation of the Indus and the 
regulation of the tariffs were concluded with the ITawab of Bhawalpur and
(3)
with Ran jit Sing. (4) Their attitude was known to.be friendly and their 
consent was obtained without much difficulty. In March 1835 9 & few days 
before leaving the country, Bentinck wrote to the Secret Committee that 
his efforts in opening the Indus had been attended with complete success.(5)
(l^  Govt, to Pottinger, 5 Sept. 1834» Beng.Sec.Cons. 5 Sept. 1834* No. 2.
(2; Aitchison, Treaties, VII, Treaty of 2 July 1834* 557* The Treaty pro­
vided for the residence of a British native agent in Sind.
(3) Aitchison, Treaties, VIII, Treaty of 22 Feb.1833> 402-404;
Treaty of 5 March 1835> 405-406.
(4) Aitchison, Treaties, VIII, Treaty of 26 Dec.1832, I46-I48;
Treaty of 29 Nov. 1834> 149-150.
(5) Beng. and India Sec. Letters Reed. 5 March 1835*
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Bentinck!s proceedings in Sind, with commerce as their main 
purpose, were not devoid of political importance. They involved check­
mating the designs of Ranjit Sing on Sind. Ranjit saw in them a cause of 
disappointment and even of apprehension. They appeared to take Sind out 
of his hands and to bring the British influence much nearer his own 
country. He showed concern about the object of Burnes's mission in Sind 
in 1851. (l) At one time even a meeting with Bentinck at Rupar filled 
his mind with misgiving. He suspected some foul play and was hesitant 
to cross the Sutlej to meet Bentinck on the day fixed. The meeting seemed 
likely to be cancelled. Astrologers were consulted and they suggested a 
way out of the difficulty. It was recommended that Ranjit should present 
apples to Bentinck, which, if accepted readily, would betoken British 
sincerity. When the meeting took place on 26 October, 1831 Ranjit 
presented the apples, which were accepted without demur, and the incident 
passed off without trouble. (2)
Ranjit did not conceal his own designs on Sind. On it, 
Cunningham says, his "fondest hopes" lay, and his disappointment over 
his defeat was acute. When Bumes met him at Lahore in 1831 he was frank 
in stating his desire to conquer Shikarpur and asked if he could capture 
it with five regiments of infantry and some artillery. He asked also 
how the British government would view such an enterprise. When Bumes 
suggested that he had better consult the governor-general before he 
embarked on such a venture he was prompt to reply that his treaty with
(1) Wade to Govt., 3 May 1830, Beng.Sec.Cons. 10 June 1831* Ho. 2.
(2) H.T.Prinsep, Origin of the Sikh Power in the Punjab, 162-163* Prinsep 
was secretary to the governor-general and present at Rupar.
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the British government gave him a free hand on the right hank of the Sutlej.
t o
A little later, when he met Bentinck at Rupar, in conversations with the 
governor-general1s secretary, he wanted to know the policy of ihe British 
government in regard to Sind and whether the two governments could not 
combine to effect its easy conquest. (2) But Bentinck while at Rupar gave 
Ranjit no hint of his schemes for opening the Indus to navigation. It was 
feared that, led by his ambition to conquer Sind, Ranjit might in spite of 
his friendly disposition contrive to counteract the negotiations by 
"intrigue and secret working." (3)
And so it was not until two months after Pottinger had been 
sent on his mission to Sind that Wade was asked to inform Ranjit of the 
British intentions in sending Pottinger there. (4) Ranjit, however, was 
not idle in the interval and was making anxious enquiries from the 
Amirs1 envoys in the Panjab as to Pottinger*s errand in Sind. (5) When 
V/ade broached the topic to him in February 1832, he was not easily 
satisfied that only commerce was intended on the British side and asked 
Wade suspiciously the description of vessels which were to be used in 
navigation and whether they were to carry guns and troops with them. He 
shrewdly perceived that his being made a party to the project was meant 
to keep him from persuing his ambitions in that quarter and his
£l) Burnes to Pottinger, 1 Aug. 1831* Beng.Sec.Cons. 25 Nov.1831* No.28.
(2) Prinsep, memorandum, 30 Oct.1831* Beng.Sec.Cons. 6 Jan.1832. No. 8.
(3) Prinsep, Origin of the Sikh Power in the Punjab, 168.
(4) Beng. and India Sec. Letters Reed. 2 July 1832. para. 172.
(5) Pottinger to Govt., 6 April 1832, Beng. Sec. Cons. 4 June 1832,
No. 32.
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disappointment was evident, (l) Though he agreed to the opening of the 
Indus and the Sutlej for commerce, and thus to co-operate in Bentinckfs 
commercial schemes, he did not give up his designs on Sind. In the time 
of Lord Auckland his interest in Sind was again seen to he keen and he 
was then told frankly that British government would not view any attack 
on Sind with indifference. (2)
Bentinck himself would not follow a policy of coercion in Sind 
hut events in Central Asia led him to give the ex-ruler of Afghanistan, 
Shah Shuja, a free hand in Sind. Though Sind had long ceased to pay 
tribute to the Afghan empire of which it had once formed a part, its 
nominal dependence on Afghanistan continued. Afghanistan was in a weak 
and divided state (3) and exercised no control over Sind, hut it was 
clear that a strong and united Afghanistan would seek to make good the 
claims it had lost. Fear of the Afghans was reflected in the desire of 
the Amirs to form a defensive alliance with the British government.
Bentinck had at first considered the danger from Russia to he 
only remote, hut his complacency hegan to he disturbed by news from 
Persia as the years passed. The Treaty of Turkmanchai (February 1828)
(1) Wade to Govt., 13 Feb.1832. Beng.Sec.Cons.19 March 1832. No. 10.
(2) Govt, to Wade, 22 Aug. I836. Enclos.to Beng. and India Sec. Letters
Rec*d. Vol.
(Continued over....)
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increased Russian influence in the councils of Persia and under her 
inspiration Persia looked eastwards, (l) In 1831 Prince Abbas Mirza 
of Persia meditated an expedition into Khorasan, over which Persia held 
only a nominal hold, and in 1832 he had conquered it. Encouraged by 
success he thought of gaining distant lands. As he told Campbell, the 
acting envoy in Persia, he was desirous of "extending Persia to her 
ancient limits.” (2)
In April 1832 the Prince was reported to be preparing for the 
conquest of Herat. (3) He was even credited with the intention of 
making an attack upon India. “Not only in Khorassan itself, ” stated 
Kaye, who was at that time in India, ”in Afghanistan and Toorkistan, but 
in the bazaars of Bombay, was the advance of the confederate armies of 
the two states into Khorassan, and thence upon Herat and India, generally 
discussed and believed." (4)
Bentinck, while still far from thinking of political alliances 
that would involve the British government in the affairs of Central 
Asia, prepared to meet an emergency. "The progress of Abbas Mirza*s arms," 
he told the Secret Committee, "and the reputed designs of Russia 
appeared to me to call urgently for the adoption of some measures to
(Continued from previous page)
(3) Dost Muhammad held Kabul, his nephew Jalalabad; Kandahar and 
Peshawar were held by his brothers. Herat was possessed by Kamran of 
the Sadozai clan. **********
(l) Beng. and India Sec. Letters Reed. 2 July 1832. para. 192.
(2  ^ Campbell to Supreme Govt.> 6 Nov.1831, Beng.Sec.Cons.12 March 1832.N0.3* 
\y) Campbell to Supreme Govt., 9 April I832, Beng.Sec.Cons.10 Sept.1832.No.14
(4) Kaye, Afghan Y/ar, I, 150-151.
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enable me to procure accurate information of the real state of the
parties and of the progress of events in that quarter M (l) Wade, the
political agent at Ludhiana was accordingly instructed to depute a person 
to Kandahar to keep the government fully informed of events in Kandahar, 
Bokhara and Khorassan. (2) In 1853 Bentinck sanctioned the appointment 
of an agent at Kabul to obtain "quick and correct intelligence of all 
events in Central Asia as well as of the intrigues and proceedings 
of Russia in those quarters." It was also to help in establishing friendly 
relations with the ruler of Kabul, Dost Muhammad, who had shown a desire 
for "a more intimate relation" with the British government. Friendly 
relations with Kabul were also considered by Bentinck to produce a 
salutary effect upon the Amirs of Sind who had yielded so reluctantly 
to the navigation of the Indus and might covertly seek to upset British 
commerce. (5)
Meanwhile the person who saw his chance in these happenings 
was Shah Shuja. Driven from power soon after Elphinstone1s mission in 
Afghanistan he had passed through several sad experiences in the course 
of which he was for a time a prisoner in Ranjitfs hands. In 1816 he 
found refuge in British territory at Ludhiana and was also granted a 
pension to enable him to pass his days in political retirement.(4) But 
he was an ambitious person and from a safe distance never ceased to see
(1) Beng. and India Sec. Letters Reed. 2 July 1852. para. 191.
(2) Govt, to Wade, 16 May 1852, P.P. 1859* XL (115), 5-6.
(5) Bentinck, minute, 1 June 1855, Beng.Sec.Cons. 6 June 1855* No.7*
(4) Aitchison, Treaties. XI, 509*
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visions of regaining his lost throne. In 1818 he made his first effort 
to recover Afghanistan but returned disappointed to the place of his 
asylum. Failure, however, did not discourage him, and time served to 
sharpen his desire. In 1827 his proposal for another attempt was not 
encouraged by the British government. In 1829 another proposal to the 
same effect was alike cold-shouldered, (l) But the reported designs 
of Russia upon India gave him the opportunity of making his request 
carry weight with the British government. He played upon their fears, 
showed chances of easy success and held out promises. "As Abbas Meerza 
is come to Herat, if I can procure assistance from the British Government, 
I will proceed to that place, and the whole country from Khorassan to 
the Oosbecks, and to the boundary of the sea will fall into my hands, 
and become friendly to the British." (2)
His request for help was forwarded to the government with 
favourable comments by Wade and his assistant Major R.C. Faithful. (3)
They quoted the precedent of 1818 when it was pointed out Shah Shuja 
was helped with an advance of 6,000 rupees, being a month's stipend, and 
2,000 rupees as road expenses. They considered the chances of the Shah's 
success easy. "The Barukzyes at Candahar," Wade observed, "are the weakest 
and least enterprising members of their family in possession of power; and 
the Shah seems sanguine of success." (4)
Thus approached Bentinck was inclined to interpose no obstacle
(1) Govt, to Resident at Delhi, 12 June 1829, Beng.Pol.Cons.12 June 1829
No.28.
(2) Shah Shuja to Bentinck, 11 Oct.1832. P.P.1839, XL (113), 6.
(3) Wade to Govt., 11 Nov.1832. P.P. 1839, XL (113), 9.
Faithful to Govt., 4 Dec. 1832, P.P. 1839, XL (113), 10.
(4) Wade to Govt., 11 Nov*. 1832. P.P. 1839. XL (113), 9*
233
in the way of Shah Shuja and even to meet his wishes partly. In place 
of the six months1 advance of his stipend which he requested, four months1 
was sanctioned and the monthly pension to his family was allowed to
continue during his expedition* Wade was also asked to help the Shah in
recovering money which he had reported to be due to him from the bankers
of Ludhiana, (l) Thus helped, Shah Shuja set out on his venture in
January 1833*
Another person concerned in Shah Shuja*s enterprise was 
Ranjit Sing* On receiving reports of his intentions and efforts Ranjit 
became uneasy and made anxious enquiries about the attitude of the British 
government towards the Shahfs reported movements. (2) He was anxious
that the two governments should have a common policy: "--  if he advanced,
it should be with the consent of both; if he was prevented advancing, it 
should be with the consent of both." (3)
Bentinck found it difficult to explain his help to Shah Shuja.
It meant in effect supporting him morally and to a limited extent 
materially. Its open avowal however, he feared, might alarm the Amirs, 
Ranjit and the Afghans. It would be a deviation from the policy of 
non-intervention that he was pursuing* He had himself told the Shah in 
October 1832 that Mthe British government religiously abstains from
(1) Govt, to Wade, 19 Oct. 1832. P.P. 1839. XL (113), 9*
Govt, to Faithful, 13 Dec. 1832. P.P. 1839. XL (113), 10.
(2) Faithful to Wade, 6 Feb. 1833, P.P. 1839, KS. XL (113), 13.
(3) Fraser (agent to Gov. Gen. at Delhi) to Govt., 21 Feb. 1833,
P.P. 1839. XL (113), 15.
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intermeddling with the affairs of its neighbours•" (l) This was also 
the time (1832-33) when Bentinck was receiving presents from Dost 
Muhammad with every desire of friendship with the British government, (2) 
Hence Bentinck considered it necessary that he should appear disinterested, 
Ranjit was accordingly told that the British government viewed Shah Shuja*s 
expedition with 'indifference," (3) Thereupon Ranjit took advantage of 
the British attitude and of Shah Shuja1s need to strike an advantageous 
bargain with him in the form of a treaty whereby the Shah on behalf of 
"himself, his heirs and successors" formally relinquished all claim to 
Kashmir, Peshawar and some other places, (4)
Quitting his asylum in January 1833 Shah Shuja proceeded to 
Bhawalpur and thence to Shikarpur, increasing his forces and collecting 
money on the way.(5) In Shikarpur he established himself firmly and 
before long became unwelcome to the Amirs because of his pecuniary , 
demands on them. He threatened to pillage the city unless his demands 
were met. Rather than yield, the Amirs chose to fight, but in January 
1834 they were completely defeated in battle and compelled to sign a
(1) Bentinck to Shah Shuja, 20 Oct. 1832, P.P.1839* XL(ll3)> 8*
(2) Dost Muhammad to Y/ade, 2 Dec. 1832, Beng.Sec.Cons. 19 March 1833*No,40; 
Wade to Govt., 17 Jan. 1833» Beng.Sec,Cons. 19 March 1833* N0.4O; 
Bentinck to Dost Muhammad, 28 Feb.1833> Beng.Sec.Cons. 19 March 1833*
No.34.
(3) Govt, to Wade, 5 March 1833, P.P.1839. XL (113), 15.
(4) Treaty of 12 March 1833. Article I. P.P. 1839. XL (U3)» 31*
(5) Lt.Mackeson (agent for the navigation of the Indus) to Wade,
25 May 1833, P.P.1839* XL (113)* 17*
T/ade to Govt., 9 June 1833. P.P. I839. XL (113), 16-17.
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humiliating treaty, agreeing to provide him with men and money and even 
giving hostages for the fulfilment of his demands, (l)
For a time Shah Shuja1s success held out hopes of his victory 
in Afghanistan. Even Bentinck at one time thought vaguely of the 
possibility of Sind and Afghanistan being held under one power which in 
the person of Shah Shuja would be dependent on the British. But such a 
result he considered at the same time by linking India with Central 
Asia would create new problems which were best to be avoided. (2) It did 
not however remain long in suspense whether Shah Shuja was to hold 
Afghanistan or not. From Shikarpur he advanced towards Kandahar and won 
another victory over its ruler Kohan Dil Khan who sent an appeal to 
Dost Muhammad for help. (3) Dost Muhammad rose to the occasion and 
forgetting the jealousies that had divided the' Barakzai brothers marched 
on Kandahar. Shah Shuja was unable to prevent a junction between the 
Kabul and Kandahar forces, and in a battle fought on 2 July 1834 lost the
day. He fled precipitately from the field and passing through
Baluchistan returned to his old asylum at Ludhiana. (4)
In the meantime Ranjit Sing took advantage of the troubled 
situation of Afghanistan to wrest Peshawar from the Afghans finally. The 
Sikh commander Nihal Sing, after a successful campaign occupied it on
(1) Wade to Govt., 1 Feb. 1834. P«P* 1839. XL (113), 19?
Wade to Govt., 5 March 1834, P.P. 1859. XL (113), 20-21.
(2) Bentinck to Pottinger, 25 Feb. 1834> Bentinck Papers.
(3) Wade to Govt., 23 May 1834, P*P* 1839. XL (113), 22-23;
Wade to Govt., 17 June 1834, P.P.1839. XL (113), 25-27.
(4) Beng. and India Sec. Letters Reed. 5 March 1835* paras 51-53.
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6 May 1834* (l) Ranjit in announcing his success congratulated Wade on 
the victory which in his opinion, had brought lustre to the alliance 
existing between the two governments. (2) Bentinck in turn asked 
Wade to congratulate Ranjit in a personal capacity. (3)
Dost Muhammad though victorious felt deeply the loss of 
Peshawar*. He threatened a holy war against the Sikhs but could not 
recover the place. (4) He found little reasoiyfco be grateful to the 
British government without whose connivance Shah Shuja would not have 
been able to make the attempt. British neutrality was not taken 
seriously. "The expedition of the Shah," remarks Durand "was regarded 
throughout the country as countenanced and supported by the British 
Government, and those well disposed to Dost Mahomed were discouraged by 
a report apparently so well founded." (5)
Bentinck1s giving Shah Shuja a free hand in Sind and 
Afghanistan and yet disavowing any British support or cognizance explains 
the dilemma in which Bentinck found himself. On the one hand Bentinck had 
decided not to have any political alliance with either Sind, the Panjab 
or Afghanistan. On the other hand he did not mean to remain a silent 
spectator of events in an important quarter. How to adhere to a policy of
(1) Wade to Govt., 22 May 1834, P.P. I839. XL (113), 22.
(2) Ranjit to Wade, not dated, P.P. 1839* XL (113)> 30-31*
f3; Govt, to Wade, a7 June 1834» India Sec. Cons.* 27 June 1834* Ho. 3»
(4) Wade to Govt., 15 June 1834, P.P. I839. XL (113), 24;
Wade to Govt., 7 Sept. I834, P.P. I839. XL (113), 38;
Beng; and India Sec. Letters Reed. 5 March 1835* para. 63.
(5) H. Durand, First Afghan War. 20.
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non-alignment and yet to provide for a danger from the north-west was the 
problem. At such a time, when Bentinck had yet to settle his course,
Shah Shuja came on the scene with hopes and promises and an answer to 
what appeared to be a rapidly developing situation in Central Asia. 
Bentinck decided to try him. It is difficult to say how much Bentinck 
did in fact expect from him but the result of his decision was 
unfortunate. He was soon adopting an ambiguous course in which he was 
officially denying what in effect he was doing - namely countenancing 
Shah Shuja1s expedition.
To conclude, Bentinck opened Sind for British commerce. It was 
accomplished by peaceful methods rather than by a resort to force. It 
was also done without involving the British government in any sort of 
political engagement or undertaking. Bentinck had to face the fears and 
suspicions of the Amirs and was urged by Pottinger to employ coercive 
measures but he held on to a milder course of policy and in the end 
succeeded in his purpose.
Bentinck's measures were further important for the future. In 
several ways he prepared the background of subsequent events. His policy 
in checkmating Ranjit*s designs on Sind was followed by his successor 
Auckland. Further, the amity established between the British government, 
Shah Shuja and Ranjit culminated a few years later in the Tripartite 
Treaty of 26 June 1838. Dost Muhammad could not reconcile himself to 
the loss of Peshawar and it was in the midst of Shah Shuja1s expedition 
to Afghanistan that the Afghans finally lost this place to the Sikhs.
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All these events foreshadowed the future. Apart from 
opening Sind for oommercial purposes, in which he was keenly interested, 
Bentinck was rather led into them instead of having planned or willed 
them. The extension of British influence in the north-west region of 
India was clearly enjoined on him by the Despatch of the Secret Committee 
of 12 January 1830, and while seeking to implement those instructions his 
great object was to steer clear of any political involvement either in 
Sind, the Panjab or Afghanistan, and in this he succeeded# But he was 
not correctly understood and when a few years later Auckland*s policy was 
criticised, Bentinck*s name was also included in the censure. And it may 
appear somewhat odd to find Bentinck being roundly attacked for having 
permitted Shah Shuja*s expedition to Afghanistan by Ellenborough who had 
himself inspired the trans-Indus movements
"The origin of the changed feeling of the sovereigns of 
Afghanistan," Ellenborough observed in 1839 "is to be found in the conduct 
of Lord W. Bentinck who in 1833 not only did not prevent Shah Shuja from 
leaving Loodiana on an expedition to Candahar but enabled him to do so, 
by advancing to him four months pension and engaging to pay the pension as 
usual during his absence to his family. It was in vain that Lord W. 
Bentinck declared that he took no part in that expedition. He saw Shah 
Shuja preparing it on British territory; he enabled him to move by 
pecuniary advances; and he received him when he returned defeated. The 
sovereigns of Afghanistan naturally connected the British Government with 
that expedition. All Central Asia did the same -— " (l)
(l) Ellenborough, memorandum on Afghan affairs, 23 April 1839 > A.Law,
India Under Lord Ellenborough, 4 - 5 .
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These were strong words of censure and indeed true. But 
it may nonetheless be said that while Bentinck!s measures prepared 
the ground for Auckland fs policy it would be wrong to assume that 
Bentinck would have followed the same course as pursued by Auckland.
He was averse to any involvement in Central Asian politics and is indeed 
reported to have expressed surprise when Auckland had taken upon 
himself to place Shah Shuja on the throne of Kabul, (l)
(l) Kaye, Afghan War, I, 305• footnote.
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION
Bentinck did not see the solution of the problem 
of the Indian states either in annexation or in any relation-- 
ship in which tney did not exercise real powers of government 
At the oeginning of his administration he saw them in a de­
cadent condition. Ruling out annexation as the remedy, he 
proposed by bestowing full authority on the rulers to make 
them conscious of their powers of doing good to their people. 
The solution was a radical one and characteristic of his ar­
dent nature. Once convinced of the correctness of his stand 
he was ready to relinquish not only civil out also military 
control over the states.(1) If the Indian princes under 
British protection could manage their ovm affairs well in 
peace and friendly co-operation with the British government 
he considered it preferable to British intervention which 
produced bitterness and misunderstanding.
Bentinck conceived the internal freedom of the 
states to do a permanent solution of the problem presented 
by them and advantageous in many respects. It enabled the 
states to exist as honourable members of an Indian political
(1) Bentinck did not contemplate the withdrawal 
of the subsidiary forces but he did mean, as seen in Nagpur, 
to give the princes control of their ovm state forces.
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order comprising both them and the British government. It 
left the British government free to pursue reforms in British 
India which could not in the last resort fail to react 
favourably on the states under an intimate contact with the 
British government. The internal freedom of the states also 
satisfied Bentinck1 s feeling that their position had an 
international oearing and needed to some extent to be re­
solved by reference to international law. The Indian states 
by surrendering control over their foreign policies did not 
remain sovereign states like some of those or Europe but 
they oy that fact or by agreeing to admit British control 
in internal affairs did not obliterate their international 
existence in the sense conceived by Vattel, to whom he at 
times adverts while dealing with the states* problems.(1)
(!>■ e.g. India Pol. Letters Heed. 4 June 183^,
Ho. 6. Vol. I. para. 29, p. 65.
"Since men are naturally equal, and their rights and 
obligations are the same, as equaixy proceeding from nature, 
nations composed of men, considered as so many free persons 
living together in the state of nature, are naturally equal, 
and receive from nature the same obligations and rights.
Power or weakness does not in this respect produce any differ.1: 0 
rence. A dwarf is as muck a man as a giant; a small republic 
is as much a sovereign state as the rnost powerful kingdom". 
Vattel, The Law of Nations, "Idea and General Principles", p.5U
"We ought therefore to reckon in the number of sovereigns, 
those states that have bound themselves to another more 
powerful, by an unequal alliance, in wnich, as Aristotle says, 
to the more powerful is given more honour, and to the weaker, 
more assistance"...
See foot of next page.
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Such a connection oi the British government with 
the Indian states which recognised their internal freedom was 
not considered by Bentinck to be a source of weakness. It 
was, on the other hand, a means of strengthening the empire, 
of ushering in an era of co-operation which would make pos- 
siole "the consolidation of their resources and ours for 
common defense".
He thought that a policy of non-intervention would 
also satisfy the princes v/no nad lost tneir independence and 
whose submission was associated wita memories of the oy-gone 
days when they or tneir predecessors had exercised an unre­
stricted sway over their affairs - foreign and internal. It 
was axso to ailay sucn fears as tney might entertain about
(i) (Cont.) "Consequently a weak state tnat, m
oraer to provide for its safety, places itseif under tne pro­
tection of a more powerful one, and frorn gratitude, enters 
into engagements to perform several offices equivalent to 
tnat protection, without in the least stripping itseir of the 
right of government and sovereignty; that state, I* say, does 
not cease, on this account, to be placed among tne sovereigns 
who acicnowjLeage no other law, tnan tnai; of nations."
"There is no more difficulty with respect to tri­
butary states; for tnough tribute paid to a foreign power,
in some degree diminishes tne dignity of tnese states, from 
its being a confession of tneir weakness; yet it suffers 
their sovereignty to subsist entire ..."
ibid. "Of nations or sovereign
states", p.2.
their ultimate position in the British Indian political 
system. . Bentinck saw that there was need to establish such 
confidence in the minds of the princes. In his minute of 
25 August 1828, recording the decision of his government to 
regulate its conduct by a strict adherence to the ”very 
letter” of the treaties, he observed to make these
alliances useful to the British government and comfortable to 
the chiefs themselves there must reign in the minds of all 
not oniy no distrust of our ultimate designs out a thorough 
and intimate conviction that while their feelings of pride 
and independence will never be offended oy our pov/er, their 
tranquillity, v/ealth and prosperity can oniyi Dy assured by 
our protection”. (1)
Another mode of establishing confidence and of 
exercising a kind of moral influence over the princes was Dy 
maintaining closer and intimate contact with them. He 
thought that if the Supreme. .Government had its seat at some 
point in the western provinces ^either Agra or Ailahaoad), 
it could do so much Detter tnan wnen it was placed at the one
(1) BentincK, minute, 2b Aug. i62B, Beng. P01.
Cons. i3 Sept. i828, No. jl.
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extremity or the country, and he contemplated a transfer 
or the seat of government to tne western provinces. His 
proposal for a change v/as not accepted Dy the home government 
but he urged it on a number of occasions. He considered it 
an important step in establishing such "an improved order of 
things that should eventually make better rulers, happier 
subjects and more useful allies".(1) Before leaving tne 
country ne ventured again "most anxiously to urge the question 
of the seat of government, as tnat cardinal point of an, on 
wnicn tne earliest reduction of air -cne discordant, incong­
ruous and diversified particles of which our Great Empire is 
composed, into one harmonious wnoie essentially depends". (2)
The policy or non-intervention aiso accorded v/eii 
witn tne measures he was taking in British India or admitting 
Indians in larger numbers in the revenue and judicial branches 
of tne administration. British intervention as seen in 
states like Hyderabad had a tendency to increase the numoer of 
Europeans, thus narrowing further the scope for the employment 
of Indians. (3) In Mysore, where he actually, intervened, or
(1) Bentinck, minute, 1U Sept. 1831- P.P. 1833*
XXV (418), 56.
(2) Bentinck, minute, 20 June 1854, Bentinck Papers.
(3) Metcalfe, minute, 15 May i829, Beng.Poi. Cons.
30 Sept. 1831. No. 2.
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in Oudh, vmere he contemplated intervention, he was specially 
carerui that tne number of Europeans did not exceed wnat he 
considered to oe absolutely essential ror the purpose or 
superintendence, (l) And tnis consideration was a motive not 
only in viewing intervention in the states with hesitation 
but aiso in withdrawing British control from states like 
Nagpur and Hyderabad. Thus, when telling Asteli that he had 
sanctioned a modification of the treaty with Nagpur.to allow 
the Raja more internal freedom, he wrote:
t!In time of danger it might be necessary for our safety 
to make all civil and military administration European out 
now to appropriate ourselves individually every lucrative 
situation, cannot be good policy." (2)
Lastly, in his resolve to follow a policy of non­
intervention Bentinck was strengthened by the policy of the
home government until his time. As late as 1826 the Secret
Committee categorically repudiated any right of the British 
government in the internal affairs of the states "except in 
so far as that right has been established by Treaty."'--------
(1) Supreme Govt, to Mysore Commission, not dated, 
Beng. Pol. Cons. 5 June 183U- Ho. n ;  Bentinck, minute,
30 July 1831, Beng. Pol. Cons. 30 Sept. 1831. No. 2.
(2) Bentinck to Asteli, l Nov. 1829, Bentinck
Papers.
4
246
In the time of Ellenborough and Grant as Presidents of the 
Board of Control there was a change in the policy of the home 
government in favour of extended intervention. But such 
right was not definitely afrirmed. Neither Ellenborough 
nor Grant was consistent in upholding intervention in respect 
of ail the states on the ground of misgovernment.
Ellenborough, who severely censured Bentinck’s action in witn- 
drawing British control from Nagpur, found tne difficulty of 
laying down any definite line of conduct towards all tne 
states. The terms of the treaties appeared to limit such 
right of extended intervention as he would have otherwise ;,-j 
liked to assert for the British government. He admitted the 
difficulty. "Tne treaties with the Hajpoot States", he wrote 
in his diary, "generally secure their internal independence. 
Those with the States of Maiwa give us the right, and Impose 
upon us tne duty of supervision. It requires, therefore, 
a most delicate hand to bring the whole into one system 
animated by one spirit." At Agra, wnere the establishment 
of a separate government was contemplated by the home 
authorities, he favoured the appointment of Metcalfe as 
lieutenant-governor with "precise instructions" to follow 
"a system of non-interference" in place of that of Malcoira.
He feared that Malcolm if appointed to that position might
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"be disposed to interfere* (l) Thus even if Bentinck had 
desired to adopt a policy of intervention he would not have 
found the attitude of the home government of positive help 
to him*
But non-intervention was not merely an attitude 
favoured hy the circumstances of his time. It expressed 
Bentinck*s hope and faith to an uncommon degree. Influenced 
hy the utilitarian ideas of the day he strove sincerely to 
influence the Indian princes to "become good rulers and promote 
the happiness of their subjects. In this way he wanted to 
identify the interests of the Indian princes with those of 
their people. The strength of his belief that Indian princes 
could he made to play the part of benevolent sovereigns made 
him capable of initiating bold measures without the consent 
of the home authorities and even of incurring their displeasure. 
He contemplated resigning when his policy in Nagpur was dis­
approved. In order to succeed he carried non-intervention to 
great lengths. He made full allowance for the shortcomings 
of the Indian princes and was not alarmed to see disorders in 
their states. He did not make much of the reports sent by the 
residents at several courts depicting great abuses in the 
administration. He would even behave for a time as if the
(l) Ellenborough, Political Diary. II, 13 April 1829, 12-13;
Ellenborough to Bentinck, 2 Jan. 1830, Bentinck Papers.
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problem of misgovernment in a particular state did not exist 
and adhere to non-intervention in the hope that matters would 
eventually improve if the prince was allowed to learn from his 
mistakes*
It was not that he considered that the British 
government as the paramount power could not interfere. He 
avowed such authority on occasion. But hy non-intervention 
he meant to identify the interests of the prince with those of 
his subjects in a peaceful way* If successful non-intervention 
would establish happy relations with the princes. The British 
connection with them would rest on goodwill not force. By 
promoting mutual understanding and co-operation non-intervention 
would strengthen the Indian states and the British empire in 
common* It would further give British paramountcy in India a 
truly benevolent character. Paramountcy, emerging from the 
unquestioned superior strength of the British government in 
India, was not an aggressive power to deprive the princes of 
internal freedom, though it could be so employed. It had a 
positive role in enabling the princes to manage their affairs 
unencumbered by British intervention. It aimed at reforming 
the states and not destroying them. For that reason, too, it 
was also power held in reserve and exercised vigorously in the 
last resort when advice, persuasion, remonstrance and warning
A
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failed to produce any effect* But even then its exercise was 
to he temporary and meant for the benefit of the people of the 
state affected by British intervention* Bentinck’s purpose 
was firm and so his approach tended to become theoretical* He 
pinned his faith in non-intervention even when he felt the 
chances of reform at the hands of the princes to be unpromising. 
He did not interfere even when he admitted conditions in a 
particular state to be unsatisfactory and even though he was 
enjoined to do so by the home government.
It may be argued that as Bentinck encountered dif­
ficulties in following the principle of non-intervention and 
even saw its failure in several cases he should have turned 
actively to a policy of intervention and annexation. But this 
does not seem to have been so* He interfered in Mysore and 
annexed Oachar, Jaintia and Ooorg, but did not give up non­
intervention. In fact he did not seek quick results from his 
policy. Indian problems, administrative or otherwise, required 
firmness of purpose and application, and a beginning once made 
was not lightly to be abandoned. India was ”a large House”, 
he observed in a minute in June 183^ - taking stock of his whole 
period of administration, ”and will need much time, patience 
and wisdom to put it in order”* Having spent more than five 
years in India, he stated in this minute, he was in a position
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to speak on Indian problems with confidence. After Metcalfe 
and perhaps Macnaghten he considered himself the most ex­
perienced person in India and took his stand against the 
coercion of the Indian princes.
,f...we have to render our numerous tributaries contented. 
We have to engage them to introduce voluntarily and 
by the effect of our example, and not by our dictation 
such improved management into their own internal 
system, as will introduce peaceful habits, and render 
the numerous hordes of mounted men with which all these 
states abound, into useful and organised auxiliaries...11
His tours in the western province, he observed, were useful.
They allowed him to have personal intercourse with the princes.
"This opportunity enabled me, as I verily believe, 
to remove much of the distrust entertained of the 
intentions of the British Power, and of establishing 
in their minds more comfortable and satisfactory notions 
of their forced relation with the Paramount Power.(1)
In this connection Bentinck*s dissatisfaction with 
the administration in British India should also be taken into 
account. (2) Prom the outset he saw much that was unsatis­
factory, much that required reform and overhaul. (3) He made
(1) Bentinck, minute, 20 June 183U, Bentinck Papers.
(2) T.G.P. Spear, "Lord William Bentinck”. Journal of Indian 
History. Vol.XIX, 19U0, April, 105-107.
(3) Bentinck, minute, 30 May 1829# P.P. 1831-32, VIII, General 
Appendix, 275.
In a letter to Grant from the western provinces he 
writes: "I cannot with a safe conscience omit to state to 
you the result of my constant observation and enquiries into 
the effect of our system of civil government. I am, as an 
honest man, bound to state my deliberate opinion that it is 
miserably inefficient. You have seen already officially our 
proceedings to be satisfied that in every branch of revenue, 
judicial and police, it has sadly failed."
Bentinck to Grant, 21 Dec. 1832, Bentinck Papers.
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reforms "but was never satisfied.
“You claim for the British system*1, he observes with 
disappointment in a private letter in 183U, "merits 
which it do63 not possess. You have described it, 
not as it is, but as it ought to be... With all due 
submission therefore, I think we had better reform 
our system before we attempt to describe it...,f(l)
In his evidence before the Select Committee in 1837 he bitterly 
attacked British rule in India as having brought to India little 
more than "general peace and tranquillity." In the hands of 
European functionaries he considered British administration 
“in all its civil branches, revenue, judicial and police" to 
have failed.(2) With such critical views of British adminis­
tration Bentinck*s attitude of non-intervention becomes more 
easy to understand.
Bentinck*s policy depended much for its success upon 
the character and ability of the Indian princes. Where, as 
in Nagpur, the ruler showed himself alive to the duties of his 
office, it produced satisfactory results. Where this sine qua 
non was wanting, as in Oudh and Hyderabad, it was a sad failure. 
With few exceptions the princes of that generation were lacking 
in those qualities whieh could enable them to show an
(l) Bentinck to [?] 1 June 183*4-* Bentinck Papers.
(2; Bentinck, evidence on 11+ July 1837 before the Select 
Committee, P.P. 1837, VI (0.91), 189.
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enlightened conception of their duties as rulers. The policy
of non-intervention may accordingly "be said to have been on the
whole unsuccessful. While cherishing an exalted notion of
their authority they appeared inattentive to the welfare and
happiness of their subjects.
"•••it is a sad reflection," says Bentinck in his minute 
of 30 July 1831 "that few of these native princes, more 
especially among the Musulmans have that high moral 
feeling which should teach them to consider the welfare 
and happiness of the people as their paramount duty; 
they have no education, they are surrounded from their 
infancy hy flatterers and self-interested counsellors 
who are always exalting their consequence and dignity 
and endeavouring to maintain the favour of the prince 
hy administering to all his had passions."(l)
Bentinck*s difficulties arising from the shortcomings 
of the princes were increased hy the attitude of the home 
government. As early as 1830 his policy towards the states, 
which he conscientiously believed to he "wise and liberal", 
had met with the strong disapproval of the home government. In 
fact, along with some other measures of his administration his 
policy towards the states had brought upon him the marked dis­
pleasure of his superiors. In 1829 and 1830 his recall was 
being considered in England.(2) In 1832, when Grant was the 
President of the Board of Control, Bentinck felt that he was not
(1) Bentinck, minute, 30 July 1831 > Beng. Pol. Cons. 30 Sept. 
1831* No.2.
(2) The Greville Memoirs, edited hy Lytton Strachey and Roger 
Fulford, 31 Aug. 1829, I, 315;
Ellenborough, Political Diary. II, 29 Jan. 1830, 179*
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wanted in India and had even sent his resignation to "be 
accepted if his office was desired by others.(l) If, therefore, 
knowing that his labours in India were not being appreciated 
in England, Bentinck upheli non-intervention it shows high 
courage, endurance and sincerity of purpose.
The question of intervention or non-intervention in 
the internal affairs of the states remained unresolved even 
after Bentinck. The problem of improving conditions in the 
Indian states vexed his successors as it had him. It was not 
till after the mutiny that the position could improve. The 
territorial integrity of the states was at that time guaranteed 
but the right of intervention to remedy serious abuses or even 
to assume the government for a temporary period was clearly 
upheld. (2) It was also after the mutiny, when the development 
of the means of communication had rendered possible better 
contact and supervision, that things could improve. As has 
been said, Bentinck had, in the absence of better means of 
communication, urged the transfer of the seat of government to 
some more central place.
Bentinck1s contribution to the solution of the problem 
of the Indian states then lay in the fact that at an early
(1) Bentinck to Earl of Gosford, 2 Aug. 1832, Bentinck Papers. 
(2; H.H. Dodwell, Cambridge History of India. VI, U92-U94.
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period after the establishment of British supremacy in India 
he worked in earnest to place British relations with the Indian 
states on a footing of mutual understanding and benefit, and 
that he considered a temporary assumption of the administration 
as the remedy for mis-government • But perhaps he deserves a
far greater meed of praise for what he sought than for what he 
could accomplish in this sphere. His great aim to see reform 
by the princes themselves could not materialize, his intention 
of finding them playing the part of benevolent sovereigns was 
disappointed, but he left ideals behind to point and adorn* 
Between the wars that preceded his administration and those that 
followed it, Bentinck1s period formed an interlude in which a 
great experiment was tried. Though on the whole it miscarried 
this does not mean that the experiment itself was wrong or that 
it would have produced no better results if the princes had 
shown an enlightened conception of their duties and Bentinck 
had had the ungrudging support of the home government.
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